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ABSTRACT
This digital thesis seeks to evaluate the impact of the digitization of analog record
archives in environmental justice activities for the Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune
Community. The details of the Camp Lejeune contaminated drinking water issue are firmly
rooted in the analog era of record keeping and were all but forgotten by the affected community
when the base was listed as a National Priority site in 1989. However, government public health
activities at the Agency of Toxic Substances and Disease Registry in the late 1990s and early
2000s resulted in the digitization of records from the military and the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency onto CD-ROM discs and made available to the community and public. The
conversion of the data from an analog paper format, restricted to onsite archives, into a digital
medium provided the community an opportunity to independently assess the historical facts free
from government interpretation and challenge the official Marine Corps narrative. My role as the
community’s informal public historian allowed for the organization and utilization of these
historical documents to create a community-based narrative using digital timelines. This work
led to several congressional investigations into the drinking water contamination which were
ultimately instrumental in the passage of legislative relief for the service personnel and their
families who were exposed to the contaminated drinking water aboard the base.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis project explores the use of digital tools and public history methods by a
geographically dispersed community of environmental justice advocates seeking government
acknowledgement of health effects from the contaminated drinking water supply at Camp
Lejeune Marine Corps base from 1953 through 1987. During this time, an estimated 1 million
service men, women, their families and base employees were exposed to fuel products and
volatile organic compounds in the base potable water supply. The Environmental Protection
Agency’s (EPA) official National Priority List (NPL) designation for Camp Lejeune is Camp
Lejeune Military Reservation NPL site #NC170022580, which was listed on October 4, 1989.
The base was among the first of 141 Department of Defense sites to be listed on the NPL,
otherwise known as a Superfund site.1 The affected community did not begin to organize until
ten years after the Superfund designation. The project highlights efforts by community
organizers to gather, curate, preserve, and display relevant government records through
hyperlinked timelines, between 1997 and 2021, in order to understand their exposures and to
effect policy change at the federal level. The project explores what historians Daniel J. Cohen
and Roy Rosenzweig call “the promises and perils” of digital history as a sustainable medium for
community organizing and environmental justice advocacy in the realm of public history.2
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OLEM US EPA, “National Priorities List (NPL) Sites - by Listing Date,” Data and Tools, US EPA, August 14, 2015,
https://www.epa.gov/superfund/national-priorities-list-npl-sites-listing-date.
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Daniel J. Cohen et al., “Interchange: The Promise of Digital History,” The Journal of American History 95, no. 2
(2008): 452–91, https://doi.org/10.2307/25095630.
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According to Tom D. Crouch, “Public historians are in the business of making the
messages and lessons of the past useful and accessible to a broad general audience.”3 The
National Council on Public History’s website describes the public historian as routinely engaging
and collaborating with their community as wells as their peers.4 Public History and
Environmental history have been long intertwined. Melosi argues in his 1993 article “Public
History and the Environment” that there is a natural need for the two areas to coalesce the skills
of traditional academic historian with that of the public historian while maintaining a balance
between advocacy and academic integrity.5 Robert Kelley held that historians trained in
historical methods were valuable tools to provide historical perspective to help shape public
policy.6
This author is a stakeholder in the Camp Lejeune drinking water contamination. He
became involved in the issue following his diagnosis of male breast cancer at the age of 39 and
subsequent discovery of his own toxic exposures which occurred while residing aboard the base.
His family was stationed aboard the base during the contamination period and he was born in the
Tarawa Terrace family housing area in January 1968. There are instances in this paper where the
first person is used to reflect his role as an activist and a Public Historian. However, the subject
and purpose of this paper is an analysis of the digital historical tools and methods used by him

3

Tom D. Crouch, “Some Thoughts on Public History and Social Responsibility,” Illinois Historical Journal 82, no. 3
(1989): 195–200.
4
“About the Field | National Council on Public History,” accessed March 25, 2021, https://ncph.org/what-is-publichistory/about-the-field/.
5
Martin V. Melosi, “Public History and the Environment,” The Public Historian 15, no. 4 (1993): 11–20,
https://doi.org/10.2307/3378632.
6
Robert Kelley, “Public History: Its Origins, Nature, and Prospects,” The Public Historian 1, no. 1 (1978): 16–28,
https://doi.org/10.2307/3377666.
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and the community to understand and uncover the historical events for the Camp Lejeune
drinking water contamination and utilize them to effect public policy for the community. The
initial digital timeline project (see Appendix A) was accomplished through the efforts of retired
Marine Master Sergeant Jerry Ensminger and the author. The origination of a community curated
time line germinated over a six-month course of nightly two to three-hour phone conversations
between Ensminger and the author during the author’s chemotherapy treatments for cancer.
Ensminger was a living repository of base knowledge and Marine procedures aboard the base.
The idea of creating a timeline of events did not originate with members of the
community. The Marine Corps has several versions of their own timeline of events but they are
neither hyperlinked nor referenced with supporting materials. The genesis of a community
researched timeline occurred during a phone conversation between this author and Ensminger,
after I inquired as to why there was no timeline for the community. Ensminger advised that it
was a good idea and tasked me with the project of creating the community timeline of historical
events for the drinking water contamination at Camp Lejeune. The highlighted difference
between the community’s timeline of and the official Marine Corps timeline(s) was the use of
embedded hyperlinks to official government documents which served to both engage the reader
and authenticate the narrative contained within the entries.
Cohen and Rosenzweig observed in thier 2006 Digital History: A Guide to Gathering,
Preserving and Presenting the past on the Web, that digitization of records and the internet
worked together to expand accessibility of knowledge and allowed a greater voice to the amateur
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historian.7 Cohen and Rosenzweig’s observations are certainly reflected in the Camp Lejeune
community website and timeline projects. This author functioned as Cohen and Rosenzweig’s
amateur historian for the Camp Lejeune community. This author has an undergraduate degree in
History and worked as a history teacher, followed by two decades as a claims investigator for an
insurance company. The structure of the original timeline was derived from the author’s tenure
as a history teacher at the International Baccalaureate High School in Bartow, Florida. The
timeline entries were modeled after a dreaded homework assignment where students were
assigned historical terms and tasked to identify who or what it was, when it occurred and, most
importantly, why was the person, place or event important to the historical topic under study at
the time of the assignment. Above all, as Ensminger constantly stated, the timeline was to avoid
speculation and to be factual. The timeline was and remains a living document subject to
revisions as new information and document sources are released or uncovered. Each entry is
hyperlinked to the historical primary source document for the reader to review and verify the
written narrative. The documents are in turn stored on the community’s website, The Few, The
Proud, The Forgotten (www.TFTPTF.com) in order to preserve the integrity of the timeline’s
hyperlinks. Ensminger and this author utilized then newly digitized document sources from the
Marine Corps, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the State of North Carolina to
network our investigation and worked in collaboration together via the internet. It was the
internet and the digitization of informational sources which transformed the disorganized and
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incomplete community efforts into a direct challenge to the established Navy and Marine Corps
narrative of how the drinking water contamination events transpired. Our efforts resulted in the
passage of the Janey Ensminger Act (H.R. 1627 section 102) on August 6, 2012, a law providing
healthcare for sailors, family members and civilians who were exposed.
Chapter one outlines the early history of the contamination event and how documentation
of the environmental pollution aboard the base was controlled by the Department of the Navy in
order to limit public knowledge and understanding concerning the drinking water contamination
aboard the base. Direct community knowledge of the drinking water contamination was stymied
by lack of access to the information possessed by the Navy. The first chapter concludes with the
base listed as a Superfund site under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) law. As a result of these requirements and
regulations under CERCLA, a public library of documents was established at the Onslow county
Library in Jacksonville North Carolina. More importantly, CERCLA also signaled the
commencement of scientific public health inquires at Camp Lejeune, by the Agency of Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), a department of the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC). These two events resulted in a renewed opportunity for members of the community to
discover details about the drinking water contamination and re-engage the Department of the
Navy over their official narrative of the Historic Camp Lejeune Drinking Water Contamination.
Chapter two focuses upon the net activism and the efforts of the community to uncover
and curate newly digitized records and information about the Camp Lejeune drinking water
contamination to effect change. Curation was necessary because of the sheer volume of records
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made available through digitization of government files onto a CD ROMs. Sifting through the
uncollated electronic files was a daunting task unto itself and much like throwing 50,000
baseball cards onto a table while trying to make sense of what was there and missing. The second
chapter examines the impact of the digital age upon the practice of public history. The timeline
was assembled from digitized government records, curated by the community and used to
ultimately challenge the Navy’s official narrative in the media and on Capitol Hill to effect
change in public policy through legislation.
Lastly, chapter three will evaluate the effectiveness and perils encountered during the
timeline project and its associated digital products. It is my hope that the lessons, processes and
techniques used in our fight for justice are translated to the academic community for further
study and refinement. One drawback of the digital age is the temporal nature of the medium or as
Cohen and Rosenzweig wrote, a “lack of durability”8 This point was illustrated in 2018 when the
community’s website, The Few, The Proud, The Forgotten (www.TFTPTF.COM), was hacked
and disabled for eight months until we were able to recover most of the lost data. I elected to
pursue a Master’s degree in History because of my work on Camp Lejeune and my desire to
academically preserve the work we accomplished in our fight for justice. In 2014, at the Annual
Meeting of the National Council on Public History, Dr. Cody Ferguson cited Nancy Zak and the
creation of the Ironbound Justice History and Resource Center as a way to preserve their efforts
for future academic research.9 A final goal of this paper and project is to memorialize this work

8

Cohen and Rosenzweig. p. 10.
“Are Public and Environmental History Connected? Naturally. | National Council on Public History,” accessed
March 25, 2021, https://ncph.org/history-at-work/are-public-and-environmental-history-connected/.
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in an academic database such as the University of Central Florida’s STARS (Showcase of Text,
Archives, Research and Scholarship) Digital Repository and preserve the Camp Lejeune
Community Digital Archive in a sustainable manner for future scholars to utilize.
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CHAPTER ONE: ESTABLISHING THE OFFICIAL NARRATIVE
The historical origins of the Camp Lejeune drinking water contamination are firmly
rooted in the analog age of historical record keeping in the form of log books, written notes,
reports, and government documents detailing contamination problems aboard the base. The first
documented warnings detailing the extensive contamination present within the base’s drinking
water supply commenced in October 1980. During this time, there was no internet, no smart
phone, and the personal computer was in its infancy. Camp Lejeune was placed on the EPA’s
National Priority List (NPL) on October 4, 1989.10 Much of what is known about the early events
of Camp Lejeune’s drinking water contamination was preserved as part of the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) archives for the base.11 Every Superfund designated
site is required by law (CERCLA) to establish and maintain an administrative record for
historical documents pertaining to the site. One of the requirements found in CERCLA was a
stipulation for public access to the site’s contamination records, otherwise known as the
administrative record. Camp Lejeune’s administrative record is housed at the Onslow county
library. Public awareness of the contamination issue largely laid dormant after 1989. The
Department of the Navy’s marginalization of the affected community was facilitated by barriers
in access to accurate information about the contamination events which transpired aboard the
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ML Maslia et al., Analyses of Groundwater Flow, Contaminant Fate and Transport, and Distribution of Drinking
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base. These barriers were a result of the compartmentalization of knowledge and information
concerning the drinking water contamination aboard the base, the inability of the community to
access known and hidden data archives, and the lack of a viable medium to tie together the
mountains of compiled information into a useful and communicable storyline for dissemination
to the community, media and members of Congress.
Prior to 1989, the Department of the Navy was the final custodian for historical records
generated for the base, including the various naval entities providing logistical support for the
base. One of these facilities is the Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command
(NAVFACENGCOM or LANTDIV) located in Norfolk, Virginia. The records generated by the
Navy and Marine Corps were often handwritten notes, teletype copies, carbon copies,
photographs, original typed letters and memorandums and other various written hard copies of
documents. Navy and Marine documents were mostly internal and not readily disseminated to
the public or outside government agencies, regardless of whether they were state or federal. The
initial discovery of a problem in the water at Camp Lejeune resulted from concerns over
impending drinking water regulations and the transition of the base’s drinking water quality
management from federal to state control.12 Concurrently with the transition, the Navy instituted
a program called Navy Assessment and Control of Industrial Pollutants (NACIP) to identify the
possible presence of any Love Canals13at Naval installations across the country.14 The Navy’s
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Maslia et al., Analyses of Groundwater Flow, Contaminant Fate and Transport, and Distribution of Drinking
Water at Tarawa Terrace and Vicinity, U.S. Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina: Historical
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CLW, 0001-8761 (Not Consecutively Available) Provided on CD-ROM Format. CLW 173.
13
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Water at Tarawa Terrace and Vicinity, U.S. Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina: Historical
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NACIP program was not subject to EPA or state purview and was administered internally by the
Navy. Documents generated by this program represented a dark archive until the base was
designated as a Superfund site in 1989. Even then, many of the Navy’s internal documents were
not provided to the EPA for inclusion into the base’s Superfund administrative record and
remained hidden until later scientific work by the ATSDR revealed their existence to the public.
Historical documentation of the base’s drinking water problems began in October 1980.
Officials from the Navy’s LANTDIV arrived at Camp Lejeune and collected drinking water
samples for analysis to characterize Camp Lejeune’s water supply. Jennings Laboratory was
specifically tasked to conduct a scan of priority pollutants in a composite sample of all eight of
the base’s water distribution systems.15 Jennings found trace amounts of some chemicals
including trichloroethylene (TCE) but no documented action was taken by base officials nor the
Navy.16 A second set of water samples were taken later that same month by the U.S. Army
Environmental Health Agency laboratory at Ft. McPherson, Georgia. The Army Lab’s samples
were collected and screened for a specific family of compounds called trihalomethanes (TTHMs)
found in treated drinking water. The purpose of this set of tests was to prepare the base for
upcoming regulations which limited the cancer-causing TTHM compounds in drinking water.17

Reconstruction and Present Day Conditions - Chapter A: Summary of Findings, Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) Documents from the EPA Adminstrative Record for Camp
Lejeune 1-3,744 (Not Consecutively Available), Provided on CD-ROM Format. (Atlanta: Agency for Toxic Substances
and Disease Registry, 2007). CERCLA 2042.
15
Maslia et al., Analyses of Groundwater Flow, Contaminant Fate and Transport, and Distribution of Drinking
Water at Tarawa Terrace and Vicinity, U.S. Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina: Historical
Reconstruction and Present Day Conditions - Chapter A: Summary of Findings, Camp Lejeune Water Documents,
CLW, 0001-8761 (Not Consecutively Available) Provided on CD-ROM Format. CLW 613.
16
Maslia et al. CLW 430.
17
Maslia et al. CLW 6452.

10

TTHMs are a by-product of the chlorination process during the treatment of water for drinking
usage. Trichlorethylene (TCE), like the trihalomethanes, is a chlorinated organic and as such
interfered with the Army Lab’s testing for TTHMS to the point the lab was unable to accurately
read the levels of TTHMs in the water.18 William Neal, the Army laboratory chief, hand wrote
upon the lab’s official test reports the first documented warning that something was wrong with
Camp Lejeune’s water supply, “Water is highly contaminated with low molecular weight
halogenated hydrocarbon.”19
The paper trail initiated by the U.S. Army lab was more than just an anomaly of one set
of tests. The drinking water tests were repeated every three months over the following year, and
many of the reports contained more handwritten warnings including the warning that solvents
were in the base’s drinking water supply.20 By the end of 1981, the Army lab experienced
equipment problems and developed a backlog of work.21 Camp Lejeune’s drinking water quality
TTHM testing was then transferred to a new laboratory in early 1982. Grainger Laboratories
represented the third independent entity to scientifically test and examine Camp Lejeune’s
drinking water.22 The technicians at Grainger Laboratories were not informed of the prior two
laboratories’ test results but their initial samples did find the same contamination previously
disclosed to the Navy and Marine officials on the base.23 The Navy and the offices at LANTDIV
were the original respective repositories for both the water quality testing and contamination

18

Maslia et al. CLW 448.
Maslia et al. CLW 436.
20
Maslia et al. CLW 441.
21
Maslia et al. CLW 468.
22
Maslia et al. CLW 542.
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Mike Hargett, “Committee on Science, Space and Technology,” Government, Committee on Science, Space and
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knowledge originating from the base. The Navy’s failure to disseminate the existence of past test
results to scientists conducting reviews aboard the base, the EPA, state of North Carolina and
base residents during the course of the drinking water contamination event resulted in the
fragmentation of knowledge, which inhibited the respective shareholders from ascertaining the
true scope of the issue with the drinking water aboard Camp Lejeune Marine Corps Base.
Grainger Laboratories was the third laboratory to perform drinking water testing aboard
the base. Their contract to analyze the two main water treatment plants began in April 1982.
Representatives from Grainger Laboratories collected their first water samples for TTHM testing
on April 19, 1982.24 Michael Hargett, co-owner of Grainger Laboratories, was then informed by
his chemist, Bruce Babson, that TCE was the chemical in the base’s water that interfered with
the TTHM testing after he had run the samples on a gas chromatograph mass spectrometer.25 On
May 6, 1982, Hargett approached Elizabeth Betz, Camp Lejeune’s supervisory chemist, and
informed her of their findings. Betz in turn passed this information to her superior, Danny
Sharpe, who in turn was responsible to inform the Marine Corps officers overseeing the facilities
management of the base.26 A few days later, Betz was summoned to a meeting with Marine
Corps officers to discuss Camp Lejeune’s water supply. Betz documented the meeting in a
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memorandum for the record; “it appeared to me that they had not been informed about the
findings (PCE and TCE in the finished water). I did not inform them.”27
Elizabeth Betz was a civilian base employee who was hired to fill the supervisory
chemist position just before the first drinking water samples were collected at the base. Betz
played an important role in documenting the behind-the-scenes activities on the base. Her written
records were preserved when her personal files were located in the early 2000 as part of a record
search conducted by the Marine Corps on the base.28 It is important to note that while the raw
data within the documents was captured and turned over to the ATSDR, the agency was not
concerned with historical facts other than data directly describing the chemicals contaminating
the water. Betz’s memorandums for the record began in March 1981 and suddenly cease after
January 1983. Betz’s personal memorandums for the record contain key insights to what
transpired aboard the base during the early stages of the discovery of the drinking water
contamination and what was recorded in the Navy’s official records for the base. Her personal
records cease in 1983 after one of her memos expressing concern about the water was forwarded
by the base’s command staff to the then newly appointed base environmental engineer, Robert
Alexander.29 Between May 1982 and August 1982, Betz and Hargett worked together to
ascertain the nature of the contamination problem in Camp Lejeune’s drinking water. In July
1982, Hargett and Betz sampled the water systems for Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace. These
two systems provided drinking water for most of the base’s barracks and family housing areas.

27
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Hargett and Betz took samples from the water entering the treatment plant from the well fields
and water leaving the treatment plant for distribution. They found the water was contaminated
before it reached the treatments plants meaning that the well fields were the source of the base’s
drinking water contamination.30 Their findings prompted Hargett to author a letter directly to the
officer in charge of the base’s facilities, Col. John T. Marshall. Hargett’s August 1982 letter
formally informed the colonel that the interferences in the TTHM testing “appeared to be at high
levels and hence more important from a health standpoint than the total trihalomethane content.
For these reasons, we called the situation to the attention of Camp Lejeune personnel.”31
However, the contaminated drinking water wells aboard Camp Lejuene remained in service until
the first closure of the contaminated wells under the Navy’s NACIP program confirmed the
pollution in the drinking water in November 1984. To date, the Navy has been unable to provide
an adequate explanation for why the contaminated wells remained active from July 1982 through
November 1984.
The Navy and Marine internal documents were not readily available to the public or
media until they were included in the release of the ATSDR’s Chapter A: Summary of Findings
report for the Tarawa Terrace Water Distribution system in July of 2007. The document library
known as Camp Lejeune Water (CLW) was included along with the EPA’s CERCLA
administrative record as part of a three set CD disc set attached the back cover of the report. One

30
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Maslia et al. CLW 592.
Maslia et al. CLW 592.
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of the critical components of the ATSDR CD disc set was that the documents were scanned with
optical character recognition (OCR) and thus electronically searchable.32
The compartmentalization of knowledge surrounding the drinking water problems at
Camp Lejeune was facilitated by the Navy’s control of the documents concerning the base and
the military’s command hierarchy. There were two focal points of knowledge which controlled
the initial developments of the drinking water contamination event at Camp Lejeune. The first
focal point, as previously discussed, was centered at the Navy’s facility command in Norfolk,
Virginia Naval Facilities Engineering Command under engineering chief J.R. Bailey. Camp
Lejeune’s focal point for knowledge was found in the base’s Assistant Chief of Staff/Facilities
(ACS/F), specifically Cols John T. Marshall, K. P. Millice Jr. and M. G. Lilley, and after 1983,
the base environmental engineer, Robert Alexander. The ACS/F position at Camp Lejeune was
rotational and staffed by a colonel whose tour typically lasted two years. Col. Marshall served as
the base’s knowledge focal point for the initial warnings at Camp Lejeune.33 LANTDIV
provided engineering support and advice to Camp Lejeune officials. The two entities worked
together under the auspices of the Navy’s NACIP program beginning which commenced in
1981. In April 1981, Bailey sent an environmental engineer named Jerry Wallmeyer to work
with Elizabeth Betz in their efforts to collect water samples at the base’s only registered toxic
material disposal site known at the chemical dump and located near the base rifle range. The

32
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chemical dump was a concern because of its close proximity to a water treatment plant servicing
the base rifle range.34
From March 1981 through July 1981, Wallmeyer and Betz worked at the chemical dump
collecting samples and provided LANTDIV with the testing results. Their work culminated in a
letter from LANTDIV’s chief engineer to the base’s ASC/F, advising the colonel to discontinue
the use of a contaminated well supplying the rifle range water treatment plant.35 The problem
with this chain of events is that the Rifle Range served under a thousand people while the Hadnot
Point water system served over 10,000 people and had received similar warnings from the U.S.
Army Lab concurrently with the testing activities at the Rifle Range. The only difference
between the Hadnot Point and Rifle Range water systems, besides their service size, was that the
Rifle Range water system was located adjacent to a known and registered chemical dump where
the Hadnot Point Water Distribution System was not. J. R. Bailey also informed the base
command the NACIP program was scheduled to conduct their Initial Assessment Study (IAS) in
fiscal year 1982 and that the Rifle Range’s TTHM monitoring program was to be included in the
IAS for the base. Bailey also recommended that state and local officials be informed there was
no migration of pollutants from the chemical dump, despite the abandonment of one of the wells
due to organic chemical contamination including TCE.36 During this juncture of the drinking
water contamination event, the only naval entity (LANTDIV) with a clear picture of the drinking
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water contamination events aboard the base did not share their analytical findings which
indicated a problem with the base’s water supply with base officials until a later date.
The purpose of the Navy’s NACIP IAS was to collect and evaluate all evidence of
existing pollutant sites at Camp Lejeune which may have contaminated a site or posed an
imminent health risk to people located on or off the base.37 The IAS for Camp Lejeune
commenced in October 1981 and the final report was issued in April 1983.38 The timing of the
IAS investigation directly coincides with the initial warning from both the U.S. Army and
Grainger Laboratories to LANTDIV and for the latter, the base. Yet, the IAS report contains no
mention of these warnings nor the presence of TCE and PCE in the drinking water supply
systems in three of the eight water treatment plants providing drinking water to the base.39
Ironically, the draft IAS report was delivered to ACS/F, Col. Marshall just five days prior to
Hargett’s August 1982 letter to Col. Marshall advising him that TCE and PCE were
contaminating the well fields for Tarawa Terrace and Hadnot Point water treatment plants. Col.
Marshall was tasked to provide comments to the draft IAS no later than August 25, 1982. Instead
of disclosing the problems found in the drinking water at Camp Lejeune or Hargett’s letter, the
colonel wrote, “It is important to note the accuracy of data provided by U.S. Army laboratory is
questionable. It is recommended that TTHM information be de-emphasized throughout the
report.”40 The TTHM readings were inaccurate because of the interference of TCE and PCE
upon the tests conducted by the U.S. Army lab; they could only guess at the true levels of
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TTHMs because of the interference. The colonel made no mention of Hargett’s letter nor the
TTHM interferences caused by TCE and PCE at the Tarawa Terrace and Hadnot Point water
treatment systems. Col. Marshall’s actions compartmentalized knowledge of the base’s drinking
water problems to remain known only to a select few on the base’s command staff and the
Navy’s LANTDIV.
The base’s environmental engineer first appears in the document stream in January 1983.
Robert Alexander’s involvement began when the base ACS/F forwarded a memorandum from
Betz to his attention. Betz’s memorandum warned that the interfering chemicals were again
present within the samples taken by Grainger Laboratories. Betz’s memorandum also
corresponded with the impending release of the completed IAS report for Camp Lejeune in April
1983. Betz’s personal written record keeping ceases from this point forward with no other
memorandums for the record found after this date.41 The IAS report concluded, “that while none
of the sites pose an immediate threat to human health or the environment, 22 warrant further
investigation under the NACIP program to assess potential long-term impact.”42 The report is
devoid of any information of the chlorinated organic solvents found in the base’s drinking water
supply.
The Navy was set to enter the next phase of the NACIP program called the Confirmation
Study. The purpose of the Confirmation Study was to determine the location of extent of
contamination sites on the base and to ascertain whether or not there was a danger to the health
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upon service personnel and civilians on or outside the installation.43 However, there remained
two loose ends, the first in the form of Hargett, who discretely alerted the state of North
Carolina’s Division of Environment and Natural Resources Management (NCDENR) about the
drinking water issues.44 The second loose end was the location of the base’s daycare services in
building 712, the former base pesticide mixing and storage building. The issue of the base
daycare services was quickly resolved by relocating the children out of the building and the
publication of test results in the media which showed no detectable concentrations of dioxins or
other chemicals of concern.45 The events at the daycare were reported in the local media but
quickly disappeared after the Marine Corps closed the building and released the findings of their
testing.46 The state of North Carolina proved to be more problematic. In June 1983, Larry Elmore
wrote Col. Marshall and specifically requested the hard copies of the analytical reports written
by Grainger labs be sent to NCDENR.47 The analytical lab sheets contained asterisks which
noted the interference of TCE and PCE on the TTHM testing conducted by Grainger. The
colonel had previously side-stepped the problem of providing the actual data sheets by compiling
them on a data table.48 Elmore’s letter went unanswered for six months and a change in
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command. The new ACS/F, Col. Lilley, advised NCDENR that he had called the Water Supply
branch and was told that sheets were not necessary and thusly not supplied to Elmore. The
colonel also requested the TTHM testing be reduced from quarterly to once a year for the Hadnot
Point system.49 The issue was dropped and no further action was taken by the state or Marine
Corps/Navy personnel. Once again, Navy and base personnel continued to keep the information
about Camp Lejeune’s drinking water problems contained within their internal confines.
The second phase of the Navy’s NACIP program, the Confirmation Study, began in July
1984. Even then, Navy and base personnel sought to limit knowledge of what was transpiring
aboard the base. The base periodical, The Globe, advised its readers on base that “While
contractor personnel will routinely wear personal protective equipment such as chemical
resistant coveralls, we do not expect to expose anyone to any contaminants.”50 The Navy’s
contractor for the Confirmation Study began collecting water samples for analysis and provided
the Navy with its first progress report.51 The contractor’s next set of samples included a well on
the Hadnot Point water system known as well HP-602. They sampled this well while it was
operated as part of the Hadnot Point water distribution system.52 After the July sampling by the
Navy contractor, the document trail from the contractor vanished for a five-month period until
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the end of November 1984, when the base suddenly closed several water supply wells on the
Hadnot Point water distribution system.53
The discovery of fuel and solvents within an active potable water well for the Hadnot
Point water distribution system during the Confirmation Study represented a turning point for the
contamination events at the base. The media promptly reported the story even though initial
statements about the contaminants were downplayed as “trace” by the base environmental
engineer, Robert Alexander.54 It was Alexander who appeared in the media as the spokesman
for the environmental problems aboard the base. The involvement of the media also signaled a
new phase in the battle for knowledge and information regarding the drinking water
contamination. Media involvement brought with it public awareness but more importantly the
involvement of the U.S. EPA and the state of North Carolina regulators which served to broaden
knowledge and documentation of the contamination.
Informational containment of the drinking water problems at Camp Lejuene failed with a
simple phone call from an officer’s wife on the main side of the base. The call registered a
complaint of a fuel smell emanating from the faucets at her home. Ironically, the fuel smell had
nothing to do with the groundwater contamination at the base. The source of the smell in the
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water was from a fuel line feeding a generator located near the Holcomb Boulevard treatment
plant’s potable water reservoir. The generator’s line leaked fuel into the potable water storage
tank and contaminated the system. Base officials closed the water treatment plant, drained the
reservoir for cleaning and requested officials from North Carolina to take split samples of water
from both the Holcomb Boulevard and Hadnot Point water treatment plants.55 The events of
January 27 through February 4, 1985, more than likely represented an opportunity for base
officials to demonstrate to the State of North Carolina, that the problems at the base were under
control. Eleven days prior to the Holcomb Boulevard fuel line leak, base officials quietly
completed their sampling of the remaining potable water wells for the base.56 The two events
then converged to expand the scope and severity of the drinking water contamination aboard the
base. First, the Tarawa Terrace potable water system test samples tested positive for both PCE
and TCE. Then, extreme amounts of TCE were found in the Hadnot Point system test results as
well. The organic chemical contamination in the test samples resulted in more well closures,
including the worst contaminated well aboard the base, Hadnot Point well 651. This highly
contaminated well was located adjacent to the base junkyard and Volatile Organic Compound
(VOC) dumping area.57
On February 27, a three-hour meeting took place between state and base officials in
which base officials provided Rick Shiver from the State of North Carolina’s Division of
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Environment and Natural Resources Management (NCDENR) copies of their Hadnot Point data
identifying the contaminated wells aboard the base and their testing data.58 The sharing of the
contaminated well data with the state was significant because it represented an end to the
compartmentalization of knowledge concerning the contamination to Marine and Navy officials.
The sharing of the contamination data also initiated the state’s direct involvement into the
contamination problems unfolding at the base as well as the creation of a new document
repository for the base. The closure of 10 potable water wells presented new problems for base
officials in the form of water shortages for the Tarawa Terrace family housing area.59
Furthermore, in late 1984, the state changed its groundwater regulations, which required water
used within the state for dinking purposes be free of man-made substances.60 On April 30,
Major-General L.H. Buehl issued a notice to the base residents at Tarawa Terrace advising them
“minute (trace) amounts of several organic chemicals” had been detected in some of the wells
supplying the Tarawa Terrace system and, as a result of the well closures, they had to conserve
water.61 This memo and the subsequent media articles represented the initial broadening of the
contamination story and to a degree, loss of control of information by Navy and Marine Corps
representatives.
The Navy’s informational control concerning the drinking water contamination at Camp
Lejeune ceased when the state of North Carolina delivered its notice of violation of the state’s
drinking water code. The violation notice tasked the Navy and Marine Corps to identify the
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source and scope of the contamination on the base, develop a remediation plan, and set a
schedule to complete the cleanup for the ground water at the base.62 The notice placed the state
in a supervisory role over the Navy and Marine Corps. However, the statements made in the
press by Charles Rundgren, the head of North Carolina’s Water Supply Branch, appeared to
illustrate a degree of cooperation existed between the state and Navy officials. Mr. Rundgren was
quoted in a September 1985 media story which emphasized the “wells had been plugged shortly
after they became contaminated. The amount of chemicals found were not a threat to people who
had been drinking the water that short period.” His quote appeared alongside Robert Alexander’s
statement that people had not been directly exposed to pollutants aboard the base.63 Nevertheless,
the state pressed forward and officially requested the data from the Navy’s NACIP report on the
base. The state followed the request up with a letter requesting the Navy’s analytical data for the
contaminated wells. The verbal request and subsequent letter to the Navy represented a cat and
mouse game between Navy/Marine Corps representatives and state officials to not share Navy
data on the contamination. The state had previously requested the completed Navy NACIP report
for Camp Lejeune, but had been told that portions of the report were in error and refused to
release the report to the state.64 The tension between the state and Navy/Marine Corps officials
was also complicated by a perceived lack of state authority over the base.65
The cat and mouse information game between the state and base officials climaxed
between late 1985 and early 1986 when the U.S. EPA sent representatives to a meeting at the
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base to review the results of the NACIP study. During the course of the meeting, the EPA
indicated that data from the NACIP study established a substantial risk for people on the base
and, as such, triggered consideration of the base onto the National Priority List (NPL), otherwise
known as a Superfund site.66 Robert Alexander countered that the EPA held no jurisdiction over
the base and that their NACIP Confirmation Study report was in error. The initial meeting with
EPA representatives took place in November 1985. The meeting also included Rick Shiver of
North Carolina’s Division of Environment and Natural Resources Management, whose
handwritten notes of the meeting indicated that recent changes in CERCLA law gave authority of
the drinking water contamination issues to the EPA due to the substantial risk to the population
aboard the base.67 A month after this meeting, Rick Shiver released his official report on the
ground water contamination aboard Camp Lejeune. The report focused on the organic
contamination (TCE and PCE) found in the Tarawa Terrace water distributions system. A copy
of this report was sent to the EPA. Between December and April 1986, the EPA corresponded
back and forth with base officials, including the base environmental engineer, Robert Alexander.
During this time Alexander continued to refuse to supply the EPA with the 1985 Confirmation
Study data and resisted the EPA’s efforts to place Camp Lejeune on the NPL as a Superfund
site.68 The continued disagreement between Alexander and the EPA was then elevated to J.R.
Bailey at LantDiv in April 1986. It was at this time that Bailey first provided to the EPA
documentation concerning the findings of the NACIP’s Confirmation Study. However, Bailey
did not reveal to the EPA earlier testing results which illustrated an earlier discovery date of the
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drinking water contamination. Specifically, Bailey failed to provide any of the testing results
from the Jennings lab, the U.S. Army lab, nor Grainger Laboratories to the EPA for their review.
These missing test results showed extensive organic chemical contamination in the potable water
for Camp Lejeune beginning in October 1980.69 The Navy’s fight to keep contamination details
and information under their jurisdiction finally ended in October 1989, when Camp Lejeune was
designated as a Superfund site by the U.S. EPA due changes in CERCLA and the Safe Drinking
Water Act which placed the contamination problems aboard Camp Lejeune under the EPA’s
jurisdiction.70
During the four-year long struggle between the U.S. EPA and Department of Navy
officials over whether or not to list the base as a Superfund site, base officials continued to
appear in local media. Base and regional newspapers featured stories about the contamination but
always stopped short of making a direct connection between the existence of pollutants aboard
the base and past exposures aboard the base. Elizabeth Betz was quoted in a 1989 news article
shortly before the base was listed as a Superfund stating that, “Once you have identified where
the potential for a threat is, you start taking action to correct it.”71 Control over the official
narrative rested primarily with base officials and officials and LantDiv in Virginia. This narrative
is what was presented to the public, media and other government regulators such as the U.S.
EPA and the state of North Carolina. Facts concerning the contamination and past exposures
were downplayed to these stakeholders. The suppression of knowledge in the community was
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further marginalized as personnel who were directly exposed to the contamination left the
Marine Corps to return home or transferred to other duty stations. There was no public outcry of
concern from the community. The community was told that the base had everything under
control and their narrative was accepted. However, while the Navy achieved informational
containment of the true extent of the drinking water’s contamination, the involvement of the U.S.
EPA and, to a lesser degree, the State of North Carolina, meant that information, knowledge and,
most importantly, documents were no longer exclusively under purview of the Department of the
Navy and its officials.
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CHAPTER TWO: CREATING A COMMUNITY DIGITAL ARCHIVE

The designation of Camp Lejeune as a Superfund, or National Priority List, site was an
important transition in the Camp Lejeune story. Under CERCLA regulations, the Navy became
the primary responsible party (PRP) with the responsibility to clean up the base under the EPA’s
purview. One requirement under CERCLA regulations was for the Agency of Toxic Substances
and Disease Registry (ATSDR) to conduct a public health assessment for each NPL site,
including Camp Lejeune. While the 1997 Public Health Assessment for Camp Lejeune did not
cite adverse health outcomes for adults aboard the base, the report did recommend a cancer study
be conducted for the children born aboard the base during the contamination period.72 The
recommendation and subsequent childhood cancer study effectively reopened and reengaged the
Camp Lejeune contaminated drinking water issue with the community. This reengagement
period is when this author was both diagnosed with cancer and made aware of his exposures to
the contaminated drinking water before and after his birth aboard the base.
Early community efforts centered around a small cadre of Camp Lejeune families who
used a website called Watersurvivors.com and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to
obtain information about the Camp Lejeune community. Two former Marines, retired Master
Sergeant Jerry Ensminger and retired Major Tom Townsend, led most of the early fight through
FOIA requests written by Townsend. The two slowly gathered Navy and Marine documents
which they took to the media and Congress. A 2004 news article from the Washington Post titled
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“Tainted Water in the Land of Semper Fi” proved to be pivotal in elevating early community
efforts for a larger voice. The article featured Jerry Ensminger whose daughter, Janey, died of
leukemia at the age of nine years old.73 The article captured the attention of long-term U.S.
Congressman John Dingell, who served as chairman for the House Energy and Commerce
Committee from 1981 to 1995 and again from 2007 to 2009. Congressman Dingell arranged for
Ensminger to testify in a congressional hearing concerning the Department of Defense’s request
for exemptions from environmental laws. Ensminger’s testimony was successful and the
committee blocked the exemptions requested by the Department of Defense. In return,
Congressman Dingell promised a hearing into Camp Lejeune which occurred three years later.74
The June 2007 Congressional hearing titled “Poisoned Patriots Hearing: Contaminated
Drinking Water at Camp Lejeune” focused increased scrutiny upon the Department of the Navy
and the Marine Corps over the handling of the drinking water contamination notification and
record keeping. Numerous documents were included in the official transcripts which in turn drew
media attention.75 The hearing was covered on CNN and other networks. The hearing detailed
the contaminated drinking water at Camp Lejeune and that scientists at the ATSDR were
conducting studies on the children born at the base between 1968 through 1987. Two months
prior to the hearing, this author had been diagnosed with male breast cancer at the age of 39,
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followed by a radical right mastectomy on May 4. I immediately reached out to Ensminger and
offered to help once I completed my chemotherapy regimen.
From 1997 until 2007, Ensminger and Townsend had acquired a mass of documents from
Townsend’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. The FOIA documents were further
augmented by a trove of documents published by the Marine Corps on their website for Camp
Lejeune. Townsend and Ensminger spent days downloading these documents before they were
removed from the internet by the Marine Corps. Townsend’s FOIA documents were kept in
paper files at Townsend’s home and later scanned into digital files by attorneys working with
Townsend and Ensminger. Practically, all of the knowledge acquired by the community up until
then, resided with these two individuals. However, they lacked a written narrative. Townsend
sent this author a digital copy of his document library for him to study and learn. Concurrently,
the ATSDR released a water model study for the Tarawa Terrace Water Distribution system in
July 2007. Contained in the study’s appendices were a set of CD-ROMS with electronic Adobe
Acrobat PDF document copies from the Marine Corps’ Camp Lejeune Water files (CLW) and
the EPA’s CERCLA library for Camp Lejeune.76 Combined, the CD-ROM set represented over
8,000 documents and tens of thousands of pages. More importantly, the CD-ROM data set was
created with searchable files by key terms. However, Townsend’s collection was scanned
without optical character recognition (OCR) and documents were unable to be individually or
collectively searched. This limited the usefulness of Townsend’s archive because it was difficult
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to utilize and organize but because of the FOIA requests, contained documents not found in the
ATSDR CD-ROMs.
Unlike most Superfund sites, most of the exposed Camp Lejeune community did not
reside upon the base or even in North Carolina. Townsend lived in Moscow, Idaho, and seldom
traveled, Ensminger resided near White Lake, North Carolina, about 90 miles from Camp
Lejeune, and this author resided in Central Florida after his family relocated there following his
father’s service in the Marine Corps. Normally, the lengthy geographical separation between the
location of the Superfund site and members of the community represented an insurmountable
challenge to any coherent historical investigation and explained past failures of the community to
organize and challenge the Marine Corps’ narrative of the drinking water contamination.
However, the intervening development of the worldwide web and the availability of digital
records allowed the community to effectively coordinate their efforts to challenge the official
Marine Corps narrative for Camp Lejeune.
I completed my chemotherapy in late 2007 and was appointed as a community member to
ATSDR’s Community Assistance Panel (CAP) for Camp Lejeune. The panel was formed in
2006 and served to provide community input for ATSDR’s studies for Camp Lejeune.77 During
the course of my chemotherapy, Ensminger regularly called me to bring me up to speed on the
history of the water contamination. His personal knowledge of the base, Marine Corps operations
and the historical documents was indispensable for this work. In effect, Ensminger was and is a
walking human encyclopedia of the base, Marine Corps procedures, and chain of command. He

77

“ATSDR - Camp Lejeune, North Carolina - Water Modeling Reports and Studies.”

31

and I reviewed earlier versions of Marine Corps timelines, their current timeline of events, and
their website. Ensminger also had a small website for the drinking water contamination, The
Few, the Proud, the Forgotten (www.TFTPTF.com), which was created by Ensminger and other
members of the community. The website was limited in scope and served mainly as a host for a
discussion forum which served to notify the community of news events. I pointed out the lack of
a community written narrative and the absence of a challenge to the Marine Corps’ established
narrative. I asked why we did not have a timeline of our own and Ensminger replied that was a
good idea and that I needed to comprise it and post it on the internet with references to the
documents.
My undergraduate training in History served, along with my classroom teaching
experience, to provide the frameworks necessary to both identify pertinent material and construct
a historical framework of events using the documents. What I was lacking was an understanding
of the sub-world of military culture and protocol. To this end, Ensminger was an indispensable
resource to educate me on the nuances of military lexicon contained within the documents. The
initial effort to organize the data took about three to four months to accomplish. I constructed a
total of four electronic document libraries using flash drives to store them and work in between
computers. The original government document libraries located on the CD-ROM were titled
CLW and CERCLA and were provided as an appendix attachment within ATSDR’s 2007 report
on the Tarawa Terrace’s drinking water system. The discs included reference material needed to
support the ATSDR’s water modeling work and were largely unredacted government archival
material. These libraries were directly copied from the CD-ROMs to a flash drive and served as a
hard reference for the original documents. However, they were not in a usable format for
32

research nor the organization of a narrative. Two different libraries were then created to resolve
this problem of utility. These document libraries were titled Chronological CLW and
Chronological CERCLA respectively.
The timeline itself is a living document and is updated as new information is discovered.
The home for the timeline is the website, The Few, the Proud, the Forgotten
(www.TFTPTF.com). Since my entry into graduate school, I have written a sub-timeline for the
Hadnot Point Fuel Farm (2013) and a digital timeline using TimelineJS78 to incorporate multimedia displays into the project (2015). Beginning in 2015, with the assistance of the Yale Law
School, we initiated a FOIA lawsuit against the Veterans Administration over documents
concerning the implementation of a Subject Matter Expert Program (SME) to evaluate adverse
health outcomes for military personnel stationed aboard Camp Lejeune during the contamination
period.79 The suit succeeded in obtaining over 50,000 pages of VA documents and represents
future research opportunities for Public Historians.
The biggest challenge I faced with the timeline projects was organization. The initial
work incorporated over 8,000 documents from two government document libraries (CLW and
CERCLA) which were neither sorted nor organized. Curation was needed to make sense of the
data before I could even begin work on the timeline. Documents within the ATSDR CD-ROM
library sources included duplicated and partially duplicated material or contained fragments
which had to be pieced together to arrive at a complete original document. I determined the best
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way to organize the data was to open each digital file, review the content, and then rename the
file to include the date of origin in the title so I could sort the library by date electronically. In
some instances, documents appeared in different chronological sequences as attachments to
reports. In these cases, the document file had to be duplicated and labeled for both the date of the
original report and a different file for the date of the attachment where the original reference
appeared at a later date. An excellent example of this point is found in the timeline entry for June
21, 1983.

Figure 1: screenshot of timeline's June 21 1983 entry.

This entry is based upon a Marine Corps document labeled CLW 940 which is a letter to
the base Assistant Chief of Staff, Facilities, Col. J. T. Marshall. The letter was a request to
submit the original Grainger Laboratory reports in the Colonel’s possession to the State of North
Carolina. Col. Marshall had previously compiled the original Grainger Laboratory reports, which
contained warnings of contamination, into a table and submitted them to the State of North
Carolina. This report is found in document CLW 934, which is dated June 1, 1983. Shortly
afterwards, there was a change in command, and Col. Marshall was replaced by Col. Lilley as
Assistant Chief of Staff, Facilities. Col. Lilley then responded to the State of North Carolina on
December 12, 1983 in a water monitoring report branded CLW 6348. The colonel simply
resubmitted the tables compiled by his predecessor and advised that, per a telephone
34

conversation he had with the state, the original reports were not included. The significance of
these three documents once connected together in the timeline meant that the base command
staff had an understanding that there was a problem with the drinking water aboard the base and
made direct attempts to conceal this knowledge from state regulators. This was later confirmed
when I personally interviewed the owner of Grainger Laboratories, Michael Hargett, who told
me and later testified in Congress that the state requested the Grainger forms after he had
informed them of the data and warnings included in Grainger’s reports to the base in 1982.80
During the course of our historical investigation, we discovered the existence of a dark
archive in the form of a Navy electronic Underground Storage Tank (UST) Library. The Navy
password protected the electronic portal but it was revealed after a scientist at the ATSDR was
mistakenly given the passwords and access to the site. We were made aware of its existence at a
CAP meeting and in late 2010 we obtained a CD-ROM disc set of these documents with the
assistance of U.S. Sens Richard Burr and Kaye Hagan. However, information in the library was
heavily redacted with Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemptions which was a notable
departure from the CLW and CERCLA documents. The portal contained extensive details and
reports on the loss of an estimated 1.5 million gallons of fuel from the base’s Hadnot Point Fuel
Farm. Much of this information was not available to the authors of the ATSDR’s 1997 Public
Health Assessment for Camp Lejeune.
Before we were able to display and utilize the timeline, I had to update and restructure
the community’s website. The original The Few, The Proud, The Forgotten website was founded
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by Ensminger and administered by Andrea Byron, who was exposed as a child at Camp Lejeune.
Byron and I collaborated together to rework the website to incorporate a document section where
we could upload documents to support the timeline as well as a link to the timeline itself.
Visibility of the website on the internet was an early challenge. The website failed to appear
consistently on Google and Yahoo web searches, which made the site practically unknown to the
community. I overcame this challenge by inserting key terms such as contaminated drinking
water, trichloroethylene, TCE, poisoned patriots and so forth into the metadata for the website to
improve our searchability on the internet. The website itself is a crucial component of the
timeline and our efforts to engage the media, Congress, and the community. In essence, the
website served and continues to serve as a rallying point for the community. We had a discussion
board (now relocated to Facebook as the Camp Lejeune Toxic Water Survivors) to foster
interaction, a listing of past and present media stories, Veterans Administration links and our
community timeline. The initial version of the community’s timeline, various versions of the
Marine Corps timelines, and supporting documents were first published on The Few, The Proud,
The Forgotten in July 2008. The updated website served as both a home for the community’s
timeline and a vehicle for dissemination of Camp Lejeune information to the public, media and
Congress. Please see Figures 2 and 3 for a comparison between revisions made to The Few, The
Proud, The Forgotten.
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Figure 2: 2006 version of www.TFTPTF.com

Figure 3: www.TFTPTF.com after revisions.
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A second community timeline was added to the website in 2015 which incorporated digital
multimedia into the layout. This timeline was the result of my graduate school work and served
to update the original work to a different format which was more engaging to the reader.
The structure and appearance of the timeline is based upon my teaching experiences
while I was a History teacher in the International Baccalaureate (IB) program at Bartow High
School in Bartow Florida from 1997-2001. The IB program afforded me, as a History teacher,
with several creative liberties not found in public schools at the time. The first was the creative
freedom to set my curriculum so long as my students were sufficiently prepared for the
program’s exams in their senior year. The second was the use of the internet within the class
room. It was during my time in the IB program that I first ran across the use of hypertext links
and historical data. I do not recall specifically where I saw the use of hypertext links on the
internet but when it came time to format the timeline, I recalled how hypertext links served to
provide the reader with the means to instantly refer back to the primary source material to verify
credibility of the material presented. This point was reinforced when I entered graduate school
and realized that historians like Edward L. Ayers had also seen and advocated for the use of
digital technology in historical work. Ayers argued that hypertext links “could weave text and
source more tightly”81which is precisely what the hypertext links embedded within the timeline
were created to accomplish. Each timeline entry was modeled after a homework exercise I used
in the classroom where students were given a set of key terms, events and/or people and then

81

“The Pasts and Futures of Digital History: Edward L. Ayers,” accessed April 12, 2021,
http://www.vcdh.virginia.edu/PastsFutures.html.

38

tasked to identify who or what it was, place the item in time, and then provide a narrative
explaining the importance of the item in relation to the overall subject under review. The end of
each entry contains a hypertext link which connected the reader to the referenced document
housed on the website, The Few, The Proud, The Forgotten (www.TFTPTF.com).
The Camp Lejeune contamination story had largely been forgotten by the time the base
was listed a National Priority Site (NPL or Superfund) in 1989. The base was, and remains, a
largely transitory community that rotated on and off the base in the matter of months to a few
years. Community re-engagement was made possible with the release of the flawed 1997
ATSDR Public Health Assessment for Camp Lejeune and the ATSDR’s call for health study on
the children born aboard the base between 1968 and 1987. The announcement initially engaged
members of the community who had lost children while stationed at Camp Lejeune or whose
children had sustained adverse health effects. My introduction into the issue commenced in 2007
following my diagnosis of male breast cancer at the age of 39. Between 1997 and 2007, Tom
Townsend and Jerry Ensminger worked tirelessly to push both awareness and accountability for
the contamination event aboard Camp Lejeune. My contribution to the struggle was that of a
Public Historian. Ensminger was and remains the public face for the Camp Lejeune community.
Ensminger often refereed to me as “his brain” due to my work in creating the community
timeline and organizing the historical data into a meaningful written community narrative. This
community narrative was then used to challenge the Department of the Navy’s official version of
the Camp Lejeune drinking water contamination in both the media and Congress.
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CHAPTER THREE: ANALOG LEGACY IN A DIGITAL WORLD
The process by which the community unwound the Marine Corps’ narrative occurred in a
series of victories where the community utilized the digital archive, their website and timeline to
challenge the Marine Corps’ established narrative in government meetings with the ATSDR. The
withdrawal of the ATSDR 1997 Public Health Assessment for Camp Lejeune, due to the omitted
benzene exposure pathway uncovered by the community, led to increased media involvement
and highlighted the community’s efforts to uncover the truth about the Camp Lejeune drinking
water contamination. The community then successfully converted their progress into legislation
with the passage of the Janey Ensminger Act into law in August 2012. This was followed by the
establishment of a of several presumptive service connections in 2017 for service members
stationed at Camp Lejeune during the drinking water contamination period.
Part of ATSDR’s initial work at Camp Lejeune focused upon recreating a comprehensive
historical water model for the area of the base known as Mainside or Hadnot Point and a separate
model for Tarawa Terrace housing area. The water models, in turn, supported the agency’s
epidemiological studies for the exposed Camp Lejeune population. The agency undertook the
water model projects to recreate possible exposure levels due to the lack of well data and
finished water sampling from the Marine Corps during the contamination period.82 The Hadnot
Point section of the base housed the majority of the base personnel, the base industrial area, and
was also the site of extensive groundwater pollution. Unlike the Tarawa Terrace family housing
area, the sources for the Hadnot Point drinking water contamination originated from the base fuel
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depot, leaking underground storage tanks at the base’s maintenance buildings, transmission lines,
and authorized as well as ad-hoc dumpsites historically located around the base. The ATSDR
CAP meetings represented the community’s sole official forum to interact both with the
government scientist and the Department of the Navy.
The original timeline was extensively used during the ATSDR’s quarterly CAP meetings
held primarily at the Center for Disease Control’s Chamblee’s campus in Atlanta Georgia. The
CAP formed in 2006 and at the time of this paper, was still in existence. The Department of the
Navy also held a seat at the CAP’s table in the form of a spokesperson who records minutes and
questions posed during the course of the meeting. The Navy also maintained a staff of Judge
Advocate General (JAG) attorneys who regularly attended the CAP meetings up until shortly
after the ATSDR’s revocation of the 1997 Public Health Assessment in 2009. The timeline
became a crucial piece for the community inquiries into Camp Lejeune’s water contamination
history. The CAP sessions were court recorded and transcribed for publication on ATSDR’s
Camp Lejeune web page. The CAP meeting transcription documents provide a treasure trove of
information and concerns raised by the community.83 CAP transcripts were further utilized by
enclosing them as attachments to congressional emails which provided a quick reference and
verification for the issues, raised with the timeline during the course of the CAP meetings. Use of
the timeline illustrated historical gaps and conflicts with the Marine Corps’ narrative. While, the
struggle for accurate historical accounting was at first not scientifically relevant to the ATSDR,
the historical informational gaps presented problems to the Marine Corps’ credibility and also
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served to strengthen the community’s line of questioning regarding gaps in the historical
knowledge of the contamination.
One such gap was the lack of documentation and knowledge concerning the base’s
900,000-gallon fuel farm located in the industrial area of Hadnot Point. The CERCLA and CLW
documents contained evidence of leaks and maintenance problems with the underground storage
tanks but no evidence was found which outlined the extent of the problem nor was there any
evidence the lost fuel had reached the finished water supply aboard the base. In 2009, the
community requested their congressional contacts with Sens. Burr and Hagan to formally request
from the Marine Corps how much fuel was lost from the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm. The written
reply from the Marine Corps was a letter from Marine General Regner who wrote that, according
to their records, 30,000 to 50,000 gallons of fuel had been lost at the Hadnot point Fuel Farm.84
The documents contained within the CLW and CERCLA documents supported this claim.
Without records of fuel losses or fuel in the finished drinking water aboard the base, there was no
way to challenge the Marine Corps’ response. Historically, the Marine Corps beat a consistent
drum from the moment of the official announcement of the drinking water contamination in
1984, that fuel nor any fuel products were found in the finished drinking water aboard Camp
Lejeune.85
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The timeline was then used to review the role of the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm in the base’s
drinking water contamination. Extensive analysis of the community’s timeline in conjunction
with the cited Marine Corps and Navy documents revealed an obscure reference to testing
performed by an environmental contractor in 1984 for the Navy’s Confirmation Study aboard the
base.86 The test results for this sampling indicated a production well for the Hadnot Point well
system, well HP-602, was contaminated with benzene and operating as a contaminated
production supply well before the well was taken offline. This meant that fuel had indeed been
introduced into the treated drinking water and an exposure pathway existed for the personnel
residing aboard Camp Lejeune.87 This new data revelation utilizing the community’s timeline
had been missed by the scientist at the ATSDR in their 1997 Public Health Assessment. The
realization that fuel, specifically benzene, was historically present in the bases potable water
system directly led to the revocation of the ATSDR’s 1997 Public Health Assessment for Camp
Lejeune in May of 2009.88 Further community sponsored congressional inquiries into the fuel
problem combined with the accidental discovery by an ATSDR scientist of a Navy electronically
password protected Underground Storage Tank (UST) archive rewrote the historical narrative of
the contamination. Information found within the portal revealed that the Marine Corps lost an
estimated around 1.5 million gallons of fuel into the aquifer at Camp Lejeune.89 The
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community’s successful challenge to both the ATSDR and the Marine Corps public narrative
regarding the presence of fuel in the base’s drinking water served strengthen the community’s
investigative credibility with both the media and the ATSDR. A recent caption in a news media
article about Camp Lejeune illustrates the point by citing the website The Few, The Proud, The
Forgotten’s archive and information as a resource for the Camp Lejeune drinking water
contamination.90 Please see Fig. 4 below.

Figure 4: Greg Barnes’ North Carolina Health News Article.
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One of the measures I undertook to gauge the effectiveness of the community’s website
was to install a counter on the bottom of the main page for the site. The counter counts the
number of unique hits upon the website from external visitors. Since 2008, there have been
681,417 unique users who have visited The Few, The Proud, The Forgotten. Considering the
website was and remains solely dedicated to only Camp Lejeune contaminated drinking water
issue, the tally represented a respectable number. At one point we ran a spreadsheet report to see
what internet provider addresses had visited the website. Entities which visited the community’s
website included but were not limited to the following (see Fig. 5 below): the DoD Network
Information Center, the Navy’s Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, the Department of Veteran’s
Administration, the Pentagon, the Department of Justice, the Senate Sergeant of Arms, several
individual military installations, media outlets, and universities had logged a visit to the website
at various times. This report served as verification that revisions made to the website were
successful and that the website was reaching wider audiences thus creating an impact.

Figure 5: Table of Internet IP entities visiting TFTPTF.com 2008.
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The timeline served as a vehicle to instantaneously fact check any claim or historical fact
stated by the Marine Corps representatives to congressional staff or the media. By the summer
2009, the community effectively challenged a government sponsored report downplaying the
Camp Lejeune drinking water adverse health effects and began to appear in national media
stories.91 This author appeared in a CNN story in September 2009 about Camp Lejeune and the
alarming number of men with male breast cancer who shared the single commonality of male
breast cancer and exposure to the contaminated drinking water aboard the base. Shortly after the
CNN story, a congressional hearing was held in the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee about
Camp Lejeune (See Congressional Testimony Appendix D). Between 2004 and 2016, this author
testified twice in Congress and Ensminger, nine times about Camp Lejeune.
The true value of the timeline as a tool to challenge the historical Marine Corps narrative
occurred in September 2010 during this author’s second congressional testimony. I was asked by
Chairman Brad Miller to prepare a written rebuttal and testify regarding a 2010 Marine Corps
informational booklet about Camp Lejeune (See Appendix E). The booklet was sent to members
of Congress and media in response to community efforts to challenge the details of the establish
historical account of the drinking water contamination. During the question-and-answer session
of the hearing, Chairman Stupak recognized this author as an expert on the Camp Lejeune
documents.92 The hearing represented a turning point in our confrontations with the Marine
Corps over the historical account of the contamination event. From that point forward,
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congressional office reached out to Ensminger and this author for information about the
contamination events before going to the Marine Corps. It was also at this time that the Marine
Corps stopped appearing on camera for media interviews and resorted to prepared written
statements to the media. The culmination of our legislative efforts occurred in August 2012 when
Ensminger and I were asked to attend the Oval Office signing of the Janey Ensminger Act into
law by President Obama. This was the community’s first lasting policy victory and it succeeded
in achieving health care for members of the community for fifteen named conditions.93 Five
years later, the community achieved the establishment of eight presumptive service-connected
conditions for Camp Lejeune. The health care provisions and presumptive service connections
apply to the Marines and sailors stationed aboard the base between 1953-1987 and provided for
medical care and disability benefits through the Veterans Administration. It is the largest
presumptive service connection since Vietnam’s Agent Orange exposures. Without the
Community Digital Archive Project, none of this would have been possible.
This author then entered into graduate school at the University of Central Florida in 2013
and first heard of the term Public History. My purpose of entering into graduate school was to
find a way to academically memorialize the work I had completed in our efforts for social justice
at Camp Lejeune and to find ways to enhance the work. During the course of my studies, I
realized the role I played in the Camp Lejeune community archival project was that of a public
historian. My undergraduate training in history afforded me a historical perspective not available
to the community at the time. The work I completed to organize the website, create the timeline
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and curate the digital archive into a meaningful database was crucial in achieving our goals of
rewriting the Camp Lejeune historical narrative and obtaining legislative relief for the
community. As I worked my way through my graduate course, I also realized the ultimate fear of
work in a digital world as Cohen and Rosenzweig warned was the lack of durability.94 The
internet is temporal and subject to unforeseen data loss. The Camp Lejeune Community Data
Archive will remain so long as a domain is paid for and the site updated. However, as time
progresses and members of the community pass into history how will future historians find the
data? The only true way to memorialize the work completed by this author and others was to
academically record the website, timeline and archive through a public history project thesis.
This observation was emphasized in 2018 when the community’s website, The Few, The Proud,
The Forgotten, was hacked and subsequently destroyed by an unknown person or group. This
author paid several hundred dollars to clean the domain and then proceeded to rebuild the
website using older versions of the website saved over the years, nevertheless, data was lost.
Furthermore, the website along with the archive remains active so long as someone pays the
domain and hosting fees. Once this author has passed into history, the website will fail if no one
maintains the account. It will disappear from public domain. It is this author’s hope that this
project will serve as a template for others to follow and study. The internet is a powerful tool to
democratize knowledge in a manner that was unknown thirty years ago. The Camp Lejeune
Community Digital Archive project is an example of how public historians can interact with a
local community, use digital tools and technology to organize and effect change.
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Lastly, as this author concluded his paper for submission, the United States Supreme
Court rendered a decision concerning a case for government FOIA exemptions. The case
centered upon attempts by the Sierra Club to obtain documents from the U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service which the agency held as pre-decisional and exempted under FOIA.95 The Supreme
Court ruled in favor of the government in this case. If this decision had been rendered at the time
the community accessed the digitized documents for Camp Lejeune, much of the knowledge the
community obtained would have been shielded from their view and scrutiny. This author
encountered several documents which were marked deliberative or pre-decisional during the
course of his research. The “draft” argument was used by the base environmental engineer,
Robert Alexander, in 1985 and 1986 to withhold information from the U.S. EPA as previously
noted in this paper. Within the Navy UST’s library, there are a number of FOIA exemption,
black outs, labeled pre-decisional which are now legally hidden from the public’s scrutiny. This
author can only imagine what the future may hold for communities attempting uncover past
contamination events at other military Superfund sites which are located all over the country.
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APPENDIX A: CAMP LEJEUNE HYPERTEXT LINK TIMELINE
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Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune chronology of significant events
concerning contamination of the base drinking water supply©.
Part 1 1941 through October 1989.
Compiled by Mike Partain for use by WWW.TFTPTF.COM

Introduction – This time line was compiled by means of public documents available from the CERCLA
and CLW files kept under requirements of Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980. There are many documents that still have not been released or are
currently being suppressed from public view. As these documents become available, we will update this
time line and promptly post it on our website.
We are currently working towards completing the second installment of this time line. The research
needed to untangle the many documents, errors, hidden information and obfuscation of facts will take
some time. We will post the second portion of the time line as soon as it becomes available.
1941 – Hadnot Point Fuel Farm Constructed southeast of Holcomb Blvd adjacent to Ash street. The fuel
farm was comprised of 15 fuel tanks. There was one 600,000 gallon above ground tank, six underground
12,000 gallon tanks, and eight underground 15,000 gallon tanks. The underground tanks were placed at
grade and completely covered with soil. The above ground tank stored diesel fuel while the other tanks
stored gasoline, unleaded gasoline and kerosene. The tanks were located in a highly developed area of
the base where natural drainage had been modified by extensive areas of asphalt, concrete, ditches and
storm sewers. Hadnot Point supply well HP-602 was located 1,200 feet northwest of the Hadnot Point
Fuel Farm. Marine Corps records indicate that 20,000 to 33,150 gallons of fuel were lost over the course
of the fuel farm’s operation. This estimate did not include or account for product lost during transfers or
unreported leaks. (Cercla 417).
1950-1952 Installation of Tarawa Terrace (TT) well field and construction of Tarawa Terrace subdivision
by Spangler Construction. Three of the initial wells were located along Lejeune Blvd down gradient from
established gas stations, automobile repair shops and dry cleaners. These businesses (and residences)
were at the time, all on septic ground absorptions systems until city sewers were installed in the1970’s.
(Bozarth Interview 1994).
1952- Tarawa Terrace well number TT-26 Constructed. It was located on the base property line along
Lejeune Blvd. The well was drilled to a depth of only 95 feet (CLW 3548). Less than a year after
construction, ABC Dry Cleaners became operational. The well was now situated less than 900 feet and
down gradient from yet another potential contamination source. The well was also down gradient of
Glamorama dry cleaners, gasoline stations, and auto repair facilities. In January 1985, this well tested
1580 ppb PCE. (CLW 5011 + CLW 4810).
1953 – ABC One Hour Dry Cleaner begins operation at 2127 Lejeune Blvd. The business was located
directly across the street from the Tarawa Terrace well fields. According to co-owner Victor Melts, ABC
uses 110-165 gallons of Tetrachloroethylene (PCE) per month. The business disposes waste water
through an on site septic ground soil absorption system that was located up gradient and directly across
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the street from the Tarawa Terrace water distribution system’s well fields and family housing. The
business also generates a solid waste from the PCE reclamation process. This waste was contaminated
with PCE and was used as pothole fillers or deposited in the rear of the business from 1953 until 1984.
(VJ Melts Depo 04/01).
1953 – Possible nerve gas or mustard gas drums were buried near the Rifle Range Chemical dump.
According to a 1982 interview with a former civilian employee named Jerry Rochelle, 50-55 drums were
buried at the site. Mr. Rochelle noted that the drums were light or bluish green and unmarked. They were
protected by rubber matting aboard the trucks and were handled by equipment which had been rubber
padded. Mr. Rochelle was required to wear extensive protective gear including a gas mask, hood jacket
and gauntlets. He noted that other personnel wore what he called “space suits.” The drums were buried
five feet below the surface side by sides several rows deep. (Cercla 280).
1958 – Legrand preliminary and interim ground water report was published for Marine Corps Base Camp
Lejeune (MCBCL). The report establishes that Camp Lejeune’s ground water wells were generally
effective up to a depth of 250 feet. Below that depth the water was unsuitable for use. It was noted that
the use of shallow wells directly alongside Lejeune Blvd would furnish more than the anticipated water
supply for Tarawa Terrace. The disadvantage of these wells was that they would require frequent
maintenance inspections and repairs. Furthermore, in 1983, the Initial Assessment study for Camp
Lejeune stated the soil was composed of fine sand and was extremely permeable with little or no
confining layers that would prevent surface generated contaminants from reaching the aquifer. (CLW 1,
CLW 32, CLW 4819-20 & Cercla 1998).
1959 – Ed Carper Assumes Administrative control of Camp Lejeune’s Chemical Dump. The dump was
established in the early to mid 1950’s and used as a dump for hazardous materials. The dump was
located near the rifle range. Mr. Carper ran the dump until 1965, when Mr. Don Tallman assumed control.
Mr. Tallman administered the dump until 1976 when it was closed. Materials disposed of in the dump
included but were not limited to TCE and other PPP chemicals. Mr. Tallman noted in his 1982 statement
that Base order 5100.13B was expanded in 1974 to include the Air Station. Earlier versions of the order
including the order which created the chemical dump and why it was used are now missing. Base Order
5100.13B did clearly establish that hazardous substances such as organic solvents were hazardous and
the chemical dump was the designated place for their disposal. (Cercla 226).
June 1959 – Legrand Survey and Evaluation of water supply wells at Camp Lejeune. The report states
development of the water wells at Lejeune has reached the stage in which continuous technical
assistance in ground water hydrology would be worthwhile. A concern was expressed about increased
withdrawal of groundwater (including intra-aquifer movement), especially at Hadnot Point, will increase
salt-water encroachment. In 1986, MCBCL consulted with the United States Geological Service (USGS)
for a survey of the groundwater at the base to assist in planning, development and protection of the
groundwater supply aboard the base. (CLW 102). The USGS found that there was a very dependable
source of water aboard the base. However, the aquifer was not well protected from potential surface
contamination because clay layers above the water supply aquifer that might serve as a barrier to
contamination are thin and discontinuous. The survey also found that with some relatively inexpensive
modifications in the design and positioning of future supply wells could significantly improve well yields
and reduce costs. (Cercla 1998).
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December 1959 – Department of the Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) issued instruction
6240.3A; Standards for potable water. This instruction applied to all U.S. Naval vessels and shore
installations which included United States Marine Corps (USMC) installations. The standard defined
Health Hazard to mean any faulty operating condition including any device or water treatment practice,
which when introduced into the water supply system creates or may a create a danger to the well being of
the consumer. (BUMED 6240.3A).
August 1963 – Department of the Navy’s Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) issued Navmed P5010-5, Manual for Naval Preventive Medicine. Chapter 5 of this manual is dedicated to Water Supply
Ashore for the Navy. The importance of this document is that it is the reference material from which the
Navy’s own internal potable water standards are derived. BUMED Instruction 6240.3B and version 3C
specifically reference the reader to this manual for guidance.(NAVMED P 5010-5)
1. Pdf Page 5 identifies BUMED as the responsible entity to determine standards for Naval Potable
water.
2. Pdf Page 6 The Commanding Officer is responsible for all phases of the water supply and was
assisted by the public works and medical officers. On USMC installations, the maintenance
officer is responsible for maintenance and operation of the water works.
3. Pdf Page 17. Sampling was to be conducted by the Public Works and Medical officers
once a year for both raw, treated and if supplied by groundwater wells, from EACH
individual well.
4. Pdf Page 35 Identifies that mounting pollution problems indicate an increased need for attention
to the quality of source waters. “Abatement and control of pollution sources will significantly aid
in producing drinking water which will be in full compliance with the provisions in these
standards”.
5. Pdf page 35 “Well water obtained from aquifers beneath impervious strata are usually
considered sufficiently protected”. ‘However, ground waters are becoming polluted with
increasing frequency and the resulting hazards require special surveillance.”
6. Pdf Page 43. Carbon Chloroform Extract was identified as a “practical measure of water
quality and as a safeguard against the excessive amounts of potentially toxic material”
and afforded “ a large measure of protection against the presence of undetected toxic
materials in finished drinking water.” This was a test for total organics present in the water
and not for any one specific chemical. The purpose of this test was to identify the total organic
content within the water and protect the consumer against possible exposures to toxic
compounds.
7. Pdf page 4.”Water supplies containing over 200 ppb CCE/1 of water represent an
exceptional and unwarranted dosage of the water consumer with ill defined chemicals.”

September 1963 - Department of the Navy’s Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) issued
instruction 6240.3B Standards for potable water. Regulations are substantially revised from prior version
(6240.3A). The definition of a health hazard is expanded to include an example. The example cited a
structural defect in the water supply system by either location, design or construction that prevents the
satisfactory purification of the water or causes it to be polluted from extraneous sources. Pollution is
defined as the presence of any foreign substance (organic, inorganic, radiological or biological) in the
water which tends to degrade its quality so as to constitute a hazard. The instruction also requires
substances which may have a deleterious (harmful) physiological effect or for which the physiological
effects are not known, shall not be introduced into the water system in a manner which would permit them
to reach the consumer. Water supply wells are defined within the instruction as part of the water
system.
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The Carbon Cholorform Extract (CCE) for total organic content permissible in the drinking water was set
at 200 ppb. There are no known records in existence indicating these required tests were ever conducted
by the Navy. (BUMED 6240.3B).
1970 – DDT, trichloroethylene and calcium hypo-chlorate buried in a pit at the rifle range chemical dump.
During the burial an explosion occurred which injured the bulldozer operator. The operator required
medical treatment for 2 years. (Cercla 208).
1972—Hadnot point supply well number 651 installed adjacent to lot 203. Lot 203 was the base Defense
Reutilization Management Office (DRMO Lot) i.e….junkyard. The DRMO lot had been in operation for
decades and was well establish at the time well HP-651 was constructed in 1971. (CLW 726). Well 651
was drilled to a depth of 199 feet (CLW 3546) and became operational in January of 1972. On 4 February
1985, this well tested 400 ppb PCE, 18,900 ppb trichloroethylene (TCE), 7,580 ppb dichlororethylene
(DCE) and 168 ppb Vinyl Chloride. (CLW 5011). The Naval Assessment and Control of Institutional
Pollutants (NACIP) program’s Initial Assessment Study (IAS) of 1983 also identified lot 203 as a dumping
ground for dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane (DDT) and Polychlorinated B-phenyls (PCB) laden
transformers (CLW 726).
1972 – Holcomb Boulevard Water Treatment Plant (WTP) and distribution system became operational.
Water to Paradise Point, Berkeley Manor, Watkins Village, Midway Park Family housing areas and
irrigation water for both of the base’s golf courses were now supplied by Holcomb Boulevard water
distribution system. Prior to 1972, these same areas were served by the Hadnot Point System. However,
Holcomb Blvd water distribution system remained intra-connected with the Hadnot Point water distribution
system. This intra-connection was controlled by 2 isolation valves which were located at the bridges
which crossed over Wallace Creek on Holcomb Blvd. and the Main Service road by Marston Pavilion.
During times of water shortages or system problems, these valves could be opened to allow treated or
raw water to flow in either direction to either plant. Recent developments reveal that these valves were
frequently activated to allow contaminated Hadnot Point water to enter and be distributed through the
Holcomb Blvd water distribution system between 1972 through 1985. The use of treated water to irrigate
the base’s championship golf course and secondary golf course appears to be the main reason why there
was a continual shortage of treated water at Holcomb Blvd. (CLW 1264). On 27 January 1985. Holcomb
Boulevard suffered a generator fuel spill leak and gasoline was leaked into the water system. The
valve(s) interconnecting the 2 systems was/were activated for a nine day period resulting in a
documented contamination event for the above cited family housing areas, facilities and schools served
by Holcomb Boulevard (CLW 4514) & (CLW 4546)
December 13 1972 - Revision 3C of Department of the Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED
6240) instruction for standards for potable water. Within the new instruction there was yet another
provision for the rejection of a water supply source. The BUMED reads “the presence of the following
substances in excess of the concentrations listed shall constitute grounds for rejection of the supply:”
Chlorinated Hydrocarbons were listed with a value of 3-100ppb. PCE, TCE and organic pesticides are
chlorinated hydrocarbons.
The Carbon Cholorform Extract (CCE) for total organic content permissible in the drinking water was
changed from 200 ppb to 150 ppb. There are no known records in existence indicating these required
tests were ever conducted by the
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( CLW 144.)
June 27 1974 – Base Order 5100.13B Safe Disposal of Contaminants or Hazardous Waste. The purpose
of this order was to set forth responsibilities for the safe disposal of subject hazardous wastes such as
“organic solvents”. The order also recognized that improper practices of disposal created hazards such
as contamination of drinking water. (CLW 5996). According to the last Administrator of the dump, Don
Tallman, the 5100.13B revision of the base order was to include the Air Station into the order. (Cercla
226). The copy of Base Order 5100.13B contained in the CLW documents was attached to a
memorandum dated 12 March 1981 from Julian Wooten to the Base Maintenance Officer after
contaminants were discovered at the Rifle Range Water Distribution System located next to the chemical
dump.
March 31 1977 – Final Report: Oil Pollution Survey for Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune prepared by
SCS Engineers for NavFacEngCom. This report details an Oil Pollution Survey conducted at Camp
Lejeune in 1976. The Navy has refused to release the uncensored version of the report for public viewing.
The Navy asserts that Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemption 5 (protecting inter-agency or intraagency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in
litigation with the agency) applies in this case despite the fact that the 1977 report of the survey was
issued by an independent contractor and as such does not fall under the FOIA exemption. Furthermore,
since MCBCL is a NPL site, this report falls under the CERCLA and RCRA disclosure laws and has not
been made available to the public. (1977 SCS Engineer Report)
October 24 1977 – Southern Testing and Research Laboratories performs testing for four specific
chlorinated hydrocarbons (Lindane, Endrin, Toxapehene and Methoxychlor) and 2 herbicides. The
contract is for testing for these contaminants only. The detection limit is set at 1 part per billion (ppb) and
0.1 ppb respectively. The lab report was negative for these chemicals. The samples were received
September 15th and analyzed on October 24 1977 after a month’s delay. The delay in testing casts
serious questions to the validity of the results. (CLW 172).
1977 – Pease Air Force Base New Hampshire. The base supply wells were analyzed after complaints
about fuel odors in the drinking water. The water from the supply wells was found to contain
trichloroethylene (TCE). The contaminated supply wells were then shut off and water was provided to the
base by the city of Portsmouth. (ATSDR PHA Pease AFB, New Hampshire).
1978 — Memo titled Primacy of Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) and N.C. Potable water laws. The base
prepares to co-ordinate operation and inspection of the water utilities in accordance to state law.
Certification was required of the lab and plant operators. The state now required daily tests for bacteria
and chemicals in the water. It was noted that when the new criteria went into effect, then the base would
have need of an increase in lab and plant personnel. Julian Wooten was designated by the base as the
single point of contact for all matters pertaining to the SDWA and the state. Utilities personnel would also
be subjected to state laws and operating procedures. (CLW 173).
February 28 1978 – Letter from J.G. Leech of Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NavFacEngCom)
to Charles Rundgren Water Supply Branch State of North Carolina concerning North Carolina’s
implementation of the Safe drinking Water Act. The letter confirms that all monitoring data,
operational logs, requests for laboratory certification or special analysis concerning Marine Corps
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activities within North Carolina will be submitted to the state. NavFacEngCom requested that the state
provide all relevant rules, regulation, newsletter, forms etc. be provided to them. (CLW 176). (The well
operating logs have yet to be turned over to ATSDR. Verbally, the Department of the Navy advised they
no longer have any copies of these logs. According to ATSDR representatives, the files pertaining to
Camp Lejeune’s drinking water systems are missing from the State archives. The missing files pertained
only to the time frame of the drinking water contamination.)
May 8 1978—Safe Drinking Water Act meeting. The meeting was attended by N.C. Department of
Human Resources, base officials, Navy and Marine Corps officials. Charles Rundgren and Dr. Dyre of
N.C. Dept. of Human Resources discuss testing state laboratories could provide to Camp Lejeune if
specifically requested. However, Mr. Rundgren advised that because of their work load they were
reluctant to take on anymore work. The state advised that they can provide tests for all organic, inorganic
and radiological materials. (CLW 3554). On October 1978, the Marine Corps requested the state to
provide testing for the base. (CLW 187).
September 7 1978—Memo titled Leachate from Solid waste and chemical landfills; monitoring of.
“Because groundwater is used extensively as a potable water source at Camp Lejeune, current land
disposal facilities should be monitored to indicate, as early as possible, any movement of contaminants
from either disposal facility into the groundwater.” (CLW 3558).
October 10 1978-- Camp Lejeune reports elevated Coliform bacteria readings at the Courthouse Bay
system. (CLW 185).
• Oct 13 1978 -- NavFacEngCom letter 114:DPG ser 6280 13 Oct 1978, it was noted that there was
a rapid increase in sewage and water discharges at the base. NavFacEngCom advised that if the
current growth trends continued, MCBCL water and sewage treatment facilities capacity will be
exceeded in the early 1980’s. This was significant because increased growth meant increased
usage upon the existing wells in the system. If not properly planned, as indicated in the 1959
Legrand Hydrological report (CLW 1 and CLW 32), the water table would be in danger of salt
water encroachment and more importantly, the increased draw from increased pumping has the
effect of pulling surrounding water in towards the well heads. If the well head was situated near a
contamination source such as wells HP 651 and TT 26, the contaminated water will be
increasingly drawn into the well. (CLW 274).
1979 – Fuel leak at Hadnot Point Fuel Farm. An estimated 20,000 to 30,000 gallons of fuel product
leaked from the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm. The exact details of the leak and if any clean up was performed
is unknown at this time. (Cercla 417).
1979 – Water testing at Willow Grove Naval Air Station in Pennsylvania revealed tetrachloroethylene
(PCE) and TCE contamination in the base’s drinking water supply. According to a 2002 Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) report, the well was no longer used for drinking water. Please
refer to the following excerpt from the 2002 report: “Sampling of station supply wells began in 1979, when
groundwater contamination was found in areas throughout the region. Data from 1979, when
contamination was discovered, to 1984 reported maximum detected concentrations of 300 part per billion
(ppb) of TCE and 91 ppb of PCE in on-site supply wells. The second highest detected levels in this time
period were 68 ppb of TCE and 79 ppb of PCE.~ After contamination was detected, this well was
used mainly for fire protection, and not drinking water.” (2002 ATSDR PHA Willow Grove NAS).
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1979 – Warminster Naval Air Warfare Center Pennsylvania began sampling on-base water supply wells in
1979 when groundwater contamination in the area was first discovered. Based on the 1979 sampling
results,the Navy closed Wells 1, 2, and 5 due to VOC contamination. (ATSDR PHA for Warminster Naval
Air Warfare Center).
February 8 1979— NavFacEngCom letter to Commanding General MCBCL. Camp Lejeune was cited by
EPA as a “major polluter” because of noncompliance with legal requirements listed under the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. This violation stems from sewage treatment and industrial
wastewater/oil discharges to 71 different storm drains. The report states that several hundred corrective
actions will be necessary to bring the base into compliance. (CLW 276).
April 1979 -- Study of Tarawa Terrace (TT) and Montford Point Water Treatment Plants (WTPs)
recommended demolishing plants due to age. The Holcomb Blvd plant was recommended to be
expanded to serve Tarawa Terrace and Montford Point. A new transmission line will be needed to
connect Holcomb Blvd. to these areas. The study cites serious operating problems have been
experienced at Tarawa Terrace WTP due to the inability to properly control the water treatment process.
Problems included cementing of filter sands, structural damage to the filter bed supports and short filter
runs (CLW 191). The report recommended the addition of three new wells at TT and two wells at
Montford point (CLW 195). Tarawa Terrace WTP remained operational until 1 April 1988.
November 20 1979 – Environmental Engineering Survey MCBCL. The report was prepared for Utilities,
Energy and Environmental Divisions, and NavFacEngCom. The purpose of the study was to identify
current facility environmental deficiencies and provide an update on previously identified projects.
1. At the time of the report, the Quality Control Lab Chemist position was vacant. The responsibility of
the chemist was to supervise the base Quality Control lab. (CLW 253).
2. The Quality Control lab was not certified by the EPA. One of the lab’s responsibilities was to
perform chemical, physical and bacteriological analyses of potable water systems. (CLW 253).
3. A required 3 year inorganic chemical analysis for potable water was not completed. (CLW 253).
4. The water and sewage treatment plants exhibited evidence of sporadic maintenance problems and
personnel shortages. The report noted a severe shortage of personnel in the Natural Resources
and Environmental Affairs Division. It was recommended this division be adequately staffed in order
perform/meet the necessary demands for the environmental program. (CLW 256).
5. Severe personnel shortages in the Natural Resources and Environmental Affairs Division limit
current capability to perform/meet the necessary environmental program. (CLW 350).
6. The state of North Carolina required at least one person in charge of the 8 potable water treatment
plants at Lejeune posses a Class A license. The current person holding the position possessed a
class B license. There was also a recommendation for the laboratory technician to attend an EPA
training course to achieve an effective pollution control and abatement program. (CLW 258-259).
7. All known areas of existing and potential oils spills and oily wastewater discharge on Base were
previously identified. However, spill prevention control and countermeasures (SPCC) to
eliminate/control spills from 55 gallon oil drums for an estimated 1,561 space heaters was deleted
due to cost limitations. (CLW 259).
8. MCAS New River, Solvents, fluids and oil discharges were found to be draining from the helicopter
pad area into the storm drainage system. (CLW 260).
9. Hazardous Waste/Toxic Substances. Identification, handling and disposal of hazardous and toxic
materials have in the past, been an area of relatively minor concern. New laws and an increasing
frequency of accidents have rendered past handling and disposal methods unacceptable. (CLW
262).
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10. A survey was conducted of all transformers containing Polychlorinated B-phenyls (PCBs). A
request was submitted to NavFacEngCom to provide assistance in preventing PCB spillage into the
water ways. 304 transformers were located at the Defense Property Disposal Office (lot 203)
awaiting disposal. (CLW 263).
11. 5,094 4oz cans of DDT were found awaiting disposal in a tractor trailer at DPDO (lot 203). (CLW
263).
12. Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) trichloroethylene, toluene, and xylene are categorized as
hazardous materials on an attachment to the survey. (CLW 346).
13. A recommendation was made for Mr. Sonny White of NavFacEngCom be requested to visit MCBCL
to evaluate/provide acceptable storage and disposal options for the hazardous waste program.
(CLW 351).
• Nov 26 1979 – Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) publishes Suggested No Adverse Reaction
Level (SNARL) for TCE. The one day and 10 day SNARL values are determined for emergencies
and spills for a short period of time. EPA recommended a one-day SNARL of 2,000 parts per
billion (ppb), a ten-day SNARL of 200 ppb and a long-term SNARL of 75 ppb. “It should be
assumed that drinking water would be the primary or sole source of human intake of
trichloroethylene.” The same report also advises that SNARL calculations for short term and
chronic exposures ignore possible carcinogenic risk that may result from those exposures as well
as any possible synergistic effect of other chemicals in the water. The EPA report also warned of
long term carcinogenic effects in both male and female animals. Trichloroethylene was reported
to be mutagenic in microorganisms It transformed cultured mammalian cells to carcinogenic cells
that bound with tissue macromolecules. These observations comprised the basis for reasoning to
support the carcinogenic potential of trichloroethylene. (CLW 353).
• Nov 29 1979 -- EPA publishes final regulations for the control of total trihalomethanes ("TTHMs") as
an amendment to the National Primary Drinking Water Standards. This regulation establishes a
Maximum Contaminant Level (MCL) of 0.10 mg/L (parts per million) for TTHMs. A timeline was
established for compliance and monitoring with this MCL. Water treatment systems serving
between 10,000 and 75,000 people, such as Hadnot Point and Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS),
New River WTPs, required mandatory monitoring to begin by 29 November 1982 and compliance
with the new standard was to be achieved by 29 November 1983. Water treatment systems
serving less than 10,000 people, such as TT, Montford Point, Rifle Range, Courthouse Bay,
Onslow Beach, and Holcomb Blvd, the regulation left primacy with each respective state. (CLW
6452).
February 10 1980 – The EPA publishes SNARL in Federal Register for PCE. The EPA recommended a
one-day SNARL of 2,300 ppb, a ten-day SNARL of 175 ppb, and a long-term SNARL of 20 ppb. This
same report also advised that “SNARL calculations for short term and chronic exposures ignore possible
carcinogenic risk that may result from those exposures as well as any possible synergistic effect of other
chemicals in the water”. Adverse effects to mice fetuses were also noted in the report. The adverse
effects include lowered birth weight , increased fetus resorptions, split sternebrae, subcutaneous edema
and delayed ossification of skull bones. A matter of interest was cited as part of the report. The matter
was a 1978 article in Medical World News which discussed a mother who worked in a drycleaner during
the time she was nursing her infant. The child developed jaundice and an enlarged livered. Both
conditions ceased when the mother discontinued nursing. (CLW 385).
March 14 1980—State of North Carolina assumed primary enforcement responsibilities for the
enforcement of Safe Drinking Water Act for all public water systems. (CLW 425).
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April 9 1980 – Suggested Action Guidance Tetracholorethylene (PCE), published by the EPA. “Our
recommendations for this situation (contamination of the drinking water with PCE) include: (1) immediate
remedial action (within 24 hours) if the drinking water concentration of tetracholorethylene is found to
exceed 2.3mg/l (2,300 ppb), equivalent to our 1-day SNARL, and (2) remedial action within 10 days if the
tetracholorethylene concentration exceeds 0.13 mg/l (130ppb), equivalent to our 10 day SNARL. For
extended exposures, we recommend, in addition, that the drinking water supplies should be maintained at
no more than 0.04 mg/l (40 PPB) for any extended period.” “The suggested action guidance should not
imply that EPA condones the presence of any level of this contaminant in drinking water”. (CLW 391).
June 27 1980 – Condition Survey for POL Facilities (Hadnot Point Fuel Farm) Camp Lejeune. The survey
was conducted by Cal J Ingram of NavFacEngCom to determine the condition of the POL facilities for
MCAS New River and Camp Lejeune. The survey was necessary due to leakage, problems,
obsolescence and environmental/safety concerns. (Cercla 96). See PDF page 11.
The following recommendations were made for the Hadnot Point fuel farm.
1. The fuel facilities were approximately 35 years old. Mr. Ingram noted that because of age, there
has been general corrosion and deterioration of the tanks and pipelines.
2. Maintenance over the years has been minimal due to insufficient funding. Funding to keep abreast
of the latest state of the art was not available.
3. Camp Lejeune was deficient in new fueling designs including automatic high liquid alarms, tank
coatings, dead man controls, impervious dikes and containment curbs.
4. The fuel storage tanks have never been cleaned since they were built.
5. There were many buried valves and flanges that can not be inspected or maintained.
6. An automatic liquid level indicator was installed but never made functional.
7. Above ground tank S-1009 (the 600,000 gallon tank) exterior coating was beginning to peel and
evidence of rust. The protective dike was insufficient and not impervious. No locks were noted on
the drain valve for the tank.
8. Tank S- 1031 was discovered to have a leaking valve and pitting in the interior bottom of the tank.
9. As a result of the leaking valve in tank S-1031, it was determined that another tank valve also
leaked badly.A recommendation was made to test tank S-1009 as soon as possible to prevent
leakage, loss of product and environmental contamination.
10. A recommendation was made to replace and install new piping, new tank valves and new
concrete valve pits for all storage tanks. It was essential that all valves be accessible for proper
maintenance.
11. A recommendation was made to empty and clean the interiors of all underground storage tanks
and then inspect them for leaks.
Note, none of these recommendations were acted upon until 1989. Please see entry for 29 March
1988.
July 29 1980— NavFacEngCom letter dated 29 July 1980 initiated the TTHM surveillance program at
Camp Lejeune to begin in October 1980 and terminate December 1981. The purpose was to establish a
data base to characterize potable water supplies on base. Jennings Laboratories and the U.S. Army
Environmental Hygiene Agency (USAEHA) lab were selected to analyze the base’s water for TTHMs.
(CLW 448).
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October 1 1980 – LANTDIV arrives at MCBCL and collected a composite sample, composed of water
from all eight WTPs. This analysis was for priority pollutants. If a potential problem was identified, then
further testing on the eight individual systems would be warranted in order to determine the source of the
problem. (CLW 613). LANTDIV did not share these results (Jennings Lab) with MCBCL until June 1982.
(CLW 613). There were no indications that the sample was preserved with ice in order to protect the
sample for analysis. Furthermore, Supervisory Base Chemist, Elizabeth Betz questioned how the sample
was compiled and whether the volume of the sample was weighted in relation to the eight different
systems aboard the base. (CLW 590, CLW 613 & CLW 3667).
(Note: VOCs are volatile. If they were not preserved with ice, or if there is a significant delay in
sampling, then the test results indicating the presence of VOCs would be lowered and unreliable.
Furthermore, samples can be easily altered by shaking the samples and then opening the caps or
by leaving caps loose or off all together. VOCs are quick to volatize and convert to a gaseous
state thus quickly disappearing from a sample with no trace that they had been there in the first
place.)
• Oct 30 1980 --The results from Jennings Laboratories indicated that the Volatile Organic
Compounds were detected in the composite sample collected 1 Oct. 1980. Trichloroethylene,
dichlororethylene and vinyl chloride are among the 11 contaminants detected in the water. No
further testing is performed despite the presence of these compounds in the water. (CLW 430).
• Oct 30 1980 --The U.S. Army lab (USAEHA) from Fort McPherson conducted water testing for
TTHMs on samples taken from the Hadnot Point water distribution system. USAEHA Army
Laboratory Service Chief, William Neal, warned Navy officials with a hand written caption on the
bottom of the lab results: “Water is highly contaminated with low molecular weight
halogenated hydrocarbons. Strong interference in the region of ChCl2BR. Cannot determine
the value of that compound.” No action was taken in regard to this warning. (CLW 436).
November 18 1980— While grading the parking lot of the former Naval Field Research Lab (Bldg Pt-37),
workers discovered Strontium 90 Beta Buttons and at least 7 cases of Radium 226 reflectors buried in the
area. The building was formerly used by the lab to conduct radioactive experimentation on dogs from
1947 through 1976. The radioactive materials along with several radioactive animal corpses were
removed from the site by Naval personnel from Port Huenneme California. A total of 499 radioactive Beta
buttons were discovered at the site along with a former incinerator ash dump site. (Cercla 648).
December 18 1980— USAEHA Army Laboratory Services Chief, William Neal, again warned Camp
Lejeune Marine Corps Base that there was a problem with the Hadnot Point TTHM samples. He
handwrote on the report: “Heavy Organic interference at CHCL2BR. You need to analyze for
chlorinated organics by GC/MS.” (CLW 438). These samples were taken from the Hadnot water
treatment plant pump, the Naval Hospital Emergency room sink, buildings 1202, 65 and FC-530. No
action was taken in regard to this warning. (CLW 5800).
February 9 1981—USAEHA Army Laboratory Services Chief, William Neal, again warned Camp Lejeune
Marine Corps that there was a problem with the Hadnot Point TTHM samples. He handwrites on the
report: “You need to analyze for chlorinated organics by GC/MS.” The ChCl2BR column was filled in
with question marks and “heavy interference” was written over the column. No action was taken in regard
to this warning. (CLW 441).
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March 6 1981 – Military Construction Data for project number LE201M, repair of POL (Hadnot Point Fuel
Farm) facilities for Camp Lejeune. $537,200 allocated to clean and repair the petroleum/oil/lubricant
tanks, perform vaccum tests, sandblasting and required repairs. The project also included the installation
of high level alarms, reworked dikes and for the piping and valves to be replaced. The projected cited
deterioration leakage problems and potential violation of environmental and safety concerns will continue
if work is not completed. (Cercla 96). See PDF page 17.
• March 9 1981 -- USAEHA Army Laboratory Services Chief, William Neal, again warned Camp
Lejeune Marine Corps that there was a problem with the Hadnot Point TTHM samples. He
writes on the report: “Water is highly contaminated with other chlorinated hydrocarbons
(solvents)!” (CLW 443). No apparent action was taken by Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune
on this or any of these warnings for Hadnot Point. The TTHM reports continue to show
indications of interference in the areas previously identified but the warnings from Lab Services
Chief Neal cease at this point.
• March 12 1981 -- Base Maintenance Officer receives copy of Base Order 5100.13B concerning the
Safe Disposal of Contaminants of Hazardous Wastes from the Director of the NREA division,
Julian Wooten. (CLW 5996).
• March 31 1981 – Base Supervisory chemist Elizabeth was instructed by LANTDIV to obtain water
samples from the Rifle Range Chemical dump in order to determine Hazardous waste
characteristics. Soil samples from around the dump were also taken for the same reason.
(CLW 3667). The results were returned on 7 April 1981. A variety of contaminants were found
in the test wells and pools of water including: Toluene at 242 ppb, Carbon Tetrachloride 3560
ppb, dichloroethylene 122 ppb, chloroform 15,520 ppb and methylene chloride at 20,460 ppb in
the various tested areas. (CLW 3675). The results of this test were thought to be in error. Mr.
Wallmeyer cited possible errors in sampling technique or a problem with the containers as the
probable cause. (Cercla 376). NavFacEngCom scheduled Jerry Wallmeyer to visit the base
and assist Ms. Betz in the collection of a second sample. (CLW 3685).
April 10 1981 – Jerry Wallmeyer arrives from LANTDIV and assists Base Supervisory Chemist Betz in
collecting additional water samples from the chemical dump. Samples were also taken from the finished
water at the Rifle Range Water treatment plant and supporting wells. This plant was in close proximity to
the chemical dump. (CLW 3685). The samples were delivered by Jerry Wallmeyer to Jennings lab on 13
April. The results were released on 20 April and showed much lower readings on the contaminants than
what was seen on 30 March. However, Methylene chloride, trichloroethylene and chloroform were
present in the raw water wells for the Rifle Range water treatment plant. The water treatment plant tested
17ppb Chloroform and 3 ppb Methyene Chloride. (CLW 3678 + CLW 3679). Betz advises in a memo to
Danny Sharpe that she felt the lower samples from the 10 April readings could be because of a difference
in the sampling procedures, bottles used, faulty pumps and possibly the weather. Betz noted that on the
day of the test in March, there was rain. Rainfall in this area would cause movement of contaminants in
the ground as the water percolates to the aquifer. Furthermore, Betz advised that the well pumps used in
the 10 April samples were faulty and they experienced problems in suction and obtaining water flow. All of
these factors could explain the lower readings of 10 April 1980. (CLW 3714).
May 8 1981—LantNavFacEngCom letter 114:JGW 6280 of 8 May 1981 to Commanding General Camp
Lejeune Marine Corps base attention to Assistant Chief of Staff, facilities. Mr. Wallmeyer advised Camp
Lejeune that the second round of sampling showed a greatly reduced amount of organic contaminants.
He advised a third round of sampling will take place in May and at that point a report will be made with
interpretations and findings. (Cercla 376). On 20 May, Paul Rakowski from NavFacEngCom arrived at
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the base for the third round of sampling. Elizabeth Betz noted in a 26 May Memorandum for the record,
the weather was dry and that one of the sample sites was low in water and another was dried up entirely.
There were no problems with the wells on this sample. Mr. Rakowski collected a composite sample at the
water treatment plant. The composite sample was taken from standing water in the tank. There were no
notes on how long the water had been standing in the tank. Ms. Betz recorded on two different occasions
that the samples were not preserved in ice at the recommendation of Mr. Rakowski. (CLW 3735). The
results for the 20 May testing once again show lowered amounts of the contaminants. The raw and
treated water at the Rifle Range water treatment plant was contaminated with chloroform, methyl chloride,
and dichlororethane at reduced levels. (CLW 3755).
Jun 8 1981 – MCBCL advises the EPA that DDT was discharged at DRMO lot 203, possibly in significant
amounts. The base also advised that lot 203 would be subjected to an intense study by Naval Energy and
Environmental and Support Activity (NEESA) in FY 1982. (CLW 6004).
• Jun 23 1981 -- The Hadnot Point TTHM tests show signs of elevated CHCL3 and CHCL2BR as in
earlier reports but there was no written warnings from Lab Services Chief Neal. (CLW 446).
July 21, 1981 – Jerry Wallmeyer from LANTDIV calls Elizabeth Betz to inquire on who ran and what
procedures were used in the TTHM analysis for Hadnot Point and MCAS New River. He also confirmed
that the Rifle Range system will be collected as well. Mr. Wallmeyer specifically requested that at the
Rifle Range: one sample be taken where the raw water enters the plant while the wells are pumping, one
sample from the treated tap water at the plant, two from mid points in the distribution line, and then the
final sample from the furthest point away from the plant. (CLW 5791).
• July 31 1981 – Letter from J.R. Bailey NavFacEngCom to MCBCL concerning suspected chemical
dump in the rifle ranger area. The letter provides an analysis of the ground water, surface water
and potable waters. (CLW 3757).
1. Mr. Bailey recommended no further action to be taken concerning the TTHM or
organic problem at the Rifle Range water system at that time. Mr. Bailey then
stated that MCBCL was scheduled for an Initial Assessment Study for the NACIP
program to begin in FY-82. Mr. Bailey advised that the information in his letter
and the TTHM monitoring program will be utilized by the Initial Assessment Study
(IAS) team
2. The results of the analysis should be passed to local and state officials.
3. The letter and the accompanying enclosures did not contain any of the March
readings taken by Elizabeth Betz. These results were dismissed as invalid due to
a suspected contamination of the containers and improper sampling techniques.
4. Rifle Range well RR-97, which tested positive for organic contamination, should
not be used. Preference should be given to using wells RR-45 and RR-47
because of lower levels of organic contamination found in their samples.
5. Suggested No Action Response Levels (SNARLS) recommendations from the
EPA concerning PCE and TCE are given to the base. They include
recommendations for one day, ten day and long term SNARLS. The long terms
SNARL for PCE was 20 ppb and TCE was 75ppb.
6. USAEHA TTHM sampling/analysis was expanded to include the Rifle Range
water distribution system. (The TTHM lab reports for the Rifle Range are
missing).
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It is important to note that the measures recommended and executed in this letter applied only to the
wells located at the Rifle Range Water Distribution System which was located next to a chemical dump
known to exist and registered with the EPA. Concurrent with the March-July testing at the Rifle Range
WDS, the Hadnot Point Water Distribution System received multiple written warnings stating the system’s
water was highly contaminated with Chlorinated Hydrocarbons (Solvents). The laboratory advised that
these chemicals were interfering with the tests but no action was taken to locate by base officials to
determine the source of the contamination or test any of the specific wells on that system. A year after the
Spring 1981 testing at the Rifle Range, a new Laboratory (Grainger) began testing the potable water
aboard the base. This testing also included the Tarawa Terrace Water Distribution System. Grainger not
only notice the same interference as indicated in the prior testing the year before, they took things a step
further by quantifying and identifying the specific chemicals causing the interference (PCE and TCE).
Despite the additional warnings and specific identification of the chemicals, no action was taken to identify
and locate the source of the contamination. To date, the Navy has failed to provide any explanation as to
why action was taken at the Rifle Range Distribution System in 1981 and no action was taken when the
same chemicals were discovered at the Hadnot Point WDS in 1981 and then again in 1982. Why the
different standard?
August 27 1981 – Commanding General MCBCL, Major General Cooper advised Charles Rundgren at
N.C. State Division of Health Services that based on laboratory analyses, the Rifle Range water system
met current drinking water standards. There was no mention of the organic chemical contamination found
in the Rifle Range water distribution system. The data from the 30 March testing indicating high levels of
contaminants was left out of the letter to the state. General Cooper advised the base will continue to
monitor the water system on a monthly basis. The letter also advised the state that the base was
scheduled to undergo and Initial Assessment Study (IAS) in FY 1982 to identify assess and control
contamination at the base. (CLW 6124).
September 1981—The USAEHA Army Lab at Fort McPherson experienced equipment problems which
result in a large back log of samples. Their analysis for TTHMs in the Hadnot Point and New River
Systems ceased after September 1981. However, the Rifle Range TTHM testing continued at the request
of the base. (CLW 468).
• Sep 10 1981 – Memorandum to the Commanding General from the Base Maintenance Officer.
TTHMs at the Rifle Range and Hadnot Point water distribution systems tested below the MCL
for TTHMs but MCAS New River exceeded the TTHM standards in three of the six months
tested. Col. Mount advises NavFacEngCom recommended no further testing for other
chemicals at the Rifle Range until the NACIP study was completed. (Cercla 301).
December 4 1981– August TTHM analysis for Hadnot Point Complete. USAEHA Laboratory Services
Chief wrote “interference on this peak” in the CHCL2BR column but there was no written warning as on
prior analytical test results. (CLW 5740).
• Dec 8 1981 – Letter from Commanding General to Commandant of the Marine Corps concerning
pollution abatement related to past Hazardous Material disposal aboard MCBCL. The letter
advised that the Commanding General of MCBCL was concerned the NACIP study would not
address the Rifle Range situation in a timely manner and this may result in an adverse public
reaction and or controversy. The General requested guidance from HQMC in this matter. The
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base proposed a course of action to accelerate assessment and corrective action for the
chemical landfill site. (CLW 5816).
• Dec 18 1981 – Letter from NEESA to NavFacEngCom concerning NACIP at Camp Lejeune. The
letter outlines the detailed of the NACIP program. The first phase of the study was called the
Initial Assessment study (IAS). The purpose of the IAS was to identify potential hazardous
waste sites and evaluate them for a possible confirmation study. According to enclosure the
confirmation study would proceed only if (page A-11) (Cercla 2042).
1. Sufficient evidence exists to suspect that contaminated disposal sites exist, and that
2. The Contamination presents a definite danger to (a) the health of civilians in nearby
communities or installation personnel or (b) the environment within or outside the
installation. (note, please see how this initial wording changed in the final report listed in
April 1983).
• Dec 30 1981 – In response to the Defense Environmental Quality Program Policy Memorandum
(DEQPPM) 80-6, the Department of the Navy developed the Naval Assessment and Control of
Institutional Pollutants (NACIP) Program. The purpose of this program was to identify,
investigate, assess, characterize, the release of hazardous substances, and to reduce the risk
to human health and the environment from past waste disposal operations and hazardous
material spills at Navy/Marine Corps activities. Previously, base environmental issues were
handled by Utilities, Energy and Environmental Division, LANTDIV NavFacEngCom in Norfolk
Virginia. The NACIP program management plan was given to the base. This plan states the
Initial Assessment Study (IAS) will collect and evaluate all evidence which indicates the
existence of pollutants which may have contaminated a site or pose an imminent health hazard
for people located on or off the installation. (Cercla 2042).
January 14 1982 – NACIP (Naval Assessment and Control of Installation Pollutants) Initial Assessment
Study ("IAS") begins at Camp Lejeune. The intent of this study was to identify, asses, and control
contamination of the environment from past operations. Water Air and Research of Gainesville, Florida
was selected to perform the Initial Assessment Study. The base was instructed to provide the use of a
photocopying facility to duplicate records. The NACIP team was granted permission to review base
records in order to provide information on past operations, environmental contamination, and industrial
processes. (CLW 455).
February 5 1982 – Letter from LANTDIV to NAVFACENGCOM dated 05 Feb 1982, MCAS New River
was above TTHM limits based on the 1980-81 characterization study. The Rifle Range and Hadnot Point
systems were within standards. (CLW 458). Camp Lejeune was notified that the NACIP IAS team was
scheduled to visit Camp Lejeune in March 1982. (CLW 470 & CLW 477).
March 17&18 1982— Base Chemist, Ms. Betz, Jerry Wallmeyer, LANTDIV, and NACIP members visited
the suspected chemical dump to collect samples from rifle range test wells. Jerry Wallmeyer requested to
be provided with rainfall totals for the area. Samples were also taken from potable wells servicing the
Rifle Range water system. (CLW 488). Test results from Jennings Lab indicated Rifle Range Dump test
wells and potable RR well #97 were still contaminated with VOCs. PCB was also reported in the test well
samples. Samples were hand delivered by Mr. Wallmeyer from NavFacEngCom. The analysis was
performed two days after collection and no indications were given that the samples were preserved in ice
to ensure accuracy. (CLW 487 + Cercla 373).
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• March 1982 – Wallace Eakes of NEESA contacts prior administrators of the Chemical Dump and
determines that chemicals such as PCBS, TCE, DDT and others buried at the site. During the
course of his investigation, Mr. Eakes noted that there were reports of a chemical mist on foggy
mornings. One notation was concerning an incident where a heavy equipment operator reported
choking after he disturbed the ground while digging a firebreak. The operator reported a white
mist and abandoned his equipment after he began to choke. (Cercla 226).
• March 4 1982– The EPA issues an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking concerning Volatile
Organic Compounds in the water. The purpose of the ANPRM was to initiate discussion on the
issue of VOCs in drinking water and to develop alternatives to deal with the problem. (CLW
3804).
• March 14-21 1982 – Report from Wallace Eakes of LantDiv concerning the IAS at Camp Lejeune.
Mr. Eakes noted that the IAS discovered about 70+ disposal sites but stated most sites were
minor and not significant. The Commanding General expressed a concern about the Rifle Range
because of the chemical dump. Jerry Wallmeyer of LantDiv held a briefing for the Assistant Chief
of Staff, Facilities Col. Millice. In this briefing, Mr. Wallmeyer outlined the IAS findings at the Rifle
Range Chemical Dump. (Cercla 274).
1. The Rifle Range Dump Operated between 1955-1977.
2. Trichloroethylene, PCP, PCBs, Chlordane, DDT were some of the items discovered at
the site. .
3. The IAS scientist believed at the time that the underground water flow for the site was
toward the New River and should not enter the potable water wells at the Rifle Range.
(Note, the range’s wells were tested in 1981 and found to be contaminated with VOCs
and other chemicals. It is unclear if these findings were revealed to the IAS team.)
• March 23 1982 – IAS Exit Briefing held aboard Camp Lejeune. The exit briefing noted good cooperation with Camp Lejeune personnel. Seventy sites were discovered. Of these sites, the
Chemical landfill at the Rifle Range, The fuel farm on Hadnot Point, the Fuel Farm at MCAS, The
Camp Geiger Dump, The New River Mercury Dump and building 712 (the base daycare center)
were noted as significant. The report noted that the findings concerning building 712 were a
shock to all involved in the study. Mr. Eakes recommended the following course of action for the
daycare. “Since this may pose a health threat to the children at the daycare, preventive medicine
should be involved.” Mr. Eakes noted that he and Colonel Mount then visited the Navy medical
officer, Commander Lachapelle and briefed him on the situation. According to Mr. Eakes,
“Commander Lachapelle agreed to take air and soil samples in the area under the guise of a
normal health survey.” (Cercla 274). The samples were taken in June of 1982 by the Navy
Environmental Health Center. Their tests revealed no detectable contamination in the building.
(Cercla 268).
• March 25 1982 – Base Chemist Betz and Gaines Huneycutt visited Lot 203 and take a composite
soil sample after DDT laden barrels were reported to have been found at the lot. (CLW 3867).
This lot was located adjacent to HP water supply well #651.
April 2 1982– Dave Goodwin of LANTDIV called Elizabeth Betz and requested additional samples to be
taken at the Rifle Range WTP and the supply wells for the range. (CLW 3845).
• April 8 1982 – The EPA in accordance with the CERCLA Act (Superfund) of 1980, requested
MCBCL to complete a set of forms to supply the EPA with information on hazardous waste sites
at MCBCL. (Cercla 2053). The request was forwarded to HQMC for review and it was decided
that the base can not provide the requested information until the NACIP site evaluation is
available in September 1982. (Cercla 2054).
• April 16 1982– Dave Goodwin of LANTDIV called Elizabeth Betz and requested another resampling of the Rifle Range WTP and the supply wells for the range. (CLW 3865).
• April 15 1982– the State of North Carolina granted permits for the construction of two new supply
wells to be installed for use in the Rifle Range water treatment system. (CLW 517).
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• April 19 1982– The base began obtaining water samples from all eight water distribution systems
for TTHM analysis to be performed by Grainger Lab. (CLW 537).
May 5 1982. – MCBCL letter to Commandant Marine Corps dated 5 May 1982. Col. Millice advised
HQMC that the base can not comply with the 23 April 1982 EPA request for potential hazardous waste
inspection reports until the NACIP IAS was completed. (CLW 3853).
• May 6, 1982– Mike Hargett of Grainger Labs called Elizabeth Betz to inform her that they had found
the synthetic organic cleaning solvents tetrachloroethylene and trichloroethylene in samples
sent from the Tarawa Terrace and Hadnot Point water distribution systems. (CLW 542). Mrs.
Betz then informed Danny Sharpe, Supervisory Ecologist, of Grainger’s findings and then
passed the findings up the chain of command, I.E. Deputy Base Maintenance Officer. (CLW
5179).
• May 14, 1982. – Elizabeth Betz was summoned to Lt. Col Fritzgerald’s office in order to brief Col
Millice and Lt Col. Fritzgerald on the April TTHM analysis from Grainger labs. In her
memorandum for the record, Betz Advises, “it appeared to me that they had not been informed
about the findings (PCE and TCE in the finished water for TT and HP water distribution
systems). I didn’t inform them.” (CLW 553 + CLW 5179).
• May 17-24, 1982. – Additional TTHM samples are taken for Camp Lejeune (including the TT and
HP water distribution systems). Ms. Betz requested that all results be held until they have all of
the results. Ms. Betz also informed Grainger Labs that some of the samples had problems with
the caps and air bubbles but they were marked such. (CLW 550 + CLW 554).
• May 26 1982. – The Commanding Officer for the Occupational and Preventive Medicine Service,
Naval Regional Medical Center, aboard Camp Lejeune was advised in writing that pesticides
were found in the soil around the former pest control shop in high quantities. In 1966, this shop
was converted into an on base daycare center. The soil samples were taken from in and
around the center including the fenced play area. (Cercla 2055).
• May 26 - 28 1982. – Mike Hargett from Grainger Labs called to inform Ms. Betz that the cap liners
used in some of the May samples were “messed up”. The lab agreed to take additional
samples and new containers were sent. These samples were recollected on 27 and 28 May
1982 and mailed to Grainger Labs. (CLW 561). One of these samples was from a sink at the
Naval Hospital on Hospital Point. Bruce Babson of Grainger lab was able to quantify this
reading at 1,400 ppb TCE.
June 4-9 1982 – Mike Hargett confirmed his 27 May phone conversation in writing with Elizabeth Betz.
He also informed Ms. Betz that the solvent peaks which were reported in his previous report were still
present but the comparison with duplicate samples (the ones with the cap issues from May 17-24)
indicated poor repeatability. (CLW 564). The May 26-28 sample analysis was completed on June 9th.
(CLW 566).
• June 14 1982. – Jacksonville Daily News reported toxic pesticides found in soil at Camp Lejeune’s
sitter service facility (building 712). (CLW 572).
• June 22 1982 – Draft Initial Assessment Study for Camp Lejeune. (Cercla 332).
1. PDF Page 23 of 171. Potable wells at the base are usually deep, but due to voids in the
confining layer, this carries some risk. Also, heavy demands for water at times produce an
overall decline of pressure in the semi-confined aquifer. Therefore, contaminants can
migrate: (1) laterally to surface water and (2) vertically through gaps in the confining layer.
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2. PDF Page 43 of 171. Conclusions point number 5 states that the water table is highly
susceptible to contamination from hazardous waste disposal practices. This conclusion does
not appear in the 1983 Final IAS Report.
3. PDF Page 46 of 171.The detection of pollutants in groundwater samples is generally
conclusive evidence , negative results for a limited number of samples does not prove that
pollutants are not and/or will not be present.
4. PDF Page 103 of 171. Solvent Usage. This section described solvent usage aboard the
base. The report indicated that large amounts of solvents were used throughout the history of
the base. These operations were used at operations scattered throughout the base and
control of waste was difficult. This section of the draft IAS was omitted in the Final IAS report.
5. PDF Page 52 of 171. The IAS draft recommended that HP well 602 be sampled because it
was located 1,100 feet from and down gradient of the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm. The well was
also identified as an active pumping well.
The draft IAS report reads that Recommendations for the next phase of the NACIP program, a
Confirmation Study, is based on the findings of an IAS. A Confirmation Study is conducted only if
an IAS Concludes that:
1. Sufficient evidence exists to suspect that an installation is contaminated; and
2. The contamination presents a definite damage to (a) the health of civilians in adjoining
communities or personnel within the base fence line or (b) the environment within or
outside the installation.
If these criteria are not met, no further studies will be conducted under the NACIP program.
As explained in this report, a Confirmation Study at MCB Camp Lejeune is warranted. The
criteria and conclusion used to justify a Confirmation Study was significantly altered in the
Final version of the report.
• June 24 & 25 1982. – TTHM water samples for all water systems aboard MCBCL were collected
for Grainger Labs. (CLW 570).
July 1 1982 – Memo from J. R. Bailey NavFacEngCom to Camp Lejeune concerning composite soil
sample advises Camp Lejeune to investigate sources of lead (MOGAS, AVGAS, engine oil, water battery
acid, etc.) in order to reduce/eliminate contamination. It was noted the Cadmium level was approaching
the hazardous waste limit and should be reduced/eliminated. Battery waste and electroplating operations
were noted sources of cadmium. (Cercla 2088).
• July 13 1982 -- Grainger Labs completes the analysis for the samples taken 25 June. The samples
were received on 28 June.
• July 27 1982 – Memo from base Supervisory Chemist Elizabeth Betz to Supervisory Ecologist
Danny Sharpe. Ms. Betz recommended TTHM monthly collections be reduced. However, she felt
MCAS New River should continue their monthly samples due to high readings. Ms. Betz also
advised Tarawa Terrace, Hadnot Point and Onslow Beach continue to be tested monthly. She
also pointed out the prior commitment by the previous Commanding General to continue monthly
sampling at the Rifle Range. (CLW 583).
• July 27 1982 – Memo from Julian Wooten to Base Maintenance officer regarding TTHM analysis.
No problems were noted for Hadnot Point. However, Mr. Wooten advised MCAS New River was
at the limit set for TTHMS and any increase would result in a violation. Mr. Wooten pointed out
the remaining six water systems aboard the base do not yet require official monitoring and
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recommended the monthly analysis be discontinued in favor of a quarterly program. Mr. Wooten
recommended the Utilities Branch evaluate alternatives for reducing TTHM content through
modification of chlorination methods and procedures. (CLW 582).
• July 28 1982 – Four water samples (2 from TT and 2 from Hadnot Point) taken and shipped under
ice to Grainger Labs. (CLW 584). These samples were in addition to the TTHM samples taken
for all base systems in 29 July. The purpose of the samples was to follow up on the April
readings which were discussed in a phone conversation on 6 May between Elizabeth Betz and
Mike Hargett of Grainger Labs. (CLW 589). The topic of the 6 May conversation was interference
in the TTHM readings for Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace caused by the presence of
trichloroethylene and tetrachloroethylene, aka Perclene, (synthetic organic cleaning solvents) in
the samples. (CLW 590).
• July 29 1982 – Phone call between Elizabeth Betz and Linda Sewall of the Water Supply Branch
State of North Carolina Department of Human Resources. They discussed TTHM reporting
requirements and violation procedures. Reporting was not required until November 1982.
Systems under 10,000 people were not required to report unless over TTHM limit. Ms. Betz
inquired about secondary contaminants and was told the state added lead, manganese and PH.
No mention was made to Ms. Sewall concerning the PCE and TCE readings in the water nor did
Ms. Betz inquire into whether or not these chemicals were a concern to the state of North
Carolina. (CLW 588).
August 5 1982 – Letter from NEESA, Port Hueneme to Camp Lejeune regarding the draft Initial
Assessment Study for Camp Lejeune. The Commanding General is provided their copy of the draft
IAS for review and comments. NEESA requested that Camp Lejeune review the report for
completeness, accuracy and concurrence with the recommendations contained within the report.
These comments were due by 25 August. (CLW 6332).
• Aug 10 1982 – Grainger Lab sent the Commanding General of Camp Lejeune analytical results
from July’s sampling. Mr. Babson advised “Interference which were thought to be chlorinated
hydrocarbons hindered the quantization of certain Trihalomethanes. These appeared to be at
high levels and hence more important from a health standpoint than the total
Trihalomethane content. For these reasons we called the situation to the attention of
Camp Lejeune personnel.” (CLW 592)
1. Tetrachloroethylene was identified as the contaminant in the Tarawa Terrace well fields. The
concentrations were relatively stable during the period of examination and ranged between 76100 ppb. (Note SNARL for extended exposures was set at 40 ppb). No action was taken.
2. The May 27 Tarawa Terrace sample was reanalyzed and found to contain 80 ppb of
tetrachlororethylene.
3. Tetrachloroethylene and Trichloroethylene were identified as the contaminants in the Hadnot Point
well fields. The levels in the July samples were much lower than the ones taken in May and
ranged between 19 & 21 ppb. No action was taken. Note the presence of tricholorethylene in the
well fields is not explained by the asbestos coated pipe theory forwarded by Elizabeth Betz. (see
19 April 1982 entry).
4. The 27 May sample for Hadnot Point was reanalyzed and found to contain 1,400 ppb of
trichloroethylene. The sample was taken from the base Naval Hospital.
5. The Grainger report was forwarded to Elizabeth Betz for interpretation.
Note, Mr. Babson’s conclusion that the contamination was emanating from the respective well fields
for both Tarawa Terrace and Hadnot Point meant that the wells providing raw water to these two
systems were contaminated.
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• Aug 18 1982 – Memorandum for the record from Elizabeth Betz. Ms. Betz advised that Federal
regulations only called for quarterly samplings. No TTHM problems were identified for the Tarawa
Terrace, Hadnot Point, Montford Point, Holcomb Blvd, Courthouse Bay or Onslow Beach systems.
Therefore the decision was made to reduce these systems to quarterly sampling per authorization
of the Base Maintenance Officer. MCAS New River will continue testing while base utilities make
changes. The Rifle Range will also continue monitoring to protect against intrusion from the
Chemical Landfill. (CLW 605).
• Aug 19 1982 – Memorandum for the record concerning Grainger labs letter of 10 Aug 1982.
Elizabeth Betz confirmed the May 6th warning from Grainger lab. Tetrachloroethylene and
Trichloroethylene were specifically identified and discussed. Betz noted TCE was used as a metal
degreaser and is also used as a pesticide and fumigant. Betz suggested the PCE readings at
Tarawa Terrace maybe due to coated Asbestos coated pipes in the water system. However, a
1983 base generated chart showing the materials used in the construction of pipes in the
base’s water distribution showed that no vinyl lined asbestos coated pipes were used in any
of the water distribution systems aboard the base. (CLW 6328).
No action was recommended even though the PCE levels were above the recommended extended
exposure level of 40 ppb. The 1,400 ppb reading at Hadnot Point was dismissed for no apparent
reason and the conclusion was made that Hadnot Point was within the TCE SNARL. A hand written
note at the bottom of the page reads,”special testing of TT & HP plants for trichloroethylene &
tetrachloroethylene. Both within limits, recommend sending data to LantDiv.” No further action was
taken. (CLW 606).
• Aug 23 1982 – Memo from Elizabeth Betz to Danny Sharpe concerning missing test results. Betz
advised she has no test results from Jennings Lab concerning the March and April 1982 water and
soil samples taken from the Rifle Range, chemical landfill and Lot 203. (CLW 3851). These reports
were provided to the base in a letter dated August 19, 1982 (Cercla 373).
• Aug 25 1982 – Letter from Commanding General MCBCL to Officer in charge Naval Energy and
Environmental Support Activity regarding draft of Initial Assessment Study for NACIP. In the letter,
Col. J.T. Marshall recommends the “Discussion of Trihalomethane content of Rifle Range on page
2-18 and extensive data shown on pages 6-12 through 6-18 overly stresses relationship with
hazardous material/waste disposal. It is important to note that accuracy of data provided by U.S.
Army laboratory is questionable. It is recommended that TTHM information be de-emphasized
throughout the report.” (CLW 6332).
• Aug 1982 -- A prior version of the USMC timeline, which was posted on their website from 2004
through the Spring of 2008, asserted that at this point in time MCBCL called and notified the State
of North Carolina Department of Health that they had detected VOCs in the water. The statement
was later retracted. The former official Marine Corps heading read as follows:
1. Aug 1982 -- Camp Lejeune officials were not certain whether VOCs were coming from pipes,
treatment plants, or from groundwater wells. Additionally, there was concern over the accuracy of
the VOC findings. Camp Lejeune remained in contact with the State of North Carolina Division of
Health Services regarding the findings of VOCs at Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace.
2. This supposed notification is in contradiction of known documents from the N.C Division of
Environmental Health, Public Water Supply Section. In a letter dated 01/04/00, Mike Bell advised
their first contact with MCBCL on the matter of VOCs in the water supply was through a
telephone conversation 12 Dec 1984. He could not find any record of any reports concerning
detection of VOCs from 1982-1984. (CLW 5010).
September 7 1982 – Supervisory Base Chemist, Elizabeth Betz advised MCAS New River high TTHM
reading was a result of TTHM formation beginning in the reservoir and continue through the water
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treatment system. She recommended chlorination be moved to later in the water treatment process.
(CLW 618).
Sept 8 1982 – MCBCL filed 7 permits for new water supply wells at the base. Six of these wells were
for Hadnot Point and the seventh was for the Rifle Range. (CLW 621).
• Sept 8 1982 – Memorandum from Elizabeth Betz. Ms. Betz summarized the 1981 and 1982 testing at
the Rifle Range water system. In her summary, Mrs. Betz noted the finished water was
contaminated with organics which could be traced back to water supply well RR-97. Since then,
well RR-97 was not used except for emergencies. (CLW 635 + CLW 640). (note some of the
same organics were found in TT and HP finished water but these wells were left operating,
why?)
• Sept 23 1982 – TTHM samples collected for Rifle Range and MCAS New River. The other water
systems aboard MCBCL were not sampled. (CLW 646).
• Sept 23 1982 – The State of North Carolina granted permission of the seven new wells aboard Camp
Lejeune. (CLW 651).
October 1 1982 – Letter from Assistant Chief of Staff Facilities to Base Maintenance Officer advising
NREAD Branch will be realigned so as to be under the direct supervisory control of the Assistant Chief of
Staff, facilities. This realignment brings the base’s laboratory (Elizabeth Betz’a and subsequent
environmental testing under direct control by officers of the Marine Corps. (CLW 3882).
•

Oct 11 1982 – The State of North Carolina granted permission for the 23 September application to
construct a new water supply well at Tarawa Terrace (TT-23). (CLW 682).

November 10 1982 – NACIP IAS out-briefing held aboard MCBCL. Attendees included LantDiv
personnel, base officials, Marine Corps officers, and a representative from the IAS. No minutes of this
meeting have been found. (Cercla 2058).
• Nov 22 1982 – Phone call from Jerry Wallmeyer to MCBCL. Mr. Wallmeyer’s called the base to
notify Robert Alexander (base Environmental Engineer) and the AC/S Facilities of five new sites
which were discovered since the IAS team left. These sites included possible Nuclear, biological
chemical materials at the Rifle Range chemical Dump, (Cercla 208).
• Nov 29 1982 – Quarterly TTHM collected for all systems aboard MCBCL. Note prior to this
collection only the Rifle Range and MCAS New River systems were analyzed on a monthly basis
after August 1982. (CLW 688 + CLW 605).
December 7 1982 – Base officials notify the State of North Carolina that building 712 has ceased
operating as a site for the child sitting service for the base. (Cercla 268).
• Dec 9 1982 – Grainger Labs warned MCBCL the analysis of the eight water treatment systems
indicated resumption of VOC interferences in the TT and Hadnot Point systems.
Trichloroethylene and tetrachloroethylene were cited as the compounds that were interfering
with the analysis. No action was taken. (CLW 691).
• December 14 1982 – A change order was issued for The IAS to include 2 disposal sites in their
final study. The report was released four months from the date of the change order. (Cercla
2059). Jerry Wallmeyer of LantDiv requested Camp Lejeune’s environmental Engineer, Bob
Alexander, to send a message from the base to LantDiv in order to initiate the change. The
sites included two areas at the Rifle Range Chemical Dump, an old sawmill located near the
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mess hall grease trap, twenty drums of transformer oil, two sites near TLX Owl involving
pesticides and a site located near the Rifle Range where an operator burying TCE, DDT and
another chemical was injured during an explosion which occurred in 1970. (Cercla 208).
• Dec 13 1982 – The State of North Carolina requested MCBCL to follow up on their July 1982
agreement concerning groundwater monitoring at the Chemical landfill. Included in the testing
was a requirement for “Total Organic Halogen”. (CLW 3993).
• Dec 21 1982 – Elizabeth Betz called Bruce Babson to discuss a typographical error made on the
last round of sampling. Mr. Babson expressed his concern to Ms. Betz over the solvents which
previously interfered with prior Tarawa Terrace and Hadnot Point TTHM Samples. He advised
that the PCE & TCE interference were still present in both systems. During the phone
conversation Mr. Babson told Ms. Betz that the levels (TCE/PCE) at Hadnot Point had dropped
for a while, however in the last sample the levels were relatively high again. The TTHM levels
at MCAS New River remain just at compliance to the new standards (CLW 698).
January 4 1983 – Julian Wooten forwarded a request to the AC/S Facilities to have the base
Environmental Engineer (Robert Alexander) look into the TTHM interference problem (PCE & TCE) at
Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace water distribution systems. Attached to the request is the December
21st memo from Elizabeth Betz concerning her phone call with Grainger Labs and the interference caused
by TCE and PCE. (CLW 703).
• Jan 26 1983 – TTHM samples collected from MCAS New River and Rifle Range only. (CLW 6402).
February 25 1983 – Julian Wooten, Director Natural Resources and Environmental Affairs Division
(NREAD) aboard MCBCL, advised the Assistant Chief of Staff, facilities that the initial one year TTHM
monitoring period will end in February. He advised that MCAS New River was not in compliance with
TTHM standards and requested that they initiate immediate consult with state regulatory personnel on
order to achieve compliance. Mr. Wooten also recommended that the base discontinue TTHM monitoring
except for MACS New River and Hadnot Point. (CLW 6402).
• Feb 25 1983 – TTHM Samples taken from all water systems aboard MCBCL and sent to Grainger
Lab. (CLW 6393).
March 1 1983 – OIC, DSSC Letter DSSC/DRF/EDW 11333 indicated that piece meal rehabilitation of the
fuel facility (Hadnot Point) would not be cost effective and recommended a major rehabilitation of the
facility to include relocation of bulk loading stands, dispensing pumps, unloading area and the
administration building. Excavation of and exposure of all tanks and pipes was recommended. (Cercla
96) See PDF page 29.
Note the fuel farm remained operational until 1989. The draft IAS recommended testing of well HP 602 as
part of the confirmation study because this well was actively pumping water for Hadnot Point and located
down gradient and 1,100 feet from the Hadnot Point fuel farm.
March 7 1983 – Military Construction Project Data for project LE433R, POL Truck Dispensing Units at the
Hadnot Point Fuel Farm. $209,300 was allocated to provide for improvements for new truck stands,
pumps, valves, piping, and pavement/oil spill controls. (Cercla 96) See PDF page 20.
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• March 16 1983 – Grainger Lab completed the quarterly TTHM analysis for the water systems
aboard MCBCL and once again warned that there was interference due to trichloroethylene in
the Hadnot Point samples. There was no reported interference with the Tarawa Terrace
samples. No action was taken. (CLW 6393).
• March 30 1983 – W. R. Price, Utility System Operator General Foreman, advised Julian Wooten
that there was an inadequate water supply for Tarawa Terrace and Camp Johnson for the
upcoming summer months. Mr. Price commented that well field production has diminished from
what was achieved in past years. He noted that a new well (TT-25) was constructed in April
1982 at Tarawa Terrace and that a second new well was under construction (TT-23). Mr. Price
further cautioned that the continual use of these wells without periodic rest could result in well
failures. (note, overuse of the wells will also result in an increase draw of contaminants into the
well head.) (CLW 707).
• March 30 1983 – Col J.T. Marshall, Facilities Assistant Chief of Staff, wrote State Health Director,
Ronald H Levine concerning building 712, former site of the base child sitting service. He
advised that Chlordane and DDT were confirmed at the mix and wash pads but that
concentrations within the playground area were shown to within detection limits. Air samples
taken from within the building revealed no detectable DDT, malathion, or chlordane. (Cercla
268).
April 1983 – Initial Assessment Study for Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune was published and
concludes that while none of the sites posed an immediate threat to human health or the environment,
further investigation was warranted at 23 of the 76 sites. There was no mention in the IAS report of any
problem or dangers to the potable water systems at Hadnot Point or Tarawa Terrace. TTHM and organic
solvent contamination were discussed only in reference to the Rifle Range water treatment system.
The Final IAS report reads that Recommendations for a Confirmation Study phase of the NACIP
program was based on the findings of an IAS. A Confirmation Study is recommended only if the
following circumstances exist:
1. Sufficient evidence exists to suspect that the activity is contaminated; and
2. The potential contamination may present a danger to (a) the health of civilians in nearby
communities or personnel within the activity fence line, (b) the environment within or outside
the installation.
No further studies will be conducted under the NACIP program, if these criteria are not met. As explained
in this report, a Confirmation Study at MCB Camp Lejeune is warranted. The IAS concluded that while
none of the sites pose an immediate threat to human health of the environment, 22 warrant further
investigation under the Navy Assessment and Control of Installation Pollutants (NACIP) program to
assess potential long term impacts. A Confirmation Study is, involving actual sampling and monitoring of
the 22 sites is recommended to confirm or deny the existence of the suspected contamination and to
quantify the extent of any problems which may exist. (CLW 709).
• April 7 1983 – The contractor for well TT-23 certifies that the newly constructed well was
constructed in accordance with the state’s well construction regulations. The well was pumped
tested for 24 hours on March 15th. (TT-23 Construction logs). This document is in
contradiction to the official Marine Corps position that this well was completed in July 1984.
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The Marine Corps further contends that the well was found to be contaminated upon
construction and thus, never put into production. Please refer to July 1984 entry for more
information.
• April 14 1983 – Environmental Engineering Survey for Camp Lejeune prepared by Utilities, Energy
and Environmental Division, NavFacEngCom. The report covered the period in time between
October through the beginning of November 1982. The purpose of the report was to identify
environmental facility, environmental operation, and maintenance deficiencies. The report
covered Air Pollution, Potable water, Wastewater, Oil and Hazardous Waste/Toxic Substances.
At the end of the summary is a paragraph which states “Any Environmental problem that
should arise between surveys or problems inadvertently omitted during the current survey
should be directed to NavFacEngCom. There were no discussions concerning Grainger lab’s
findings of PCE and TCE in the potable water for Camp Lejeune contained in this report (CLW
6141).
1. Located in the Hazardous materials section of the report is the comment that the paint
and sign shop (Bldg HDP-1410) waste solvents are such as cellulose acetate thinners
are poured down the sink drains. The report recommended MCB Camp Lejeune should
identify and stop the disposal of waste solvents into sanitary sewers.
2. MCB Camp Lejeune should identify and stop the disposal of waste solvents into the
sanitary sewers.
3. Maintenance areas #TP-448, Bldg 902 and 901 were noted areas where cleaning solvent
were stored. The area lacked appropriate waste oil handling facilities and as a result of
spillage the areas have become heavily contaminated with oil.
4. A used oil solvent study if presently scheduled for FY-84.
5. TTHM readings were discussed in relation to MCAS. There was no mention of the August
1982 letter from Grainger lab nor interference in Tarawa Terrace or Hadnot Point’s TTHM
readings due to the presence of tetrachloroethylene and trichloroethylene in the potable
water.
May 10 1983 – Letter from Jerry Wallmeyer at LantDiv to MCBCL. This letter was the subject of an
intensive 4 week document search that occurred at the LantDiv repository in February of 1999. (CLW
3048 + 3049) The letter was reportedly never found but over 33 boxes of documents were uncovered.
According to a memo dated 3 April 1985, the letter was an action plan to verify the existence and extent
of VOC contamination aboard MCBCL. (CLW 1195). (note, this letter is written three years after
VOCs are first detected in the potable water at MCBCL. The letter is also is one and a half years
before the contaminated wells at Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace are shut down. Another major
point of concern is this question; Why was the information concerning VOC contamination of at
least two potable water systems left out of the IAS? Why did Mr. Bailey of LantDiv recommend
that Rifle Range well RR-97 not be used because of organic contamination in July 1981? Why
wasn’t the same recommendation made concerning the organic contamination present in the
Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace systems?)
• May 31 1983 – TTHM samples taken for all eight water treatment systems aboard MCBCL. (CLW
6380).
June 1 1983 – Assistant Chief of Staff for Facilities, Col J.T. Marshall, sent compiled test results for
inorganic chemical, corrosivity analyses, and Trihalomethanes averages to Charles Rundgren at the
State of North Carolina Water Supply Branch. He did not include the original Grainger Lab reports.
Instead a compiled table of the Grainger data was submitted. (CLW 934).
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The 2007 GAO report contains the assertion that vinyl lined asbestos coated pipes were the possible
source for PCE contamination for the base. The basis for this fallacy is contained in a memorandum
written by Elizabeth Betz asserting her opinion that she believed the contamination was possibly the
result of vinyl line asbestos coated pipes in the raw water lines at Tarawa Terrace (CLW 606). Today the
United States Marine Corps continually cites this reason as their excuse as to why the wells were
not tested until late 1984. The basis for this assumption was apparently due to a 9 April 1980 EPA
bulletin which cited vinyl lined asbestos coated pipes as a source for drinking water contamination. The
EPA also noted that their suggested action guidance did not condone the presence of any level of PCE
contamination in drinking water. (CLW 391). The problem with Betz’s conclusion was that according
to base construction records, no vinyl lined asbestos coated pipes were ever used in any of the
base’s potable water distribution systems.(CLW 3884). CLW 3884 is the rough draft version of CLW
934. CLW 934’s reference lines cite the construction material chart but it is missing from the document.
CLW 3884 and CLW 934 are the complete document together.
• Jun 15 1983 – May TTHM samples analyzed by Grainger Lab. There are no PCE/TCE
interferences noted for Tarawa Terrace. The Hadnot Point results show the same
interferences as in past results but there are no notations concerning where the interference
originates. In past reports PCE/TCE was noted to be the source of the interference. (CLW
6380). No action was taken.
• Jun 21 1983 – Wm Larry Elmore, Environmental Engineer, Water Supply Branch State of North
Carolina, sent Col. Marshall a letter in response to the 01 June 1983 letter concerning
inorganic chemical, corrosivity analyses, and Trihalomethane analysis. Mr. Elmore thanked
Col. Marshall for the data compilation but informed him that the State required the raw
analytical data on the actual forms used by Grainger. The Grainger forms for the
Trihalomethane analysis during the time period in question contain notations and warnings
from Grainger Labs indicating the interference for Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace was the
result PCE/TCE contamination. (CLW 940).
July 14 1983 – Letter from J.R. Bailey to CG MCBCL regarding groundwater monitoring results at the
Rifle Range water distribution system. Mr. Bailey advised that the organic contamination detected in
earlier testing was no longer present in the Rifle Range water distribution system. However, test wells
continue to show organic contamination in the groundwater around the chemical dump. He advised the
base that the organic contamination at the dump will be addressed via the NACIP Confirmation study.
(CLW 5937).
• Jul 15 1983 – Col Marshall advised LantDiv the base has seen the 10 May 83 Wallmeyer letter and
concurred with the scope of work detailed in the letter. He requested that Bob Alexander be
contacted to set up the required meeting between base officials and the contractor performing
the Confirmation Study. (Cercla 2063).
• Jul 27 1983 – Samples taken for TTHM analysis from all eight systems aboard Camp Lejeune.
These samples were lost in the mail. (CLW 6377).
August 11 1983 – The new Facilities Assistant Chief of Staff, Col. Lilley, provided the North Carolina
Department of Human Resources a copy of the IAS report and advised 22 of the 76 identified sites
warranted further investigation. However, none of the 22 sites were reported to pose an immediate threat
to human health. (Cercla 2004).
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• Aug 25 1983 – Samples from all eight water systems collected for TTHM analysis by Grainger
Labs. (CLW 949).
• Aug 29 1983 – Grainger report on the August 25th samples indicated that PCE and TCE was
present in the water samples from Tarawa Terrace and Hadnot Point. (CLW 952). No action
was taken.
December 1 1983 – Letter from LantDiv to MCBCL concerning contract 81-B-3849 Inspection and
Testing of POL tanks. The letter provided criteria for testing and inspection of tanks base wide. (Cercla
1235).
See 31 May 1985 entry concerning this inspection.
• Dec 12 1983 – Assistant Chief of Staff for Facilities, Col Lilley responded to the 21 Jun 1983 letter
from Mr. Elmore, Environmental Engineer State of North Carolina. The letter was addressed to
Mr. Rundgren. Col Lilley resubmitted the TTHM complied results and two additional tables
explaining the results. Col Lilley also noted that per a 30 Nov 1983 telephone conversation with
Dick Caspers at the Water Supply Branch, the original Grainger lab reports were not submitted
as previously requested by Mr. Elmore (these are the reports which contained the notes
and warnings from Grainger that PCE/TCE were interfering with the TTHM analysis for
Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace). Col. Lilley requests that Hadnot Point be reduced from
quarterly TTHM sampling to annually. (this would eliminate most of the troublesome warnings
from Grainger Labs). MCAS New River remained on a quarterly testing schedule (CLW 6348).
• Dec 21 1983 – Bob Alexander, Environmental Engineer MCBCL, called Arthur Mouberry N.C. State
Division of Environmental Management and makes a verbal request for the construction of 55
monitoring wells aboard MCBCL. The wells were needed for the Confirmation phase of the
NACIP program. (CLW 6512 & CLW 6516).
January 18 1984 – December TTHM samples for MCAS New River and Hadnot Point were analyzed.
Interference was noted in the Hadnot Point samples but no explanation was given as in earlier reports.
No action was taken. (CLW 6362).
• Jan 20 1984 – The State of N.C. granted permission for MCBCL to reduce TTHM sampling at
Hadnot Point to one sample per quarter. (CLW 977).
February 9 1984 – Letter from Commanding General MCBCL to Commanding Officer, Field Medical
Service School. AC/S facilities, Col. Lilley, advised commanding officer of the Field Medical School that
Camp Johnson and Tarawa Terrace water treatment plants were to be abandoned after the expansion of
the Holcomb Blvd water treatment plant. Construction was set to begin in January 1985 and completed by
December 1985. (Cercla 312).
March 27 1984 – Charles Rundgren requests MCAS New River’s sodium analysis for their water system.
The request was forwarded to Camp Lejeune in April 1984. (CLW 5333). The results were submitted 30
April 1984. (CLW 4133).
April 9 1984 -- Grainger Labs conducts TTHM tests for Camp Lejeune. Sample #458 for the Laundry
Room Sink at building FC-530 on Hadnot Point show interference from an unlisted contaminant as noted
by Bruce Babson. Tarawa Terrace was not sampled and the remaining five samples taken for this period
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were for New River Air station. Three of the readings exceeded the MCL for TTHMS. (CLW 5183 PDF
page 46).
April 16-18 1984 – Meeting between Confirmation study contractors and base official held aboard
MCBCL to discuss scope of work, plan of action and milestones (POA&M). There are no records of the
meeting other than a brief note on page 2-1 Confirmation Work and Safety Plan. (Cercla 337).
May 02 1984 – State granted permission for the construction of 2 new supply wells for the Hadnot Point
water system. (CLW 999).
• May 1984 – Work and Safety Plan for Confirmation study. The work plan was the verification step
in which the hired contractor will determine whether specific toxic and hazardous materials
identified in the IAS were present in concentrations considered to be hazardous. The study will
install ground water monitoring wells, sample soil, tissue, ground and surface water for
contaminants. The verification step will be a general evaluation of contamination found and will
serve as a basis to proceed with the Characterization step of the Confirmation Study. A draft
report will be provided by August 1984 and a Final report will be provided by September 10
1984. (Cercla 337).
June 1984 -- EPA published proposed recommended maximum contaminant levels (RMCL) for TCE and
PCE in drinking water and solicited public comment. Under the Occurrence of VOCs in drinking water
heading, the registry reads: “VOCs are man made chemicals; their presence may indicate that a pollution
incident has occurred.” (CLW 5055).
• June 7 1984 – Article titled “Environmental Study kicks-off” appeared in the base newspaper The
Globe. The article read that environmental engineers and scientist from ESE were going to
spend six weeks drilling wells and collecting water, soil and sediment samples to determine if
hazardous materials exist and/or have the potential to contaminate the environment on the
base. AC/S, facilities Colonel Lilley stated “While contractor personnel will routinely wear
personal protective equipment such as chemical resistant coveralls, we do not expect to
expose anyone to any contaminants.” The results of the survey were expected by August
1984. (Cercla 132).
July 1984 – Environmental Science and Engineering sampled the Hadnot Point Industrial area around
the fuel farm and supply well HP-602 as part of their Confirmation investigation. Well 602 tested positive
for VOCs (Benzene 380ppb, Dichloroethane 46ppb, Trans-Dichloroethene 7.8ppb, Ethylbenzene 8ppb,
Trichlororfluoromethane 3 ppb, and Toluene 10ppb). (CLW 1737 & Cercla 388). According to Marine
Corps and State of North Carolina documents, eight wells of the Tarawa Terrace distribution system were
tested for VOCs in July 1984. The Marine Corps claims they found three of these wells contaminated with
TCE.
Wells tested July 1984

TT-23

TT-26

TT-25

TCE

37 ppb

3.9 ppb

trace amounts

No apparent action was taken. The analytical data sheets for all of these tests are missing. It is important
to note that the USMC provided the above mentioned readings in support of their first contention that TT
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well # 23 (New Well) was discovered contaminated upon construction (CLW 2982) and never ran. The
fact the analytical data sheets are missing raises skepticism to the validity of their claim. The USMC’s
original position changed after it was discovered that well TT-23 (New Well) was indeed fully operational
by 1984 and provided water to the Tarawa Terrace water distribution system and the consumers on that
system. The USMC has since revised its position and now contends that the well began operating in July
1984. However construction documents indicate that well TT-23 (New Well) was pump tested by April of
1983 (TT-23 Construction Log). Ironically, a month before the wells completion, the utilities foreman for
the base for the base sent a memo to the utilities directory advising him of an impending water shortage
for the summer of 1983 at Tarawa Terrace (CLW 707). It is hard to believe that a fully operational well
was left dormant until July 1984, especially in the midst of a water shortage. ATSDR requested the
construction paperwork for the well’s pump house and equipment. To date, the USMC has been unable to
provide the requested paperwork to ATSDR.
Finally, if the test results are correct then, the presence of VOCs in the raw water supply wells should
have been a clear indication that a pollution event had occurred within the groundwater aboard the base.
No explanation has been given as to why it took five to seven additional months to shut down
wells HP 602, TT-23, and TT-26 after the results of these tests. (CLW 2982, CLW 5094, 87 May N.C.
Site Inspection Report, ATSDR Chapter A Summary of Findings).
July 10 1984 – Grainger Labs conducts TTHM tests for Camp Lejeune. Sample #464 for the Laundry
Room Sink at building FC-530 on Hadnot Point show interference from an unlisted contaminant as note
by Edgar Folk for Bruce Babson. Tarawa Terrace was not sampled and the remaining five samples taken
for this period were for New River Air station. Three of the readings exceeded the MCL for TTHMS. (CLW
5183 PDF page 49).
October 3 1984 – Grainger Labs conducts TTHM tests for Camp Lejeune. Sample #470 was from the
Laundry Room Sink at building FC-530 on Hadnot Point. There are no notations of interference from
technician Edgar Folk. Bruce Babson did not appear on the notes for this test. Tarawa Terrace was not
sampled and the remaining five samples taken for this period were for New River Air station. Three of the
readings exceeded the MCL for TTHMS. (CLW 5183 PDF page 52).
July – November 1984 – According to the Work Safety Plan for the confirmation study, there were three
progress reports scheduled during this time frame. The work study plan also read that ESE will routinely
contact the EIC to report the project status and any adjustments to the schedule. These reports and
updates are missing. (Cercla 337). We attempted to locate the missing data at ESE (Now called
MACTEC) but we were informed that the warehouse which contained these documents burned down
during the middle of the night on 7 January 1999. The cause of the fire was never conclusively
determined. (Fl Div of State Fire Marshal report # 99-0110).
November 30 1984 – Throughout the history of the drinking water contamination, the USMC has
maintained that Well HP 602 was shut down after benzene (121ppb), TCE (1,600 ppb), DCE (630ppb)
and PCE (24ppb) were found in the well water. (CLW 1054 & CLW 4971). The figures for these results
were based on a 3 December sample of well HP 602. This sample was taken after the well was taken off
line on 30 November. In fact, well HP 602 was sampled four and a half months prior to the 30 November
closure of well HP 602. On 6 July 1984, Well HP 602 was sampled and found to contain benzene at 380
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ppb and trace amounts of solvents. This data was collected while well HP 602 was an active pumping
well for the Hadnot Point water distribution system. (Cercla 388). The incorrect data (i.e. the 3
December samples) was included in the ATSDR 1997 Public Health Assessment (withdrawn April
2009), the 2007 GAO report on Camp Lejeune and the 2009 NRC Committee report on Camp
Lejeune.
During a 1988 briefing for the Technical Review Committee, Base Environmental Engineer, Robert
Alexander stated, “This well (602) in particular triggered this whole investigation. It was an active water
supply well at the time, and by sampling and analyzing, we identified the presence of some of these
volatile organic compounds, waste solvent, fuel derived materials. Based on that finding, Camp Lejeune
initiated a self-sampling of all of these wells”. When asked about what levels were present in the water,
Mr. Alexander comments “It depends on where you are…This was in the…and I am speaking off the top
of my head, 30 ppb (actually it was 1,600 ppb), fairly low but still toxic enough for you that you don’t
want to touch the water. (Cercla 47).
December 3 1984 – Well 602 and several other wells from the Hadnot Point water system were sampled
by base officials and analyzed for VOCs. (Cercla 250).
• Dec 4 1984 – VOCs were detected Hadnot Point water system. Samples were taken again and
shipped to the lab via Federal Express. (CLW 1054).
• Dec 6 1984 – Robert Alexander, base environmental engineer, returned a call to J.R. Bailey at
LantDiv. Mr. Bailey informed him that benzene was found in well 602, trichloroethylene was
found in wells 602,601,603 and 608 as well as the finished tap water at the treatment plant.
They agreed that confirmation testing should be initiated as soon as possible on these and
other nearby wells. Mr. Bailey advised that a message containing an action planning was
forthcoming. Mr. Alexander briefs Assistant Chief of Staff, facilities, Col. Lilley and Lt Col.
Fitzgerald later that afternoon. Mr. Alexander advised base utilities to shut down wells 601 and
608. (Cercla 250 & CLW 5635).

Hadnot
Point
Raw
water

Hadnot
Point
Treated
water

601

602

603

608

0

0

0

121

0

0

10

16

0

0

0

0

6

10

0

0

0

0

TCE

46

200

207

1600

4.6

110

DCE

15

83

88

630

0

5.4

Contaminant
Benzene
Chloroform
BRCL2Mthne
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PCE

0

3.9

0

24

0

0

Readings are in
PPB

• Dec 10 1984 – December 4th samples results revealed continued VOC contamination of raw water
and wells 601,602,605,608 and now wells 634, 637 and 642. (CLW 1054).
• Dec 10 1984 – Robert Alexander, base Environmental Engineer, called Mike Bell, Regional
Engineer, State of North Carolina and advised him VOCs have been found in the Hadnot Point
water system. He stated that four wells have been shut down and further testing was
underway. (CLW 1051).
• Dec 12 1984 – Finished water at Hadnot Point tested and found to contain 30 PPB Chloroform. 2.3
ppb DCE and 2.3 ppb TCE. A 13 December test of raw (before treatment) Hadnot Point water
did not detect any PCE/TCE/DCE in the water. (CLW 5644).
• Dec 12 1984 – Article appeared in Marine Corps news periodical, The Globe. The article reads:
“Environmental officials are taking precautionary measures to ensure drinking water is free
from possible contamination. As a result of water samples taken on 3 Dec, four wells in the
Hadnot Point industrial area were found to contain some traces of organic compounds
according to Base Environmental Engineer, Bob Alexander.” The article goes on to read that
none of the organic compounds are listed under the Safe Drinking Water Act. The article ends
with a quote from Mr. Alexander, “every effort will be made to maintain the excellent quality
water supply traditionally provided to residents of Camp Lejeune.” (Cercla 523).
• Dec 14 1984 – Hadnot Point Wells 634 and 637 were shut down after testing positive for methyl
chloride. (CLW 1647 & CLW 4546).
January 8 1985 – NavFacEngCom quality control lab checked and verifies the validity of JTC
Environmental Consultanst’s findings concerning VOCs in the Hadnot Point water system. Cheryl Barnett
of NavFacEngCom advised that ESE results were not yet available and a letter from LantDiv will follow
soon. (CLW 1103).
Jan 8 1985 – Enclosure from unknown letter to Bob Alexander. The enclosure detailed the proposed
action plan to characterize the VOC problem at the base.
1. The 7 remaining WTP plants were to be surveyed for VOCs.
2. The 100 wells on base, including the ones previously identified, were to be sampled.
3. NavFacEngCom will evaluate alternatives to respond to these tests.
4. ESE (Confirmation study contractor) will be tasked to define the scope and solution to the problem
(VOCs in the drinking water). (CLW 1105).
• Jan 11 1985 – Ground water quality standards were revised in the Federal Registry. (CLW 1106).
• Jan 14 1985 – Environmental Science and Engineering (ESE) released Evaluation of Data from
First Round of Verification Sample Collection and Analysis. This report was the raw data from
the first round of sampling (June to November 1984) and was provided to the Marine Corps
during the time the base was scrambling to determine the extent of the potable water
contamination. (Cercla 388).
1. The data presented in this report consist of analytical results for samples of surface and
ground waters, sediments, soils and fish tissue collected at 21 sites of potential
contamination.
2. 55 shallow ground water monitoring wells and 75 samples were collected.
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3. 17 existing potable water supply wells were sampled.
4. On the margins for site 1 (page 2-8) there was a handwritten note that reads, “It appears
that we do not have a true up gradient well. How will we explain away contamination in
up gradient wells or should we expand well field now or in characterization.”
5. On the margins of site 6 (2-18) aka Lot 201 and 203 there is a handwritten note that
reads, “sample 3 potable water wells on Piney Green Road for pesticides, dioxin and
contaminants found in MCBCL work. And on Holcomb Blvd. It was not clear if well HP651 was one of these wells discussed.
6. On the margin for site 22 (2-34) aka Hadnot Point Industrial Area Tank Farm there was a
handwritten note that reads, “We must send them our (1141’s) report on well data, what it
means and what wells to keep shut down.
7. PDF Page 48. Hadnot Point Fuel Farm Site 22. “of extreme importance is the high level
of benzene (380ppb) detected on the sample collected from deep water supply well no.
602. This benzene concentration far exceeds the 10 minus 5 human health risk limit of
6.6 ppb; therefore the use of this well should be discontinued immediately.”
8. PDF page 52 Hadnot Point Fuel Farm Site 22. “The absence of contamination at well
22GW2 indicates that the migration pathway is deep, not shallow.”
Note, the Confirmation Study contractor’s monthly progress reports (August, October,
September and November) a draft report and an evaluation of data scheduled for completion
by September 1984 in the May 1984 Work and Safety plan for the Confirmation study are
missing. The reports fall in between the actual sampling of well HP-602 on 6 July 1984 and
the January release of this report. (Cercla 388.)

•

• Jan 16 1985 – All operating wells for Holcomb Blvd. and Hadnot Point sampled. (CLW 4546).
• Jan 23 1985 – Tarawa Terrace water treatment system sampled. Analysis completed by lab on Feb
5 1985. (CLW 5570).
• Jan 27 1985 – The water treatment plant operator on duty received 2 phone calls from residents of
Paradise Point and Berkley Manor. They complained of a fuel smell in the finished water. The
operator collected samples form the areas affected and when he returned the source of the
fuel odor was located at the Holcomb Blvd WTP plant. The plant was taken off line and the 1
million gallon reservoir was drained. Holcomb Blvd WTP is off line from Jan 27 th through Feb
4th. (CLW 4514). During this time, finished water was provided to the areas served by
Holcomb Blvd from Hadnot Point WTP by means of a bypass valve connecting the two plants
together. (CLW 4546).
Jan 31 1985 – The state of North Carolina takes water samples from Holcomb Blvd WTP to
determine whether or not gasoline was still present in the system. There was no gasoline found.
Instead high levels of TCE were discovered throughout the Holcomb Blvd water distribution system.
(CLW 4514 + 29 Jan NC State report).
Analysis
completed
2/4/85

Hadnot Point
WTP

Holcomb
Blvd WTP

Holcomb
Blvd WTP

Holcomb
Blvd WTP

Tank S803

From
Distribution
Pump

Bottom of
Reservoir

Middle of
Reservoir

Top of
Reservoir

Fire
Hydrant
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TCE
Reading

900.02 ppb

24.2 ppb

25.8 ppb

26.8 ppb

849.0 ppb

DCE
Reading

321.3 ppb

7.4 ppb

7.8 ppb

7.6 ppb

340.0 ppb

Location

Berkley
Manor Elem.

MOQ 2212
Cold Water

MOQ 2212
Hot Water

Building PP
2600

Tank S2323

Bldg 5400

Chief of Staff
residence

Chief of Staff
residence

Firehouse

Water
Storage
Tank

TCE
Reading

1148.4 ppb

724.7 ppb

612.9 ppb

890.9 ppb

407.1 ppb

DCE
Reading

406.6 ppb

249.4 ppb

201.2 ppb

332.4 ppb

159.0 ppb

Location

Married
officer’s Qtrs

Tank SLCH
4004

Bldg BM
5677

Bldg
BM5531

Fire Hydrant
MOQ 2204

Storage Tank

TCE
Reading

839.6 ppb

318.3 ppb

981.3 ppb

905.5 ppb

DCE
Reading

307.6 ppb

107.5 ppb

368.7 ppb

335.0 ppb

the above table was compiled from CLW 4515 + CLW 5371.

Feb 5 1985 – Tarawa Terrace Wells TT-26 and TT-23 (New Well) tested positive for VOCs.
Samples taken
1/25/85

PCE

TCE

DCE

Vinyl Chloride

TT-26

1580 ppb

57 ppb

92 ppb

27 ppb

TT-23

132 ppb

5.8 ppb

11 ppb

0 ppb
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(CLW 5587, CLW 5571 & CLW 5593).
• Feb 4 1985 – Holcomb Blvd WTP is reactivated. Holcomb Blvd and Hadnot Point began flushing
their systems. (CLW 4546).
• Feb 4 1985 – Samples taken from Hadnot Point wells January 16th are returned from the JTC lab.
Several new wells were discovered to be contaminated with VOCs. Well 651 tested positive for
extreme amounts of VOCs in the water. This well was located immediately adjacent to the
base junkyard. Well HP-651 was shut down (CLW 5594 & CLW 4546).
Samples Taken
1/27/05

PCE

TCE

DCE

Vinyl Chloride

Well 634 (out of
service)

10 ppb

1,300 ppb

700 ppb

6.8 ppb

Well 651

386 ppb

3,200 ppb

3,400 ppb

655 ppb

Well 652

5.5 ppb

Well 653

1.5 ppb

Well 601 (Out of
service)

26 ppb

8 ppb

• Feb 7 1985 – Areas in the Holcomb Blvd WDS including Berkley Manor Elementary school were
tested again for VOCs. The results were received the same day. VOCs were present but in
lower concentrations. Berkley manor Elementary tested 135.1 PPB TCE. (CLW 5369).
• Feb 8 1985 – Wells 652 and 653 on Hadnot Point and Wells TT-26 and TT -23 (New Well) at
Tarawa Terrace were shut down. (CLW 5095).
• Feb 22 1985 – Hadnot Point WTP tested 1 ppb TCE in finished water. (CLW 4533).
• Feb 27 1985 – Three hour meeting between Rick Shiver, State of North Carolina, and Robert
Alexander, Base Environmental Engineer. Mr. Shiver’s brief notes indicated that he agreed to
send copies of N.C. State regulations to Mr. Alexander. Mr. Alexander turned over copies of
Hadnot Point data. (CLW 4558).
• Feb 27 1985 – Letter addressed to Jerry Hardwood at LantDiv from Calgon Activated Carbon
Division. The letter was a follow up to a phone conversation concerning cost estimates for
emergency potable water treatment systems for Trichloroethylene contamination at 1,600 –
2,000 PPB. Costs associated with this measure:
1. Delivery, installation and supervision/training, $60-70,000
2. Fee after first month,
$
5,000
3. Extra Truckloads of filtrasorb and disposal,
$ 21,000
4. Shipment is within 24-48 hours of client authorization. (CLW 6520).
March 1 1985 – Action Brief concerning alternatives for providing water to Tarawa Terrace area. Because
of the closure of wells TT-26 and TT-23, base officials realized that there will be an estimated shortage of
300,000 gallons per day of water at Tarawa Terrace beginning immediately and lasting through out the
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summer months. A list of 7 alternatives was proposed by Facilities Assistant Chief of Staff, Col. Lilley.
(CLW 1129)
1. Install a new well at Tarawa Terrace. The problem with a newer well is that water in significant
quantities is difficult to locate at Tarawa Terrace. Estimate cost: $80,000.
2. Transport water via tanker trucks from other water plants. However, the logistic of hauling 300,000
gallons per day was questionable. Estimated cost: $2,000 per day.
3. Tap into existing City of Jacksonville water line under Lejeune Blvd. There was a concern that the
city may not be able to provide the water and there was a fear that the city would request
reciprocating favors to the Marine Corps. Estimated cost: Unknown.
4. Change existing contract for Holcomb Blvd to construct a water line to Tarawa Terrace immediately.
Estimated cost: Unknown.
5. Construct 8’’ water line from Brewster Blvd to Tarawa Terrace across the railroad trestle on
Northeast Creek. It was unknown if the state would approve the measure. Estimated Cost:
$75,000.
6. Modify Tarawa Terrace plant to include aeration or granular activated carbon unit capable of
removing VOCs. A time objection was made concerning installation but this is contrary to the
letter from Calgon, please see entry dated 27 Feb 1985. Estimated Cost: $300,000.
7. Re-activate and use contaminated well(s) that have been closed if required to maintain
adequate water levels and pressure. Lack of Federal MCLs for VOCs or restrictions for using
VOC contaminated water is used to justify this measure. However, the brief also reads “the
potential health hazards must be weighed against the need and cost of providing water from other
sources.” (Please see entry for BUMED 6240.3B and 6240.3C and note the language concerning
chemicals in the water: “substances which may have a deleterious (harmful) physiological effect
or for which the physiological effects are not known, shall not be introduced into the water system
in a manner which would permit them to reach the consumer.” Estimated Cost: zero.
Alternative 5 was selected for implementation but the estimated completion date was 5 June 1985
and state approval for the project was needed. There was no discussion concerning how to provide
for the impending water shortage during while the auxiliary line was under construction. (CLW 1129).
Note Alternative 7 was used as a way to supply drinking water for Tarawa Terrace until 1 March
1987.
• March 5 1985 – Action Brief concerning Tarawa Terrace water supply system; use of contaminated
well TT-23. The decision was made by the Commanding General of MCBCL to study the use
of contaminated wells at Tarawa Terrace during the time needed to complete the auxiliary raw
water line to Tarawa Terrace. The State of N.C. also needed data on the levels of VOCs in the
finished water. A procedure to use TT-23 (New Well) was agreed upon. TT-23 new well was
operated and then closed pending the laboratory results. (CLW 4618).
•

Mar 8 1985 – Well HP651 retested and was again found to be positive for extreme levels of
VOCs. Hadnot Point WTP and Holcomb Blvd WTP plants also test positive for VOCs. The
water storage tank at Tarawa Terrace also tested positive for VOCs. (CLW 5237).

Samples Taken 2/5/85

PCE

TCE

DCE

Vinyl Chloride

Well 651

400 ppb

18,900 ppb

7,580 ppb

168 ppb
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Hadnot Point WTP

7.5 ppb

429 ppb

Holcomb Blvd WTP

2.8 ppb

Holcomb Blvd WTP

1.5 ppb

Tarawa Terr STT 39A

215 ppb

8 ppb

150 ppb

2.9 ppb

12 ppb

(water storage Tank)

• Mar 11 1985 – One hour and 35 minute meeting between Robert Alexander and Rick Shiver.
According to Mr. Shiver’s notes, much of the meeting was spent discussing N.C. State
regulations. Mr. Alexander advised Mr. Shiver that Tarawa Terrace will have a water shortfall
during the summer months due to the closed wells. A pipeline connecting Hadnot Point was
discussed. (CLW 4558).
• Mar 11 1985 – Letter from Julian Wooten (NREAD) to Col. Lilley, Asst. Chief of Staff Facilities,
concerning standards for certain types of VOCs found in drinking water wells. A call was made
to Paul Hubbell of LantDiv concerning the subject of the letter. Mr. Hubbell recommended that
the base not attempt to contact individual states for information and that he would request the
information from the EPA. (CLW 1179).
• Mar 14 1985 – Lab results from samples taken from Tarawa Terrace water distribution system
using TT-23 new well. (CLW 5362).
Samples
taken

Plant prior to
TT-23

TT-23

TT-23

3/11 & 3/12

PCE

0 ppb

14.9
ppb

40.6
ppb

Plant before
Reservoir

Plant after
Reservoir

24 Hrs after TT23

24 Hrs after TT-23

21.3 ppb

6.6 ppb

• Mar 21 1985 – Meeting held at MCBCL to discuss Tarawa Terrace water supply shortages and
alternatives to address the problem. It was agreed that with two wells closed at the Tarawa
Terrace water supply system, there was insufficient water to meet summertime demand. (CLW
6596)
1. Tests indicate that if New Well is operated and blended, then detectable levels of PCE
will exist in finished Tarawa Terrace water.
2. Estimated levels are between 10-20 ppb.
3. The auxiliary water line was expected to be completed by 01 June 1985.
4. Limited data on health effects and containment levels. (See BUMED 6240.3C)
5. The use of blended well water appears to not pose any extreme health threat to TT
residents. Use will be on a contingency basis.
• Mar 22 1985 – Meeting between Rick Shiver and Robert Alexander concerning Tarawa Terrace.
Mr. Alexander advised Mr. Shiver that Tarawa Terrace will experience a 300,000 gallon/day
shortfall in production due to closed wells. He explained the proposal for an emergency pipeline
from Holcomb Blvd. Mr. Shiver reviewed current North Carolina groundwater standards with Mr.
Alexander. (CLW 4558).
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• Mar 26 1985 –Holcomb Blvd water treatment plant expansion (contract 81-1644). The state
expresses concern that contract was awarded prior to their approval and advised that they will
need to review proposed well sites for approval. (CLW 4727).
April 3 1985 – Message from Commanding General Camp Lejeune to LantDiv. This memo was a status
report on the situation at Camp Lejeune. The General’s staff advises that 10 wells have been found to be
contaminated and were closed. Water production has not been affected in 7 of the bases 8 water
treatment plants. However, Tarawa Terrace was identified as a problem. The General’s staff advises an
auxiliary line will be installed to feed water into Tarawa Terrace. The base will also proceed with procuring
equipment to enable local testing of VOCs in the water. The Holcomb Blvd WTP was slated to be
immediately expanded, as recommended in an April 1979 report, to provide finished water to the Tarawa
Terrace and Montford Point areas. The message also referenced Jerry Wallmeyer’s letter 10 May 1983
letter and the need to expedite the study into the magnitude of the VOC contamination at Camp Lejeune.
The message concluded with a request for LantDiv to provide milestones by 22 April 1985. (CLW 1195).
• April 8 1985 – Memo from Assistant Chief of Staff Facilities, to Base Maintenance Officer
concerning changes in the State of N.C. groundwater classification and water quality
standards. The standards were not yet in force. However, the new rules will mean that the
water used aboard MCBCL will be required to be free of man made substances (i.e. VOC’s).
(CLW 4733).
• April 8 1985 – NavFacEngCom message to CG MCBCL. NavFacEngCom advised MCBCL that
Environmental Science & Engineering (NACIP Confirmation study contractor) will review
collected data and additional field sampling/laboratory data to develop interim monitoring
recommendations for raw water aboard MCBCL. The contract was expected in July 1985.
(CLW 1239).
• April 18 1985 – State of North Carolina grants permission to install 14 new supply wells aboard
MCBCL. (CLW 1189).
• April 22 & 23 1985 – TT-23 (New Well) operated and used to supply water to residents of Tarawa
Terrace. VOCs were detected in the water after each run of the well. (CLW 1194).
• April 22 1985 – Message from Commanding General MCBCL to LantDiv concerning inspection of
POL tanks and a request for field investigation. The General’s staff advises, in an attached
report from ESE, that extremely high levels of VOCs (Benzene, Ethylbenzene, Toulene) and
lead were detected in a monitoring well around the tank farm area. A request to expedite field
investigations and testing to characterize the extent of the fuel leakage. (CLW 1235).
• April 26 1985 – Internal memo from Base Maintenance Officer to Assistant Chief of Staff Facilities,
regarding water shortages in Tarawa Terrace area. Mr. Luttrell advises the AC/S that without
water conversation measures or approval to turn on the VOC contaminated well this weekend,
an anticipated water shortage for Tarawa Terrace will occur. Mr. Luttrell also requested that the
AC/S and not NREAD make the operational decision on whether or not to use the
contaminated well to supply water to the residents of Tarawa Terrace water system. Without
higher guidance, he advised that he will not authorize the operation of well TT-23, even if it
results in water outages. (CLW 4768).
• April 28 and 29 1985 – TT-23 (new well) operated to provide water for the Tarawa Terrace water
distribution system. (CLW 4769).
• April 30 1985 – Notice to residents of Tarawa Terrace from Commanding General MCBCL, Major
General L.H. Buehl. The General informed the residence of Tarawa Terrace that 2 supply wells
for the Tarawa Terrace water supply system were taken off line because “minute (trace)”
amounts of several organic chemicals were detected in the water. He advised that there are no
federal or state regulations for a safe level of these compounds but he did order the closure of
these wells for all but emergency use (i.e. fire or when domestic supply is threatened). Nothing
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was said about the levels found or when the contamination was discovered or their possible
health effects. The General went on to advise the residents served by the Tarawa Terrace
system, that water consumption must be reduced. He outlined the water restrictions needed to
be followed in order to conserve water. (CLW 1191).
• April 30 1985 – Memo titled Instructions to Operators at Tarawa Terrace. The guidance requested
by Mr. Luttrell on 26 April was put into writing. The operators were advised to call the
Command Duty Officer when the reservoir reaches 6 feet. The officer will provide approval and
instructions to operate well TT-23. Well TT-26 was never to be operated. (CLW 4771).
May 9 1985 – Message from Commanding General MCBCL to CMC Washington. The message was an
update on the situation at Camp Lejeune. The CG advises: 10 wells were now off line for VOC
contamination, construction was underway for an auxiliary pipe line to Tarawa Terrace, conservation
measures were in place, and that a press release had been issued. This message also confirms that TT23 (New Well) had been used on three separate occasions even though the well itself was contaminated.
The CG also states that additional monitoring and location of the source of the VOCs was being pursued
by the NACIP program. Further testing was scheduled to begin in July. Finally, the CG states that the
base will have a limited VOC analysis capability starting in June via the water quality control lab located
aboard the base. (CLW 1237).
• May 10 1985 – News article Jacksonville Daily News. The article reads that a Navy study has found
volatile chemicals in 10 deep water wells at MCBCL. “According to the memo from chief of
staff, facilities, no federal or state regulations mandate an unacceptable level of these organic
chemicals.” Gunnery Sgt. John Simmons from Lejeune’s Joint Public Affairs Office (JPAO) also
advised that he had no information on whether the well water was dangerous to humans. The
article also reads that the 10 wells were all taken off line in December instead of December
through February as what actually occurred. Finally, Gunnery Sgt. Simmons stated that
Tarawa Terrace can barely meet the current demand for water and that an auxiliary line was
being constructed. Nothing was said about the continued operation of contaminated well TT-23
at Tarawa Terrace to prevent system shut down due to the ongoing water shortages. (CLW
4784).
• May 11 1985 – Article in Wilmington Morning Star. This article contains surprisingly more detail
than the Jacksonville Daily News article. The article quoted Lee Mittelstadt, public information
officer for the Solid and Hazardous Waste Management Brach of the N.C. Dept. of Human
Resources. She listed some of the chemicals found by name and stated “(they) are toxic”.
Because the base was a federal reservation, the Marine Corps can not be fined by the state.
Chuck Rundgren, head of the state Water Supply Branch, advised that “he did not think Camp
Lejeune residents need to worry about getting bad drinking water. I think we kind of caught it
right at the beginning.” The article ends with Gunnery Sgt. Simmons reiterating the same half
truth and half incorrect information given to the Jacksonville Daily News. (CLW 4784).
• May 13 1985 – Letter from the State of North Carolina Water Supply Branch to Commanding
General MCBCL regarding new well sites for Hadnot Point and Holcomb Blvd. Mr. J. Fred Hill
advised the base that he agreed with the suggestion to analyze and evaluate samples from
these sites for VOC contamination prior to construction of any new wells. (CLW 1198).
• May 15 1985 – State of North Carolina Staff report concerning the application of 15 NCAC 2L to the
well contamination problem at Camp Lejeune. The report was written by Rick Shiver, Regional
Hydrologist Wilmington Regional Office. Mr. Shiver recommended that a notice of violation be
sent to the base. The state will also work to identify the sources of contamination for the
Tarawa Terrace wells. (CLW 4773).
• May 15 1985 – Letter from Regional Director State of North Carolina Dept of Natural Resources
and Community Development to commanding General MCBCL regarding Notice of Violation
Groundwater Classification and Standards, Source of Groundwater Pollution Camp Lejeune
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Marine Corps Base. The letter was addressed to Major General Buehl personally. Mr. Wakild
advised the General that according to the NACIP study, the following organic contaminants
were found in 10 potable water wells aboard base: tetrachloroethylene, trichloroethylene,
dichlororethylene, methylene chloride, vinyl chloride, dichloroethane, benzene, toluene and
dichlororbenzene. He also advised that all of the impacted wells were exposed to the tertiary
sand aquifer between 50 and 200 feet below land surface. Mr. Wakild notified the General that
the base was in violation of 15 NCAC 2L and therefore the Marine Corps must submit a plan of
action within 30 days. The plan of action also required the Marine Corps to identify the source
of the contamination, to define the scope of the contamination, future impacts of the
contamination and proposals to remediate and restore the polluted ground waters. Finally, a
specific schedule defining scope and time necessary to completed the above plan of action.
Rick Shiver was names as a point of contact for the State. (CLW 1200).
• May 24 1985 – Commanding General MCBCL letter to NavFacEngCom regarding Confirmation
Study second round sampling. NavFacEngCom was advised that the CG MCBCL has seen
the comments on the first round of sampling results and additional concerns from the base
have been attached. The General stated that the second round of sampling will be within one
mile of each contaminated well both on and off base. Finally, there was a request to add a
new contamination site located at MCAS New River to the NACIP study. (CLW 1205).
• May 31 1985 – Meeting held at MCBCL concerning Drinking water quality maintenance study
group. There are no minutes of the meeting. The occurrence of the meeting was documented
by a brief agenda. (CLW 6574).
• May 31 1985 – Message from Commanding General MCBCL to NavFacEngCom concerning
contract 81-B-3849, Inspection and Testing of POL tanks. The Commanding General requested
a field investigation for the fuel farm at Hadnot point after extremely high levels of benzene,
ethybenzene, toluene and lead were detected in ground water monitoring wells in the fuel farm
area. The testing performed during the July 1984 Confirmation study indicated the leakage of
large quantities of fuel at the site. (CLW 1235).
June 5 1985 – Memorandum for the Commanding General Camp Lejeune from Chief of Staff concerning
potential contamination of the City of Jacksonville by Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune. In response to
the General’s concern, the chief of staff contacted Mr. Shiver of the state Division of Environmental
Management and Camp Lejeune Natural Resources Director, Julian Wooten. Together they advised the
general that Camp Lejeune is in no way affecting the aquifer presently being used by the city of
Jacksonville. (Cercla 205).
• Jun 6 1985 – NREAD internal memo to director NREAD. Danny Sharpe reminded Julian Wooten
that MCO P11000.8B requires CMC notification of any written notices of violation of pollution
control laws (i.e. The 15 May violation letter from the state of North Carolina). (CLW 4802).
• Jun 19 1985 – Phone call from United States Geological Survey (USGS) Raleigh office to Robert
Alexander, MCBCL, concerning the use of the USGS to study the ground water at the base. A
meeting time was noted for July 23rd. (CLW 1231).
• Jun 21 1985 – Letter from Rick Shiver to Col R.A. Tiebout Assistant Chief of Staff, Facilities. Mr.
Shiver advised the Colonel of the test results for the 9 April sampling of Tarawa Terrace Wells
TT-25, TT-26 and New Well (TT-23). Well TT-26 was found to contain 630 ppb PCE, 18 ppb
TCE and 1.4 ppb DCE. (CLW 1244).
• Jun 21 1985 – Memorandum to the file. Gold S Johnson Jr, Utilities Director, noted that per report
from Danny Sharpe, MCAS New River was in violation of TTHM levels. Furthermore, the
violation was not reported to the State and that this would probably result in yet another
violation. (CLW 1241).
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• Jun 25 1985 – Meeting 25 Jun 1985 to discuss TTHM levels at MCAS New River/Camp Geiger.
The meeting was to discuss the probable upcoming violation letter from the State. Potential
solutions were identified and it was agreed to wait until Fred Hill from the State arrived on base
28 Jun 1985. (CLW 1280).
• Jun 28 1985 – Fred Hill arrives at MCBCL and inspected the proposed new wells sites requested
on 13 May for the Holcomb Blvd expansion and the TTHM problems at the base. The following
measures were adopted in an attempt to manage the TTHM problem at the base:
1. Effective 2 July 1985, finished water samples will be tested by NREAD and an
independent lab.
2. After testing, pre-chlorination will be discontinued for a one week trial.
3. On 9 July 1985, samples will be taken and analyzed.
4. Effective immediately, wells with the lowest potential for developing TTHM’s will be run to
the extent possible.
5. After one week trial, data gathered will be studied for further action.
6. Vendors will be contacted to obtain cost of replacing chlorination (a cause for TTHM) as a
pretreatment for drinking water. (CLW 1256 + CLW 5905).
July 2 1985 – Pre-chlorination discontinued at MCAS New River in an attempt to manage the air station’s
TTHM problem. (CLW 1267).
• July 16 1985 – A meeting was held at Camp Lejeune to discuss the TTHM and salt water intrusion
problems at MCAS New River. They identify salt water as a source of bromide which was
needed to form bromoform (A TTHM). Base officials noted studies have established the
station’s water supply was subject to salt water intrusion and a corresponding increase in
formation of bromoform. (CLW 1267).
• July 18 1985 – Golf Course watering Memo from Base Maintenance Officer to Assistant Chief of
Staff, Facilities. The memo identifies that the utilities department was using treated water to
water the base’s 2 golf courses but due to poor record keeping and inadequate schematics,
they did not know if it was Hadnot Point or Holcomb Blvd water. It was also noted that while the
sprinklers were in operation, a considerable amount of water was being used. Mr. Price also
advised that they really needed to pursue this. The AC/S facilities agreed in a hand written note
on the page and comments “This is a good idea and we should push hard.” The routing slip
also contains a note from Mr. Price “Lets proceed with vigor and get info from PWO. (CLW
1264 + CLW 1278). This memo is significant in that the Holcomb Blvd water system was
later identified as the source for the treated water used at the golf courses. Each course
can require anywhere from 300,000 to 500,000 gallons of water per day to maintain the
vegetation. At the time of the contamination, Holcomb Blvd only had a 1.7 million
storage capacity for treated water. To make up for the corresponding shortage of treated
water, water was frequently transferred from the contaminated Hadnot Point system to
Holcomb Blvd for use by the family housing areas served by that system. This was a
subject of a recent CAP (Community Assistance Panel) meeting held at the CDC in
Atlanta April 17th 2008.
• July 18 1985 – 7 wells were closed at MCAS New River due to high chloride contamination.
• July 18 1985 – Memorandum from Rick Shiver to Perry Nelson of the Exploratory Unit. Mr. Shiver
advises the contamination problem for Tarawa Terrace may originate from two facilities, ABC
Cleaners and Glam-O-Rama cleaners. He recommended Glam-O-Rama be tested first
because it was located directly across the street from the contaminated well TT-26. Mr. Shiver
states the well was about 100 feet deep and was probably exposed to the (semi-confined)
Yorktown Aquifer. If no plume exists for Glam-O-Rama, then ABC will be tested. Mr. Shiver
ominously observes that the Tarawa Terrace well fields were down gradient to ABC and GlamO-Rama cleaners. In the memo he wrote, “down-gradient well sites are a problem at ABC!”
(CLW 4810).
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• Jul 23 1985 – Meeting between Bob Alexander, base officials and representatives of the USGS
concerning Camp Lejeune’s ground water resources. Base officials requested the USGS to
perform and appraisal of the ground water resources and geo-hydrology of MCBCL. (CLW
4816).
• Jul 25 1985 – Letter from Assistant Chief of Staff, Facilities, Col. R. A. Tiebout to Mr. Wakild of the
N.C. Department of Natural Resources. The letter was the response to the State’s May 19 th
Notice of Violation letter. Col. Tiebout enclosed a plan of action and advised that the anticipated
start date will be September 1985. The projected completion dates for the characterization step
and feasibility study were set for September and December 1986. (CLW 1269).
• Jul 30 1985 – Memorandum for request for assistance at Tarawa Terrace. Rick Shiver documents
a request made to Oscar Howard to assist with the preliminary drilling around ABC Cleaners.
This drilling may isolate the source of the contamination and will provide the data needed for
further investigations by the State. (CLW 4815).
August 1 1985 – Phone conversation between Elizabeth Betz and Mike Bell concerning test well
readings for the proposed new wells slated for use in the Holcomb Blvd expansion project. VOC readings
related to gasoline were picked up in the test samples. Mr. Bell advised that the sampling procedure of
using a gas powered air blower to clear the test wells may have contaminated the samples or caused any
VOCs present to be volatized from the water. He recommended further sampling without a gas powered
air compressor. Danny Sharpe hand wrote on the memo that he needed a recommendation on whether
or not to sample or proceed with the drilling of the well. There is no documented response to his
question. (CLW 5912).
• Aug 6 1985 – Memorandum to the Commanding General MCBCL from Chief of Staff concerning
TTHMs at MCAS New River. Seven wells containing high levels of the compounds needed to
produce TTHMs were taken off line. Saltwater intrusion was the cause of the problems with
these seven wells. The closure of these wells brought the Air Station within compliance of the
TTHM standard. A sample Public Health memo was prepared in case the state requires
notification to consumers. Despite the fact that this system exceeded the EPA new maximum
level for TTHM’s, Colonel Tiebout wrote that the water consumers for the MCAS system were
to be notified “if and when DHS (N.C.Dept. of Health Services) requires it”.(CLW 1294).
• Aug 14 1985 – USGS Proposal to appraise the ground water resources aboard MCBCL. The
USGS identifies that MCBCL derives its water primarily from the ground water and was one of
the largest entities in the state which withdraws ground water (8 million gallons per day).
Operational and population growth aboard the base have increased the amount of waste
generated by the base. As a result of this growth, significant amounts of waste containing
hazardous waste and toxic organic compounds have been disposed of or spilled aboard
MCBCL. (CLW 4819). “Most of the disposal and spill sites are directly underlain by sand and
lack natural or synthetic barriers to contain the waste and prevent them from moving downward
into the groundwater. Consequently, some of the waste have infiltrated to the water table and
contaminated some of the ground water in the shallow and supply aquifers.” (CLW 4820).
• Aug 16 1985 – Letter from AC/S Facilities, Col. Tiebout to Charles Rundgren, Water Supply Branch
State of N.C. Col. Tiebout reported to the state the measures taken to reduce TTHMs at MCAS
New River. The measures include the closure of 7 wells with high chloride levels. (CLW 6339).
• Aug 29 1985 – Letter from Commanding General MCBCL to Commandant of the Marine Corps
concerning the US Geological Survey study of the ground water aquifer aboard MCBCL. The
CG advised the Commandant that growing water supply needs coupled with the threat of
present and future contamination of existing wells by disposed waste, brackish water and
saline water has prompted his command to request the U.S. Geological Survey to study the
geo-hydrology of the base and environs. The study was needed to determine what
groundwater practices are needed to reduce further contamination and help assure water
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supply needs were met for the operation of the base. The Commandant was requested to
review and provide comments/concurrence with the proposed study. (CLW 6578)
September 5 1985 – Letter from Commanding Officer Naval Hospital Camp Lejeune to Commanding
General MCBCL regarding Environmental Heath Inspection Results for buildings SH-8 and SG-14. The
inspection performed Occupational and Preventive Medicine Department revealed that the well and
chlorination system used to provide water to these 2 buildings was inadequate causing the water to be
susceptible to bacteriological contamination. The situation was first discovered in March 1984 and has
continued to exist. The recommendation was made to close the water supply for these building for use as
a drinking source. The outlets were secured with the warning signs posted appropriately. (CLW 4849).
• Sept 15 1985 – News article from Raleigh News and Observer. The article discusses in depth the
environmental transgressions that occurred at the base and is in contrast to the articles which
appeared in cities closer to the base. For example, the reporter cites that gallons of mercury,
enough to poison 184,000 acres of foot deep water was drained from radar equipment and
buried at the base. The article is a testimony to a public relations campaign waged by the base
to minimize the magnitude of the problem aboard MCBCL. (CLW 4855).
1. Base Environmental Engineer, Robert Alexander is directly quoted in the article as
saying: “the 22 sites are not considered dangerous because only trace amounts of
contaminants have been found to have escaped from the dumps. People had not been
directly exposed to pollutants.”
2. Charles Rundgren, head of N.C. water supply branch is also quoted in the article as
saying, “the wells had been plugged shortly after they became contaminated. The
amount of chemicals found were not a threat to people who had been drinking the water
during the short period. The water would not cause someone to become ill from drinking
it, but ill effects could result from long term exposure.”
3. H. Lee Mittelstadt, Spokeswoman for the state Solid and Hazardous Waste Branch states
that N.C. officials felt Camp Lejeune was taking adequate steps to protect people from
possible exposure to the contaminants by closing the wells. The contamination from the
22 sites was a potential problem but not immediate threat because the locations were
known and monitoring could detect future problems.
4. Base AC/S Facilities Col. R.A. Tiebout “characterized all actions taken so far (closing
wells, relocating the daycare and extensive testing) as precautionary measures. “
5. Wayne Mathis of the EPA states that he could not speculate on the potential risks of
each site. The risk would depend on whether the material was in a stable location and
whether people had access to the chemicals.” “You wouldn’t want kids out there digging
in the soil.”
• Sept 17 1985 – Meeting aboard Camp Lejeune MCB between Col. R.A. Tiebout, Robert Alexander,
Base Environmental Engineer, and Mr. Elston from the State of North Carolina. No known
records exist of the meeting except for a notation in a letter. The notation reads that at this
meeting, the State made a formal request for the technical data collected from step 1A of the
NACIP program be transmitted to the Division of Environmental Management for review and
interpretation. (CLW 4859).
October 7 1985 – Letter from Rick Shiver, N.C. Regional Hydrologist, to Brigadier General J.B. Knotts,
Commanding General MCBCL. The letter was a written follow up to the request for the technical data
from the NACIP Step 1A (Confirmation Study). Mr. Shiver advised. “the data is requested in lieu of the
formal report, since some portions of this report are believed to be in error.” (CLW 4859).
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• Oct 8 1985 – Letter from Chuck Wakild to Perry Neslon concerning Larry Fitzpatrick’s inquiry into
the groundwater problems aboard MCBCL. Mr. Wakild enclosed a report from Rick Shiver
titled “An Assessment of Groundwater Pollution Sources at Camp Lejeune” for his review. Mr.
Wakild warned that considerable public attention will be focused on this problem and how we
(the State of N.C.) deals with it. (CLW 1297).
• Oct 8 1985 – Report from Rick Shiver titled: An Assessment of Groundwater Pollution Sources at
Camp Lejeune. The report is an overview of the NACIP program and an assessment of the
State’s authority to participate in the groundwater remedial projects aboard the base. Mr.
Shiver noted the results of the July 1984 ground water studies were documented in a report
provided to the Marine Corps in February 1985. He also stated in the letter that: “As the Marine
Corps disagrees with the conclusions in this report, it will not release a copy of it to any outside
agency. Recently, however, the Marine Corps did agree to provide DEM copies of the technical
data for review and interpretation.” (CLW 4871-73). To date this report (mentioned in this
document by Rick Shiver) has not been released to the public despite several Congressional
requests to produce this report. In April of 2008, Congressman Allen Boyd (D Florida) again
requested the missing report and was given Cercla document #388. Titled “Evaluation of Data
From First Round of Verification Sample Collection and Analysis.” This document is the
technical data given to the State and later the EPA and not the report cited by Mr. Shiver in the
above mentioned text.
• Oct 8 1985 – Memorandum from Elizabeth Betz regarding the State’s request for recently received
laboratory reports. Betz advised Danny Sharpe that there are several problems concerning the
data she was preparing for the State. Ms. Betz advised that the distilled water analysis was
done as part of the laboratory control and was not required to be submitted to the state.
However, the data was part of the report which the state was requesting. Betz also advised
that the base had not performed the required sodium analysis of the water. The test and report
were overdue. (CLW 5344)
• Oct 25 1985 – Letter from Perry Nelson to Larry Fitzpatrick of the State of North Carolina. Mr.
Shiver’s report and supporting documents concerning Camp Lejeune were forwarded to Mr.
Fitzpatrick. Mr. Nelson advised that the State was seeking a legal opinion from the Attorney
General to address the State’s authority concerning enforcement of remedial actions aboard
Camp Lejeune. (CLW 4869).
• October 28 1985 – Test results for wells TT-26, TT-25 and now TT -25 showed continued
contamination with VOCs. (CLW 5476).
• Oct 29 1985 – Memorandum from Perry Nelson to Jim Mulligan, Mick Noland and Chuck Wakild
concerning Managing Groundwater Contamination on Military Installations. Mr. Nelson advised
the Groundwater Section Chief or higher authority will handle all communications with military
installations concerning clean up and future investigations. (CLW 4867).
• Oct 29 1985 – Letter from Base AC/S Facilities, Col. Tiebout to Charles Rundgren, Water Supply
Branch State of N.C. concerning TTHM and inorganic chemical analysis. The sodium analysis
turned into to the state was outdated and no mention was made as to when the State will
perform the required test. (CLW 5337).
• Oct 31 1985 – Letter from AC/S Facilities Col. Tiebout to Rick Shiver, State of North Carolina,
concerning the request for technical data letter dated 7 October 1985. Col Tiebout advised in
the letter that the enclosure includes a site plan for each site, water quality data and water level
data. The enclosure is Cercla document # 388, “Evaluation of Data from First Round of
Verification Sample Collection and Analysis. (CLW 4900).
• Oct 31 1985 – Phone Call from Anne Rosecrance JTC Lab to Elizabeth Betz. Ms. Rosecrance
advised that JTC did not detect any VOCs in well TT-25. Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace
treated water samples were also negative for VOCs. (CLW 4901). Ms. Betz then sent a memo
to Base Director NREAD recommending that sampling for VOCs be limited to finished water
and completed on a weekly basis.
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November 1 1985 – Conference aboard Camp Lejeune between base officials and EPA representatives
Wayne Mathis and Jim Holdaway concerning findings of the NACIP study and the groundwater
contamination aboard the base. The minutes of the meeting were preserved by Rick Shiver in his
handwritten notes. (CLW 4903).
1. The EPA “advises” Camp Lejeune to identify specific sources which resulted in the contamination of
the community water supply. It was pointed out to the EPA representatives that the EPA has no
authority to require action aboard MCBCL.
2. Mr. Holdaway countered and advises recent changes in RCRA permitted the EPA to address
environmental issues after 08 Nov 1984 for inactive sites on base.
3. Mr. Mathis advised existing data substantiates a risk to a population thus triggering consideration
for MCBCL to be included in the National Priority List (NPL). The Department of Defense was
responsible for implementing CERCLA on behalf of military installations.
4. Base officials refused to release the initial Confirmation Report from January 1985 and countered
that the report is erroneous. The EPA representatives explain that the Confirmation Study initial
report will be the basis for listing MCBCL on the NPL. Base Environmental Engineer Robert
Alexander resisted this idea and advised the report is erroneous. Mr. Shiver adds a postscript
note to himself, “CERCLA imposes punitive measures only for failure to report and concealment
of data. “
5. Mr. Shiver explains the State’s participation in the investigation for the source of the PCE
contamination in Tarawa Terrace’s wells. The State had already identified the source but this
information was not released at this meeting.
6. Another post script note indicated that emergency water line became active 01 Jun 85.
• Nov 6 1985 – Memorandum to the Commanding General MCBCL from Chief of Staff Facilities,
Col. Tiebout advised the CG that TT wells 23 and 26 remain contaminated and well TT-25 was
detected to contain PCE at 0.43 ppb. The state recommended more sampling be done to
determine if contamination was migrating to this well. Col. Tiebout also advises no VOCs have
been detected in the finished drinking water since July 1985. Finally, the Colonel advises that
the State has identified ABC One Hour Cleaners to be the source of contamination at Tarawa
Terrace. (CLW 1338).
• Nov 13 1985 – Base Order 11011.2 Encroachment control. As directed by orders from HQMC, the
CG of MCBCL implements an Encroachment Control program/board aboard MCBCL.
Encroachment was defined as any action planned or executed in the vicinity of Camp Lejeune
or normal areas of operation which inhibits, curtails, or posses the potential to impede or
adversely affect mission performance aboard MCBCL. Competition for potable water assets
and environmental/natural resource conversation legislation were identified as examples of
encroachment as used within the order. (CLW 1342).
• Nov 18 1985 – Letter from Arthur Linton of the EPA addressed to Commander Atlantic Division
NavFacEngCom to the attention of J.R. Bailey, Environmental Quality Branch. This letter
highlights some of the EPA’s input and concerns with the NACIP study.
1. Phase 1 reports are heavily dependent on the use of indicator parameters to make
conclusive decisions about the releases of pollutants at a given location.
2. The EPA recommends that samples of groundwater and/or surface water be collected
and analyzed from each site.
3. The NACIP study should contain sufficient geologic and hydrological data to support
conclusions regarding the hydro-geology and drainage of a general area. This data will
also be necessary for a valid assessment of probable direction of possible horizontal
and/or vertical migration of contaminants.
4. When studies indicate a significant potential release or detect migration of pollutants,
then data should be collected that address potential risks of exposure to human
populations.
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5. Based in information and preliminary data presented by MCBCL staff during the 1
Nov 1985 meeting, the USEPA believes that there is sufficient data indicating
potential extensive contamination of groundwater in several areas of Camp
Lejeune to warrant immediate consideration of this site (MCBCL) for inclusion on
the National Priority List (NPL) due to the potential risk to a population dependent
on potable ground water as is the case aboard MCBCL.
• 19 Nov 1985—The Hadnot Point water treatment plant tested positive for benzene at 2,500ppb,
2,600ppn methylene chloride and 100ppb toluene. The analytical data sheets for these results
are missing. There is also a notation “not representative” written above the entry. (CLW 1406).
December 1 1985 – Summary report on Groundwater Investigation to Define Source(s) of
Tetrachloroethylene that have Contaminated Three Community Water Supply Wells at Tarawa
Terrace MCBCL by Rick Shiver. (CLW 4826).
1. April through September 1985, the State of North Carolina Department of Natural
Resources and Community Development (DNCRD) conducted a groundwater
investigation to define the source of PCE present in 3 wells for the Tarawa Terrace water
system aboard MCBCL.
2. The hydro-geology underneath Tarawa Terrace indicates that the territory sand system
is unconfined (and thus would easily allow movement of contaminants in the
groundwater).
3. The cone of depression for a well in the Tarawa Terrace well field system attains a
radius of 900-1500 feet. ABC Dry Cleaners is about 970 feet from well TT-26. Glam-ORama cleaner is roughly 125 feet from well TT-26. The cone of depression created by
pumping acts like a funnel that focuses water and contamination towards the well. Over
pumping of a well or well field will accelerate this process.
4. In September 1985 well TT-25 showed VOC contamination.
5. The report concludes that the interpretation of the data suggests the PCE plume
originates from the septic tank-soil absorption system at ABC One Hour Dry Cleaners.
The study results did not implicate Glam-O-Rama as a significant source of PCE
contamination.
6. The EPA was contacted by the state and provided a copy of Shiver’s findings.
• 10 Dec 1985 – The Hadnot Point water treatment plant tested positive for benzene at 38ppb, 10ppb
toluene. The analytical data sheets for these results are missing. (CLW 1406).
• Dec 19 1985 – Letter from Chuck Wakild to Perry Nelson concerning Rick Shiver’s report on ABC
One Hour Cleaners. Mr. Wakild recommended the state send ABC a Notice of Violation of N.C.
State’s groundwater statutes. (CLW 4906).
January 24 1986 – Internal memo from Director NREAD to Facilities, Environmental Engineer, facilities
Dept, and Base Maintenance Officer MCBCL concerning analysis of drinking water systems aboard
Camp Lejeune. Periodic readings of Benzene were dismissed as a quality control problem and were
arbitrarily discounted. Shortages in NREAD personnel have affected the base laboratory’s ability to
produce certified data concerning the water systems aboard the base. Finally, Mr. Wooten advised that
careful planning will be required to offset additional cost. The base will hold actual sampling (for water
systems aboard base) to the essential minimum which protects public health and provides compliance to
standards, laws and regulations. The last paragraph contains an instruction to the base Environmental
Engineer but the instructions are blacked out. (CLW 1406).
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February 3 1986 – Letter from Arthur Linton of the EPA to Commander Atlantic Division NavFacEngCom
attention J.R. Bailey regarding 01 Nov 85 meeting aboard MCBCL and Confirmation study. In particular,
the quality of the water obtained from wells in the Hadnot Point area of MCBCL were reviewed at some
length. (CLW 5430).
1. Mr. Linton advises that during the discussions on 01 Nov 85, Mr. Mathis and Mr. Holdaway became
aware that there was evidence derived from sampling in 1983 or1984 of diffuse contamination of
ground water with unspecified organic substances (this information given to the EPA is in
direct contradiction to documentation which indicated that at least 2 potable water
systems contained tetrachlororethylene and trichloroethylene as early as October 1980).
2. The EPA representatives were led to believe that the contamination did not extend to the treated
potable water. “It was also established that there was no contamination detected in treated
potable water distributed at Camp Lejeune.” Once again this is in contradiction of known
documentation that named and confirmed the presence of specific VOCs in raw AND
treated potable water aboard MCBCL.
3. At the recommendation of Mr. Mathis, Mr. Linton made a formal request for the NACIP Confirmation
Study results for monitoring wells and potable wells so they can insure there was no
contamination present in the Camp Lejeune water supply. This report was denied to the EPA
because that the data was still in raw form and under review. Mr. Linton countered by requesting
a brief on the report and copy of the report when it was published.
4. Mr. Linton finishes by informing Mr. Bailey that the EPA was concerned that a potential for human
exposure to hazardous substances and hazardous waste via the Camp Lejeune water supply
may exist due to the presence of such materials in ground water in the general vicinity of the
potable well field. The existence of such a potential exposure would warrant immediate
consideration for MCBCL for inclusion on the National Priority List. At the time that this letter
was written, the EPA was unaware that a documented contamination event had already
occurred involving the treated potable water systems aboard MCBCL.
• Feb 6 1986 – Letter from J.R Bailey to Arthur Linton of the EPA regarding the 18 Nov 85 EPA letter.
Mr. Bailey concurs with all of the points outlined in Mr. Linton’s letter with the sole exception of
the last point regarding the National Priority List. Mr. Bailey disagreed with the idea of
including MCBCL on the NPL and stated that the NPL will result in slower cleanup time and
delays. He informed Mr. Linton the state and public were being kept informed through meetings
with the state and news paper articles in local papers (Please see entries dated 12 Dec 84, 10
May & 11 May 1985, and 15 Sep 85.) Mr. Bailey stated that they were proceeding as quick as
possible with the confirmation study and will provide the report as soon as it becomes
available. (CLW 5415).
• Feb 6 1986 – Handwritten memo from Elizabeth Betz attached to Mr. Bailey’s 06 Feb letter to Mr.
Linton. Ms. Betz stated that she has read both the 18 Nov 85 EPA letter and Mr. Bailey’s
response of 06 Feb 86. She advised that she agreed that MCBCL should not be added to the
NPL. She also stated that she does not have the site maps of sample results from round one
and can not comment on it. Ms. Betz also noted that Phase one of the NACIP did not find well
HP-651, the worst of all the wells, and that she hoped they were headed towards HP-651
because it was not sampled in relation to any NACIP site. (CLW 5415).
• Feb 7 1986 – Message from Commandant Marine Corps to Commanding General MCBCL. The
complete message is missing however, in a letter dated 12 Mar 1986, the message was cited
as a reference for the Commandant’s approval for the USGS survey of the ground water
aboard the base. (CLW 1445).
• Feb 13 1986 – State report to update status of subsurface investigations at MCBCL. The report
indicated that the state was relying on the NACIP study to investigate and provide remedial
actions for areas aboard the base. A notice of violation was served to the owner of ABC One
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Hour Cleaners but due to his health and problems with the completeness of the notice, an
extension was granted. (CLW 4912).
• Feb 18 1986 – Phone call between Jim Holdaway (EPA), Cherryl Barnett (LantDiv) and Paul
Rakowski (NACIP). The conversation was documented in a 25 Apr 1986 letter. The only known
result of the conversation was that Mr. Holdaway suggested a review meeting to be held at
Camp Lejeune. (CLW 4929).
• Feb 24 1986 – Phone call between Cheryl Barnett (LantDiv) Robert Alexander (Base
Environmental Engineer) concerning records retention. It is agreed that all available data on
drinking water for the NACIP program will be centrally stored at the LantDiv Environmental
Quality Branch. (CLW 1426).
March 6 1986 – Letter from AC/S Facilities, Col. Tiebout to Mr. Arthur Linton of the EPA concerning 1986
Environmental compliance. Col. Tiebout advised notification in accordance with CERCLA has been filed.
The NACIP phase two will set 1986 milestones once contract negotiations were completed. The Colonel
stated that no detectable levels of TCE or DCE in water since April 1985 (note Benzene and PCE were
not included). Once again there was no discussion of past finished water contamination aboard the base.
(Cercla 1999).
• Mar 11 1985 – Letter from Commanding General MCBCL to Commander NavFacEngCom
regarding ground water quality data. Col. Tiebout advises NavFacEngCom that his letter
contains data provided by the State of N.C. concerning the ground water contamination and
data obtained by the Navy contract laboratories should be combined and forwarded to the EPA
in response to the EPA letter of 03 Feb 1986. (Cercla 297).
• Mar 12 1986 – Memo from AC/S Facilities, Col. Tiebout to Comptroller authorizing the transfer of
$80,000 to fund the USGS ground water study for MCBCL. (CLW 1445).
April 8 1986 – memorandum for the file concerning dates raw water wells secured due to VOC
contamination. The memo lists all the previously closed well and the dates of closure. There was a
handwritten note added after the memo was written indication well TT-25 was closed 14 Jan 87 and well
645 was closed 13 Jan 87. (CLW 1455).
• Apr 16 1986 – Letter from Fred Hill to Utilities director G.S. Johnson Jr. regarding base visit 10-11
April 1986. Mr. Hill documents that work was progressing with expansion work. Several
“situations” were discussed with Mack Frazelle, Water Treatment Operator Foreman, including
a light oil film on the water surface at Holcomb Blvd and an apparent lack of maintenance at
the soon to be abandoned Tarawa Terrace and Camp Johnson facilities. Mr. Hill also advised
that if the base proceeds with plans for a private contract to operate water treatment facilities,
the state would like to review the final contract. (CLW 1456).
• Apr 25 1986 – Letter from J.R. Bailey to Arthur Linton, EPA regarding EPA letter 03 Feb 1986
concerning the groundwater contamination aboard MCBCL and the NPL. (CLW 4927).
1. Mr. Bailey agrees to provide the EPA with the analytical data from testing and monitoring
of ground water and potable wells aboard MCBCL. The NACIP Evaluation of Data report
(Cercla 388) was listed in the enclosures and was discussed in the letter as preliminary
report prepared by ESE.
2. The Grainger, Jennings and Army Lab results dating back to October 1980 were not
included in the documents provided to the EPA.
3. Mr. Bailey advises it was the receipt of ESE’s raw analytical data which prompted the
testing of the base well system in beginning in December of 1984 for VOCs.
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June 5 1986 – Letter from Douglas Dixon of N.C. Groundwater section to Dr. Ted Taylor, Toxicologist
Environmental Epidemiology Branch. Mr. advises that the Wilmington Regional Office has filed a request
for a risk assessment concerning the chemicals found in the ground water at Tarawa Terrace and ABC
One Hour Cleaner. (CLW 4947).
1. Jun 12 1986 – Letter from Dr. Taylor to Douglas Nixon regarding risk assessment request dated
05 Jun 1986. (CLW 4952).
1. recent studies by the National Toxicology Program indicate that Perc (PCE) showed clear
evidence of carcinogenicity in both rats and mice.
2. According to the EPA Carcinogen Assessment Group, Perc (PCE) would be listed as a
probable human carcinogen.
3. 0.7 ppb of Perc would be the equivalent to a 1 x10 to the (-6) incremental cancer risk.
4. Toluene and benzene were detected in the monitoring wells and were not chemicals
used in dry cleaning.
5. TCE, DCE and Vinyl Chloride have been shown to be biodegradation products of Perc
(PCE).
6. Vinyl chloride was a known human carcinogen and the removal of Perc (PCE) to prevent
the formation of vinyl chloride should serve as a further incentive for clean up.
July 1 1986 – Memorandum for Area Coordinators for public affairs guidance on Hazardous waste site
clean-up. (CLW 6551).
1. The purpose of the memo was to address recently published EPA regulations regarding
public awareness of NACIP activities and clean up.
2. The National Priority List was an EPA listing of the Nation’s worst hazardous sites and
was required by CERCLA (Comprehensive Environmental Restoration Compensation
and Liabilities Act).
3. NPL sites were required to follow written Community Relations Plan which must include
the following: Site Specific NACIP objectives, Community Relations plan, a schedule for
the completion of NACIP activity and a mailing list of affected and interested groups and
individuals. Note, at this time MCBCL was not a NPL site.
4. The Public affairs activity must be proactive to assure the public that the Navy was not
hiding information concerning former hazardous waste sites on Navy property.
• July 7 1986 -- Phone conversation between Jerry Perkins (Acting Director N.C. Water Supply
Branch) and Robert Alexander (Base Environmental Engineer). Mr. Alexander makes the
verbal request to reduce VOC sampling of finished water for Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace
from weekly to quarterly. The same request was made for well TT-25. The request was
granted. (CLW 1521).
• Jul 31 1986 – Meeting aboard MCBCL concerning NACIP study. Details of this meeting were
preserved in the handwritten notes of Rick Shiver. (CLW 4955).
1. Mr. Linton of the EPA advises that changes in the regulations over the next 18 months
will impact MCBCL and the NACIP study. The EPA contends that MCBCL will rank high
on the hazards ranking system for the National Priority list.
2. The EPA feels that the NACIP program and study was not consistent with the National
Contingency Plan and wants the NACIP study aligned with RIFS (Remedial Investigation
Feasibility Study).
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3. The EPA will now require facilities to assess active sources (I.E. Tank Farms & land fills)
in addition to inactive sources as previously required.
4. The EPA agrees that the Hadnot Point area was the primary area of concern. Note the
source of contamination for well HP-651 was not determined at the time of this
meeting. Well HP-651 is outside the Hadnot Point area referenced in this meeting.
August 7 1986 – Letter from Chief of Naval Operations concerning Hazardous Waste Site CleanupPublic Affairs Guidance. The letter was a follow up to the 1 July 1986 guidance memorandum. The
previous letter did not necessarily apply to MCBCL as it was not on the NPL. However, the August letter
clearly states that Navy policy to be implemented at all installations with hazardous waste sites under
study by NACIP was to be proactive in order to assure the public the Navy was not hiding information
concerning former hazardous waste sites on Navy property. (CLW 6553).
• Aug 7 1986 – Phone call from Dr. Miller at the University of North Carolina to Robert Alexander
concerning groundwater research. Dr. Miller advises that the University has funds available to
install monitoring wells and sample groundwater as part of the School of Engineering’s
curriculum and research. Dr. Miller was invited to meet Mr. Alexander at the base 12 Aug 1986.
Nor records exist from that meeting.
• Aug 14 1986 – Letter from Geologist review team to Arthur Linton (EPA) concerning NACIP scope
of work. (Cercla 210).
1. The geologist recommended that the report address why PVC was being used to
construct monitoring wells. (PVC may affect VOC testing).
2. Composite sampling of Hadnot Point to reduce cost will do little to pinpoint wells that
were contributing contaminants to the water supply system or the movement of
contaminants through the shallow aquifer.
September 17 1986 – Letter from Col. Tiebout to Staff Judge Advocate regarding Public Affairs Guidance
on the NACIP Program. Col. Tiebout requests JAG to review the 01 Jul and 07 Aug Memos from CNO
concerning Navy policy towards hazardous waste sites and CERCLA. He advised that MCBCL was not
currently listed on the NPL but that a formal community relations plan should be considered in the future.
(CLW 6551).
• Sep 24 1986 -- Base memo from Commanding General concerning additional monitoring by NACIP
aboard MCBCL and MCAS New River. The General advised that the Globe will carry an article
on the current NACIP activities and local media coverage was expected. He stated that
although there were no known human health concerns or dangerous environmental hazards
present, a policy of caution and thorough documentation was in effect. (CLW 1523).
• Sep 25 1986 – Letter from J.R. Bailey to Commanding General MCBCL regarding the USGS
proposal to study the water aquifer. Mr. Bailey advised the general that while both the Marine
Corps and the USGS wish to study the groundwater the needs of each entity were different.
Mr. Bailey then stated “The USGS proposal would have the Marine Corps fund a study suited
for the USGS goals but considerably beyond the needs for the Marine Corps.” He states that
there was a considerable overlap between ESE’s work and the USGS proposal including the
sampling of contaminated wells to determine the extent of contamination in the groundwater.
Mr. Bailey went on to state that the USGS proposal was over priced and that analysis of salt
water intrusion can be done with a simple desk top computer. Note the objection from Mr.
Bailey concerning the sampling of contaminated wells is significant. Sampling by an
outside agency would mean that control of what was known about the extent of the
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contamination would be outside the influence of NavFacEngCom and the Marine Corps.
(CLW 1527).
January 21 1987 – Meeting at building 425 aboard MCBCL on review of the NACIP Program. The
meeting was documented by the hand written notes of Rick Shiver. (CLW 4963).
1. NACIP confirmation study has verified that 15 sites have contamination, 2 sites show
trace levels of DDT, 2 sites have fuel contamination and 3 had no evidence of
contamination.
2. Hadnot Point 602 project. 10 buildings on Hadnot Point identified as places where
solvents were being used past and present. Confirmed sources of TCE included base
Maintenance (HP1202), graphics shop and Maintenance shop (HP 1601 &1502 areas),
motor pool degreasing rack, HP-901, HP 902. Land disposal of waste POL was also
verified.
3. Well HP 645 was shut down on 13 Jan 87 due to benzene contamination. Well AS-106
was shutdown due to DCE contamination on the same day.
4. EPA will have oversight at NPL sites. Per DOD (Department of Defense)/EPA
memorandum of understanding of 1983, the DOD will finance and conduct response
while the EPA will provide technical assistance for installations that fall under CERCLA.
February 5 1987 – MCON Project P-853 proposed to relocate Hadnot Point’s outdated and leaking fuel
farm. (CLW 1737). The actual project brief is not available to the public.
March 1 1987 – This was the “official” date given to ATSDR as to when the Holcomb Blvd expansion was
completed and the Tarawa Terrace water distribution system was taken off line. However, this is in
contradiction to document CLW 4993. In this document, Elizabeth Betz advises that Holcomb Blvd Water
expansion was completed and the plant began test operating. Tarawa Terrace and Camp Johnson were
not utilized during test periods when Holcomb was online. Holcomb Blvd expansion was officially
accepted on 01 April1988 and at that point Camp Johnson and Tarawa Terrace WTPs were closed.
It is important to note that in accordance with BUMEDINST 6240.3, Department of the Navy and
United States Marine Corps officials were knowingly poisoning their own people during the period
of 30 October 1980 - 1 April 1988. Prior to 30 October 1980 this same directive had pre-emptive
requirements that if had they been followed, would have eliminated most of the human exposures
that occurred after 1963.
• March 31 1987 – Phone call between Base Environmental Engineer Robert Alexander and Cheryl
Barnett at NavFacEngCom. Ms. Barnett advises Mr. Alexander that the EPA Region IV
recommended MCBCL be added to the National Priority List per Surperfund Act. (Cercla 198).
Mr. Alexander the observes the following:
1. EPA will increase oversight of NACIP methods, reports and reviews.
2. The base must prepare a Community Relations Plan.
April 05 1987 – Memorandum for the Commanding General concerning Real Property License
Agreement with UNC-Chapel Hill. The purpose of the agreement was to facilitate the University’s multi
year study of the Tarawa Terrace Exchange Service Station gasoline contamination. The study was
funded by the EPA. (Cercla 196).
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• April 16 1987 – Briefing aboard Camp Lejeune concerning USGS Phase one results. Attendees
include Robert Alexander, Carl Baker, Al Austin, Mack Frazelle and Lt Col. Kiriacopoulos.
There are no known public records detailing the specifics of this meeting. (CLW 1998).
May 7 1987 – Letter from USGS to AC/S Facilities, Col. Dalzell regarding results of Phase one of the
USGS survey aboard MCBCL. The results of Phase one reveal that the water supply aquifer aboard
MCBCL was readily recharged by precipitation and was a very dependable source of water. However, the
aquifer was not well protected from potential surface contamination because clay layers above the water
supply aquifer that might serve as a barrier are thin and discontinuous. Results suggest that with some
relatively inexpensive modifications to future placement of supply wells could significantly improve well
yields and reduce overall cost. (Cercla 1998).
• May 27 1987 – Site inspection report for ABC One Hour Cleaners performed by Cheryl A McMorris,
Environmental Chemist State of North Carolina Solid and Hazardous Waste Management
Branch. The author correctly identifies Tetrachloroethylene (PCE) as the material
contaminating the ground water in and around ABC One Hour Dry Cleaner but through out the
report she refers to the compound as TCE which is the name given to the sister chemical
trichloroethylene. ABC was identified as using PCE in their operations since 1954. PCE was
stored on site in a 250 gallon tank located in the rear of the property. Spent PCE captured in a
filtration system was disposed on site in pot holes or other areas on the property. ABC was
also on a septic tank soil absorption system that drained into the ground thus allowing the PCE
to escape into the ground water. The State used the three community water wells (TT-25, 26
and new well) and 3 test wells to determine that ABC was the source of PCE in the water at
Tarawa Terrace. An on site well at ABC tested 12,000 ppb PCE. The author of the report was
unsure whether the presence of TCE, DEC and Vinyl chloride were related to the PCE. (These
products are degradation products of PCE at the time this report was written, this was a known
fact). The presence of toluene and benzene are explained as possible by products of PCE or
natural background readings. (CLW 1557).
June 5 1987 –Letter to North Carolina Division of Environmental Management from J. R. Bailey of
LantDiv. The letter advised the state that under CERCLA section 121, that the Navy’s remedial action is
required to attain legally applicable, relevant and appropriate standards, requirements, criteria or
limitations known as ARARs. Mr. Bailey requested the state’s input concerning ARARs in order to assist
them in obtaining the level of cleanup desire. Mr. Bailey identified the contaminants of concern as
benzene, vinyl chloride, PCE, TCE, 1,2 dichlorethane, 1,1-dichloroethene, and trans 1,2 dichloroethene.
(Cercla 318).
July 8 1987 – EPA publishes final rule establishing maximum contaminant levels for PCE, TCE and
selected other Volatile Organic Compounds. The new monitoring requirements for TCE and PCE become
effective on January 1, 1988.
• July 27 1987 – Memorandum from Mack Frazelle (Utilities Systems General Foreman) to Director
Utilities Branch regarding closed wells aboard MCBCL. Mr. Frazelle raises the question of what
were the future plans with the contaminated wells. Mr. Frazelle feels that some of the wells can
be possible restarted and others can be cannibalized for their equipment before they seize
through lack of use. He requests that the memo be reviewed for consideration. (CLW 4971).
August 27 1987-- Letter Dr. Barry Johnson, Associate Administrator ATSDR to LTC. Warren Hull,
DOD/EPA Liaison Officer. Dr. Johnson informed LTC. Hull, that in accordance to CERCLA section
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104 (i) (6) (a) , the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry is required to conduct a health
assessment for all sites on the National Priorities List including Federal Facilities. (Cercla 437).
• Aug 28 1987 – Memorandum from Utilities branch to Operations branch regarding TTHM readings.
Mr. Baker advises that MCAS is now in compliance but when the MCL is lowered to 5 ppb,
then MCAS will be out of compliance. Mr. Baker requests assistance from Operations in
meeting this goal. (CLW 1646).
September 15 1987 – Letter from N.C. Dept of Human Resources to AC/S Facilities MCBCL. The state
advises that the USEPA has changed rules for Safe Drinking Water Act and that 44 synthetic chemicals
(including PCE, TCE, DCE and vinyl Chloride) will be monitored on a quarterly basis. (CLW 5432).
• Sept 16 1987 – Meeting with LantDiv and Environmental Science and Engineering inc. regarding
Installation Restoration Program (new name for NACIP). Base Engineer Robert Alexander was
the attendee from MCBCL. The purpose of the meeting was to review the IR program status,
specifically to review the proposed remedial actions for the Hadnot Point groundwater problems
and to examine data colleted to date on the remaining 22 IR sites aboard MCBCL. (Cercla 261).
1. 15 Volatile Organic Compounds have been identified in the shallow aquifer. Four of the most
serious compounds violate recommended state and EPA standards.
2. Two large plumes have been identified in the shallow aquifer. The first includes a portion of the
industrial area between building 1700 and Burger King (Holcomb Blvd to Louis Street). The
second includes the area from the fuel farm on Ash St NW to Sneads Ferry road and from
Holcomb Blvd to Louis Street.
3. Most significant issue to be determined was at what level the MCBCL needs to remediate the
groundwater. Mr. Alexander advises that the state is in the process of revising their groundwater
standards.
4. Deep well monitoring has identified Methol Ethyl Ketone (MEK a compound used for cleaning
and stripping) in the deep aquifer. The presence of this compound in the deep well aquifer will
compound the problem as treatment options for VOCs do not work to remediate MEK.
5. ESE described a tentative list of short and long term remedial options. However, these options
will cause additional environmental emissions through one of three possible medias 1. Sewage
treatment plant. 2. Air emissions (note this option involves a known viable pathway for
exposure.) 3. Package VOC for hazardous waste disposal off base.
6. Mr. Alexander recommends that the pumps and equipment from the eight contaminated Hadnot
Point supply wells be pulled and reused else where.
7. ESE was tasked to provide draft report in the next few months after the meeting. The state and
EPA were to be provided a copy for their review. This was to be followed by a briefing. As for the
other 22 IPR sites, nine were recommended for closure due to lack of documented evidence of
contamination, six needed a risk analysis and seven were to require continued monitoring and
development of a cleaning program.
8. Mr. Hubbel of CMC LFL recommends that MCBCL and LantDiv should work to release some of
this information to the public in accordance with superfund amendments. Mr. Alexander adds that
they will need to review this will JPAO and develop a cooperative effort in light of these rules and
the possibility that Camp Lejeune sites could be named to the EPA NPL.
• Sept 23 1987 – Phone call memo for conversation between Cheryl Barnett of LantDiv and Robert
Gregory of Environmental Science and Engineering (Confirmation Study Contractor). The
conversation is concerning the ARARs proposed by the State of North Carolina. The state was
requested to provide their input on June 5th by J.R. Bailey of LantDiv. Mr. Gregory advised that
the 10 to the minus 6 levels are only used when exposure is by drinking contaminated water

100

and/or eating contaminated organisms. He feels this is not applicable for Camp Lejeune. ESE
feels that accepting ARARs will set a poor precedent for all future North Carolina work and is
not in accordance with EPA guidelines. He advocated using MCLs (Maximum containment
levels) for the Hadnot Point area. Cheryl Barnett agreed with this recommendation and
received guidance that the state should be asked at the beginning for potential ARARs, but the
Navy would select the actual ARARs during analysis. (Cercla 413).
October 28 1987 – EPA amends SDWA to include notification of consumers when certain violations of
the National Primary Drinking Water Regulations or monitoring requirements occur. The use of lead pipe,
solder and flux for installation or repair of any public water system is prohibited. The effective date of
these changes will be 28 April 1989. (CLW 1662).
December 4 1987 – Memorandum from Base Maintenance Officer to Director NREAD concerning
reclaiming closed wells. Mr. Baker requests that nine of the fifteen closed wells be re-sampled for VOCs
in order to determine if any can be reclaimed. (CLW 1671).
January 27 1988 – Letter from the State of North Carolina Division of Human Resources to MCBCL
regarding the Holcomb Blvd plant expansion. The state advises that they have reviewed the plans and
records and have approved the plant’s expansion for operation. (CLW 1680).
February 8 1988 – Letter from JAG to State of North Carolina Department of Justice Attorney General.
JAG Col. Tokarz writes to inquire into potential actions to be taken by the State against ABC One Hour
Cleaners. Col. Tokarz also places the State on notice that the Marine Corps may wish to purse their clean
up cost for Tarawa Terrace as well. (CLW 1716).
• Feb 25 1988 – Article in base newspaper The Globe featuring Assistant Chief of Staff Facilities,
Colonel Thomas Dalzell. The article was written for base personnel and explained the
contamination problem aboard Camp Lejeune and why the base was to be listed on the National
Priority List. During the interview, Colonel Dalzell stated that prior to 1983 “we were not aware of
these particular compounds that might have been in the ground water and we have no
information that anyone’s health was in any danger at that time.” The Colonel went on to identify
the source of the groundwater contamination as the motor pools that existed in Hadnot Point. He
stated that “at that time oils, greases, solvents, gasoline, cleaning fluids, and other types of
chemical compounds that were used in our everyday processes were just being dumped in the
ground or dumped in sewers or things like that; and we really were not aware back in the 60’s
and 70’s of the effects of ground water contamination.” (Cerlca 132 pp 28 & 29)
• Feb 29 1988 – Letter from North Carolina Division of Health Services to MCBCL regarding lead
notification required by amendment to the Safe Water Drinking Act. The letter advises that unless
a water system owner can provide documentation that the pipe or pipe fittings of any given
system is less than eight percent of the entire system or plumbing in any home connection is less
than 0.2% lead, then public notification of lead was to be given to all consumers on the system.
(CLW 1690).
March 15 1988 – Action brief from Utilities Branch concerning clarification of Environmental responsibility
aboard MCBCL. Utilities Branch Director (C. Baker) writes the brief out of concern arising from out of
concern over who or what department on base is in charge of environmental affairs, Who represents the
base to governmental authorities and conflicting priorities among the various departments on the base
itself. This confusion and lack of organization has led to numerous environmental related problems
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aboard MCBCL. The problems involved permit violations, operation of utilities plants, monitoring of waste
treatment plant discharges, maintenance and repair of facilities, and the expansion of utilities. (CLW
1696).
• Mar 18 1988 -- Message from Col Lilley concerning action brief 15 Mar 1988. Col Lilley requests a
meeting to discuss Mr. Baker’s action brief and agrees there should be a clear division of
responsibilities among the area of the base regarding environmental concerns. (CLW 1699).
• Mar 23 1988 – The Assistant Chief of Staff Facilities notified the Commanding General of the
situation concerning the leaking fuel farm. He is advised that a MILCON project is scheduled in
the out-years for replacement of the leaking UST’s with a possibility that replacement could be
moved up to a near year. (Cercla 96).
• Mar 29 1988 – Letter from Staff Judge Advocate, A. P. Tokarz, MCBCL to Assistant Chief of Staff
Facilities MCBCL. The letter is in reference to the leaking underground storage tanks (USTs) at
the Hadnot Point fuel farm. (Cercla 96). See pp 33-34 of the document.
1. Base Environmental Engineer, Robert Alexander, advised, at a workshop held prior to the
letter, the USTs at Hadnot Point were in such a deteriorated stated that they continue to leak at
a rate of approximately 1,500 gallons per month.
2. Mr. Alexander advised the Staff lawyer on 25 March that the base planned to address the
problem by installing more monitoring wells to identify the plume, design recovery wells, receive
bids to construct a recovery system, determine the disposition of the recovered fuel and then
award a contract.
3. Mr. Tokarz recommended that pressure be applied to HQMC to move up the replacement of
these leaking USTs to the immediate future. He stated that the loss of 1,500 gallons per month
will be difficult for taxpayers to understand, and the extremely high cost of recovering that lost
fuel exacerbated the problem. He also advised that the value of recovered fuel would be
diminished due to the presence of other contaminants in that area.
4. Mr. Tokarz also pointed out that a delay in replacing the tanks will result in an indefensible
waste of money, and a continuing potential threat to human health and the environment. He felt
that formally applying to HQMC for expedited action would assist in demonstrating to the public
and the residents of Camp Lejeune that the Command took swift, reasonable action.
5. A recommendation was made to notify the state of North Carolina Department of Environmental
Management. Mr. Tokarz advised that a crucial objective in the NPL process was for the base
to establish credibility with the state and the public.
April 1 1988 -- Elizabeth Betz advises that Holcomb Blvd Water expansion was completed in 1987 and
the plant began test operating. Tarawa Terrace and Camp Johnson were not utilized during test periods.
Holcomb Blvd expansion was officially accepted on 01 April1988 and at that point Camp Johnson and
Tarawa Terrace WTPs were closed. (CLW 4993).
• April 4 1988 – Action Brief concerning Lead notification. AC/S Facilities, Col. Dalzell recommends
that Lead notification be published in the Globe magazine once a month for three consecutive
months to fulfill requirements of public law. (CLW 1700). The notification proposal was
approved for publication by Col Dalzell. (CLW 1711).
• April 14 1988 – Letter from J.R. Bailey to Nancy Redgate (EPA SF Program) concerning
Preliminary Assessments for facilities listed on the Hazardous Waste Compliance Docket.
MCAS New River is one of these facilities. Mr. Bailey advises that MCBCL is not on the docket
but that the facility has already been scored and will be proposed for the NPL shortly. (Cercla
284).
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• April 21 1988 – Memorandum from Col. Dalzell to Director NREAD. Col Dalzell requests that
testing contract for water be modified to include lead and other heavy metals. (CLW 1707).
• April 22 1988 – Letter from AC/S Facilities, Col. Dalzell to Ms. Perez (Techlaw Inc) concerning
follow up on a phone conversation on ABC One Hour Cleaners. Col. Dalzell writes to inquire on
what actions are being taken against ABC for the Tarawa Terrace contamination. (CLW 1712).
May 4 1988 – ESE Feasibility Study for the Hadnot Point Industrial Area.The purpose of the report was to
provide a database and information from which the Navy/USMC based their decisions to develop
remedial alternatives to clean up the detected contamination at the HPIA. The report determined that the
contamination at the HPIA resulted from improper waste disposal, POL disposal, underground storage
tank leaks, solvent spills and sludge disposal. A Risk Assessment study was not performed for the HPIA
at the time of the ESE FS report. Instead five interim alternatives were proposed to reduce immediate
health risks in the HPIA Feasibility Study area.
1. Drinking Water Well Assessment.
2. Ambient Air Monitoring.
3. Underground Work Space Monitoring.
4. Continued Groundwater Monitoring.
5. Cessation of Conitnuing Sources of Contamination.
Ambient Air Monitoring was recommended for the interiors of buildings near “hot spots” of contaminated
groundwater or places where the soil and gas readings were high. The contractor recommended a HNU
photoionizer, an organic vapor analyzer be used to monitor air quality fot Benzene, toluene, xylene (at the
fuel farm) and TCE, DCE, and vinyl chloride (areas south of the fuel farm). ESE advised that in the event
these compounds were detected above the threshold limit value (TLV) to humans, immediate measures
such as forced ventilation should be taken until permanent remediation measures were found. (Cerlca
428).
• May 11 1988 – ESE Confirmation Study Characterization Step Report for Hadnot Point Industrial
Area. (Cercla 258 & Cercla 48) Summary of findings:
1. Buildings 901,902,903,1202,1502, and 1601 appear to be the sources for the three contaminated
areas at the Hadnot Point Industrial Area.
2. Building 1100 was identified as former service station which conducted limited maintenance. During
the time of the NACIP study it was used as a printing plant. A 55 gallon drum of PCE was
observed outside the building. ESE was informed that the drum developed a leak and was
allowed to leak onto the ground. ESE recommended further monitoring of this area and the
installation of a monitoring well.
3. Soil and Gas investigation confirmed the presence of TCE at these three sites and in limited
quantities at several other sites.
4. The potable water obtained for MCBCL is derived from a sand/limestone interval which is highly
permeable. Groundwater flow was generally towards the New River. The flow into the deep
aquifer zone could not be definitively established by the current data due to a scarcity of sampling
points.
5. Two contaminated plumes of VOCs and petroleum hydrocarbons were found to exist. The northern
plume consists of 2 sources of contamination centered around building 901 (maintenance shop)
and the Hadnot Point Fuel Tank Farm. The data suggests that these two plumes have coalesced
into one large plume of contamination. The southern plume was centered around the
maintenance facility associated with buildings 1601 and 1709. Voc contamination of the deep
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aquifer has not been established but is assumed to have occurred due to the presence of
contaminated supply wells adjacent to the Hadnot Point Industrial Area.
• May 13 1988 – Letter from Commanding General MCBCL to Commandant Marine Corps regarding
groundwater contamination at Tarawa Terrace. Information concerning details of the
contamination forwarded to HQMC. (CLW 1716).
• May 18 1988 – Letter from AC/S Facilities, Col. Dalzell to Preston Howard (North Carolina Division
of Environmental Management) regarding notice of release from underground fuel storage
facilities at Hadnot Point fuel farm. Col. Dalzell informs the State that engineers have located and
defined a plume emanating from MCBCL’s fuel farm at Hadnot Point. He further advises that the
Commanding General has order the farm closed and an interim fuel farm be established with all
environmental precautions to prevent further contamination. (CLW 1734).
• May 18 1988 – Letter from Commanding General MCBCL to Commandant Marine Corps
concerning documented groundwater contamination at Hadnot Point fuel farm. The General
makes the request to expedite funding for the 05 Feb 87 MCON proposal to relocate the aging
and leaking Hadnot Point fuel farm. The General confirms that gasoline derivatives and other
volatile organic compounds have been found in the water supply aquifer and the deep water
aquifer underneath the fuel farm. The General also advises that inventory records indicate a
continued loss of fuel into the ground and that a “positive and swift action” will demonstrate their
commitment to the environment to the various regulatory agencies overseeing MCBCL. (CLW
1737).
• May 24 1988 – Message from Commandant Marine Corps. HQMC advises all stations that they
shall give notice in accordance with SDWA concerning lead in the drinking water systems. Notice
shall be given in the form of newspaper articles and mailers in bills. (CLW 1714).
June 1988 – Camp Lejeune Military Reservation (Including MCAS New River) and ABC One Hour
Cleaners are both proposed for listing on the EPA’s National Priority List as a Superfund hazardous
waste site under CERCLA. (CLW 4976).
1. Ground water at the base is shallow (10ft) and subsurface formations are permeable (conditions
that facilitate movement of contaminants into ground water). An estimated 13,800 people obtain
drinking water from wells within 3 miles from site # 21. The nearest well was 1,400 feet away.
2. VOC contamination in the shallow and deep water aquifer.
• June 1988 – MCAS New River Water Treatment study prepared by Hobbs, Upchurch and
Associates. P.A. The study recommends the installation of an ammonia feed system to treat
the water used for MCAS. The system will prevent the formation of TTHM and bring the air
station within compliance of the proposed 0.05 ppb standard. (CLW 6036).

July 14 1988 – Letter from Commanding Officer MCBCL to Commanding Officer MCAS New River
regarding water samples from Officer’s club. Analysis indicated that bacteriological contamination existed
in the club’s drinking water. (CLW 1784).
•

July 15 1988 – Letter from Commandant of the Marine Corps to all commands including Camp
Lejeune regarding Installation Restoration requirements and procedures. The letter encourages
full and open cooperation with regulatory agencies and the public in regards to clean up at past
disposal sites. The Commandant also advised that as amended by the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act, the USMC was required to comply with CERCLA just as any non-
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governmental entity. Contained within the enclosure is an excerpt from CERCLA discussing
document retention under CERCLA for 50 years. (Cercla 577).
July 18 1988 – The state advises that measures to be taken to disinfect the officer’s club and
that bottle water must be provided until the entire potable water system (MCAS) was
completed. (CLW 1787).
July 29 1988 –MCAS officer’s club was declared free of coli form bacteria. (CLW 1791).

August 1 1988 – Letter from the Commanding General Camp Lejeune to AC/S Facilities, CO, U.S. Naval
Hospital and AC/S Manpower regarding Installation Program MCBCL Study. According to the May 1988
ESE Feasibility Study for the Hadnot Point Industrial Area, five interim alternatives to deal with immediate
health risks in the Hadnot Point area were recommended by the contractor. One of the recommendations
was for ambient air monitoring for buildings within the HPIA. This task was assigned to the Commanding
Officer of the Naval Hospital Preventive Medicine Unit and AC/S Manpower Safety Officer. A written
report of their findings was requested. (Cercla 260).
• Aug 3 1988 -- Letter to commanding General MCBCL concerning Installation Restoration Contract
Report. The enclosed report indicates in section 3.5 (CLW 6298). ESE recommends the
evaluation and discontinuation of practices at Hadnot Point Industrial Area (HPIA) which may
result in contamination of the soil and groundwater. All current disposal practices should be
evaluated for environmental contamination potential. Fuel tanks and underground tanks should
be tested for leaks. (CLW 6298 + CLW 6300).
• Aug 5 1988 – Memo to Utilities director Mr. Baker from Mr. Elston. Mr. Baker is advised that the
supply wells will be tested for VOCs over the next three or four months and to hold off on and
further action until that time. (CLW 1793).
Aug 9 1988 – Technical Review Committee held aboard Camp Lejeune. The committee is
sanctioned by the 1986 Superfund Amendment Reauthorization Act from Congress. The purpose of
the committee it to keep the community informed of actions occurring on a superfund site such as
Camp Lejeune. (Cercla 47). The meetings were intended to encourage fluid discussion and to
provide the Chairman with comments on studies and remedial action. The meeting was recorded and
transcribed and entered into the base administrative record. DoN, EPA and state agency members
were expected to serve as their agency’s spokesperson and positions advanced by these members
during the meetings are considered the corresponding agency’s position. (Cercla 489).
1. Prior to 1986, the Department of Defense handled contamination sites at military
installations under the Installation Restoration (IR) Program. The Navy version of this
program was called NACIP. When the 1986 SARA was passed. DoD was required to
bring their program in alignment with the EPA’s program. According to Cheryl Barnett
from LantDiv, The Initial Assessment Study was released in 1983 and it wasn’t until the
1984 Confirmation Study that the drinking water contamination was discovered. (pdf 8&9)
2. The Hadnot Point Industrial Area site was created as a mechanism to attempt to explain
and locate the TCE contamination in that area. (pdf11) The sources for TCE in the HPIA
later turned out to be the vehicle and base maintenance buildings and building 1100 all
located within the confines of the HPIA. There is no mention of the benzene
contamination found in well HP-602 until later in the presentation (Pdf page 23) but he
falls short of making the direct connection or naming the levels found in well HP-602.
Also, Please note well HP-651 was located well away from the HPIA and thus it could not
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7.
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9.

10.

11.
12.
13.

be a source of contamination for that well. The source was discovered in 1992 and
became known as site 82, VOC disposal area).
Site 22, The Hadnot Point Fuel Farm was identified as a source of fuel contamination in
the groundwater. ESE’s Robert Gregory asserted that the types of contamination they
indentified there and at site 21 were in the deep wells and did not pose an immediate
threat. (Pdf 15).
Mr Gregory later described a well located along the periphery of the HPIA which
according to him triggered the whole investigation after VOCs, waste solvents and fuel
derived materials were found. This well appears to be HP-602. Mr, Gregory then went on
to state that he was not sure of the levels but that they may have 30 ppb. (Pdf 16).
Base Environmental Engineer, Bob Alexander, announced that the base was going to
perform ambient air monitoring and that they were already purchasing equipment. The
reasoning was to make sure there were not hot spots inside specific buildings where soil
and gas surveys indicated potential problems. (Pdf 39).
Building 1100 was identified as a former service station but there was no mention of the 7
UST still located there. Only a drum of PCE was mentioned. (Pdf 25).
Mr. Bittner specifically asked Mr. Alexander what kinds of tests they were running in
terms of water quality. Mr. Alexander replied that they had very little if any data before we
realized our ground water was contaminated. (Pdf 44).
Near the end of the meeting, Victor Weeks of the EPA pointed out that deep aquifer had
yet to be addressed. (Pdf 51).
Cheryl Barnett from LantDiv states “As part of that effort (Confirmation Study 1984), we
sampled a lot of potable water wells here on Camp Lejeune, and we discovered some
contamination in basically eight wells that were immediately closed by the base.” Ms.
Barnnett’s statement fails to account to the Jennings, USAEHA and Grainger lab reports
dating back to October 1980 which indicated that these chemicals were in the water 4
years before the base “immediately” closed the wells. (Pdf 8).
The current NACIP study only has three 75-150 foot monitoring wells and thus according
to Mr. Alexander, “we don’t have the data” to tell where the deep water is going or the
extent of the contamination in the deep water aquifer.
An information repository was established at the Onslow County Library.
Possibilities for remediation were reviewed including air stripping and filtration of the
VOCs.
Near the close of the meeting, Mr. Mader asked if about site 22 (HPFF). Mrs. Barnett
advised that it was part of the 22 other sites they were looking at and that they just did
not have any data to present today (on site 22). (Pdf 64).

• Aug 25 1988 – Letter from the State of North Carolina Department of Human Resources advises
the Commanding General of MCBCL the base has been selected for the EPA’s National
Pesticide Survey of public drinking water wells. This means that the base’s water systems will be
tested for pesticides. The base was to be notified of the results before they were released to the
public. (CLW 1801).
• Aug 1988 – Letter from Commanding Officer Naval Hospital to Commanding Officer MCBCL
regarding IR Program Ambient Air Monitoring request in letter dated 1 Aug 1988. The CO of the
Naval Hospital advised that they are unable to perform the required ambient air quality testing
and recommend that the tests be contracted out to another party. (Cerlca 260 pdf 8).
September 14 1988 – Letter from Director NREAD to AC/S Facilities, MCBCL regarding testing supply
wells for VOCs. Samples were taken from HP 642, HP 603 and the Hadnot Point WTP. Detection limits
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were set at 10 ppb for the test. The samples were taken 11 Aug and sent to JTC labs for testing. (CLW
1807).
• Sept 22 1988 – Letter from North Carolina Department of Natural Resources and Community
Development to AC/S Facilities, MCBCL. The letter was written to advise MCBCL that North
Carolina’s Groundwater classifications and Standards (15 NCAC 2L) were being revised. The
major revisions include the establishment of numerical standards for VOCs. (CLW 1808).
• Sept 29 1988 – Letter from EPA Chief Lucius (Site Investigation and Support Branch) to AC/S
Facilities, Col. Dalzell concerning comments for Characterization Step Report from ESE. The
EPA recognized MCBCL for their attempts to comply with CERCLA requirements before MCBCL
was listed on the NPL (Formation of the TRC and development of a Community relations plan).
The EPA provided comments concerning the upcoming remedial work at MCBCL. (Cercla 262).
1. Air testing around the sewage plant to monitor for possible toxic air emissions.
2. Air stripping was a proven technology and was highly effective at removing VOCs. A
vapor recovery system should be installed to insure acceptable air emissions.
3. Efforts to determine the extent, concentration, rate and direction of migration of
contamination need to be expanded to include all 40 CFR Section 261 requirements.
4. All solid waste management units needed to be investigated for releases.
5. Contaminants with no current health effects criteria should be remediated using the
Hazard Index for systemic toxicants.
6. Generated sludge should be treated as hazardous and treated in accordance with RCRA.
7. Lead removal in ground water needed to be addressed before discharges into streams
and waterways.
8. Biological treatment of benzene, methylene chloride, toluene and TCE were not
recommended because of extremely slow rates of biodegradation.
9. If biological treatments are used, then MCBCL will need to address vapor recovery in
order to protect air quality.
10. Any sewage discharge will need to be permitted in order to monitor for VOCs.
11. Characterization of the Deep water has not been completed and will need to be
addressed in order to comply with CERCLA.
12. The Feasibility Study (ESE) read that the clean up for contaminated water in the deep
aquifer will be developed separately after collecting additional data. However, the EPA
notes no plan for collecting this data was presented.
13. No information concerning the hydraulic functioning of the shallow aquifer was submitted
to justify the use of 32 recovery wells slated for use to recover the shallow aquifer. This
data was needed by the EPA to check the adequacy of the recovery work with their
computer models.
14. Five years was considered an unreasonably short time for clean up of the groundwater
system contaminated with an large plume as existed at MCBCL. Thirty years was
recommended as a more realistic time frame.
15. The EPA requested a written response before the next TRC meeting scheduled for
Jan/Feb 1989.
16. The EPA recommended early negotiations with the Marine Corps to enter into an
Interagency Agreement (IAG) to facilitate the clean up of Camp Lejeune.
17. Camp must develop and submit a Health Risk Assessment to the EPA.
October 5 1988 – Letter from Commanding General MCBCL to NavFacEngCom regarding IR program
Hadnot Point Industrial Area. The General requests NavFacEngCom to evaluate ESE’s Feasibility Study
for Hadnot Point and provide any recommended revisions. (Cercla 260).
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Oct 5 1988 – Letter from base Staff Judge Advocate, Colonel Tokarz to Director, Joint Public Affairs
Office Camp Lejeune regarding proposed fuel farm (press) release. In this letter the Colonel discussed
and approved a proposed press release and Q&A sheet about the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm (HPFF). Draft
forms of the press release and proposed Q&A sheet were also located in the original 595 page document
along with an October 1988 newspaper clipping from the base newspaper, The Globe. Please note that
the proposed Q&A sheet was redacted by Navy JAG under FOIA exemption #5 when they released the
electronic version of their UST library. Colonel Tokarz closes the letter with a parenthetical paragraph
which reads:

“(To avoid claims of misrepresentation, whether the fuel can be successfully separated from the
solvents at Hadnot Point should be verified in terms of anticipated amount of fuel recovered.)”
(Navy UST 1185 Pdf 185).

December 5 1988 – NAVMEDCOM Instruction 6240.1 Standards for Potable Water. This order
cancelled BUMED instruction 6240.3C. The purpose of the new instruction remains the same, (to
establish potable water standards for the Navy and the Marine Corps). However, the language of the new
instruction is significantly revised. (NAVMEDCOMIST 6240.1)
1. The definitions describing Health Hazards and Pollution are removed.
2. The language contained in the prior BUMED, “substances which may have a deleterious (harmful)
physiological effect or for which the physiological effects are not known, shall not be introduced
into the water system in a manner which would permit them to reach the consumer”, was
removed.
3. This revision replaces what was then a more advance and comprehensive potable water standard
with a new standard which was in agreement with the current SDWA requirements in force at that
time.
• Dec 7 1988 – Contaminated Ground Water Study Report for the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm. The
report was prepared by O’Brien & Gere engineering for NavFacEngCom. (Cercla 417).
1. Fuel losses of gasoline occurred predominantly through leaks in the transfer lines or
valves resulting in the formation of 2 plumes.
2. The geology of the area consists of primarily silty sand with occaisional discontinous clay
layers. Note this means contaminants were not confined to the areas where there were
originally spilled.
3. Their studies indicated the presence of a free phasing product in the groundwater that
ranged from .24 feet to 15.34 feet in thickness. Analysis of the ground water identified
significant levels of dissolved petroleum compounds including benzene, toluene, xylene
and ethylbenzene.
4. The extent of the benzene plume was not fully defined and exceeded the EPA’s
maximum containment level of 5 parts per billion.
5. Traces of other VOCs including tetrachloroethylene and trichloroethylene were detected
at the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm.
6. The engineers recommended review of past inventories to help identify which tanks were
leaking, initiate a storage tank management program or systematic removal and
replacement of all the underground tanks, remediation of soil and ground water
underneath the tanks.
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• Dec 12 1988 – Letter from Paul Rakowski Head, Environmental Programs Branch Utilities, Energy
and Environmental Division (Navy) to Dr. Barry Johnson Agency for Toxic Disease Registry
(ATSDR) regarding Health Assessment MCBCL. Mr. Rakowski makes the formal request per
CERCLA law for ATSDR to perform a Public Health Assessment for MCBCL. He also requests
a review and comment on the draft before it’s release to the public. (CLW 4989).
• Dec 28 1988 – EPA letter from Site Investigation and Support Branch to AC/S Dalzell MCBCL. The
letter advises the base that the EPA and The North Carolina Hazardous Waste Branch will
conduct a RCRA Facility Assessment (RFA) at MCBCL in January of 1989. (Cercla 265). The
purpose of this assessment is:
1. Identify and gather information on Solid Waste Management Units.
2. Make preliminary determinations regarding known or suspected releases of hazardous
wastes or constituents from SWMUs.
3. Make determinations of the need for further actions.
4. co-ordinate RCRA and CERCLA activities and responsibilities.
January 09-23 1989 – Letters between Director NREAD to base AC/S Facilities, concerning drums of
DDT discovered at lot 203. During an inspection with the EPA, 5 barrels of DDT were discovered buried
at lot 203. (Cercla 276, Cercla 277, Cercla 279, and Cercla 289).
1. A former DRMO employee (Mr. Pallotti) was contacted and interviewed concerning the DDT
disposed at Lot 203. Mr. Pallotti revealed that between 1963 and 1980 various wastes were
disposed of at Lot 203. The wastes included solvents, PCB, used battery acid and waste oil. Mr.
Pallotti also advised DDT was stored in a trailer at lot 203 (please see 20 Nov 79 item # 11 entry
for CLW 263) but he was not aware that DDT was buried at lot 203.
2. Mr. Pallotti stated 4 former DRMO lot employees had died, at least one died of cancer. Mr.
Pallotti himself would later die of cancer.
3. The decision was made to remediate the exposed 5 barrels and leave the rest undisturbed until
the Installation Restoration Program completes their inspection and assessment of Lot 203 (I.R.
site 6).
4. Julian Wooten recommends that Base Safety and PMU investigate BRMO lot 203 and provide
recommendations relative to any immediate threat to human health.
February 07 1989 – Letter to Commanding General MCBCL from AC/S Facilities, Col. Dalzell concerning
Site Survey Report on Lot 203 by Base Environmental Engineer Robert Alexander. Col. Dalzell reports to
the Commanding General that there is a presence of organic vapors at lot 203 and potentially affecting
personnel at the site. A hand written note at the bottom of the page that personnel working at the lot have
been removed. Mr. Alexander’s attached report indicated that there was no imminent hazard and that
normal operations of lot 203 should continue pending additional monitoring under the Installation
Restoration Program. Mr. Alexander also recommended that activities should be conducted to minimize
subsurface excavations around lot 203 and a 30 foot section of test area 4 be fenced pending further
investigation. (Cercla 306).
March 20 1989 – Response to letter from NREAD to AC/S Facilities, Col. Dalzell concerning Cleanup of
Lot 203. Col. Dalzell advises Julian Wooten to proceed with emergency contract to locate and hire firm
capable of cleaning up the barrels at Lot 203. (Cercla 303).
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• March 21 1989 – Letter to AC/S Facilities, Col. Dalzell concerning lot 203 soil samples. Per
direction of the EPA, the soil samples from lot 203 were sent to the OSHA lab in Utah. Upon
receipt of the samples, The OSHA lab advised that they would not be able to perform the
analysis. The samples were then sent to an environmental lab for testing. (Cercla 287).
April 11 1989 – Letter from Supervisory Chemist Elizabeth Betz to Director NREAD concerning water
monitoring as related to the Installation Restoration Program. Ms. Betz advises that she feels monitoring
of all wells on base was very important and resists the idea of only sampling the wells nearest IR sites.
Ms. Betz recalls how well HP-651 was well outside known contamination sites and that it would not have
been discovered if they had not sampled all of the best wells in 1985. She also advises that well HP-651
was the worst of the contaminated wells on the base. She also recommends that wells 603 and 642 be
sampled quarterly as they are near possible contamination. Finally Ms. Betz states that monitoring for
Synthetic Organic Chemicals be completed quarterly until approved by the state. (CLW 1818).
May 10 1989 -- Letter from N.C. Department of Human Resources Division of Health Services to AC/S
Facilities, MCBCL regarding SOC monitoring for Courthouse Bay WTP. The State advises MCBCL that
the required SOC reports have not been filed and that per state regulation a notification must go out to
users of the system advising them that MCBCL has not performed the required test. The State also
reminds MCBCL that it was their (the base) own responsibility to provide test results within the required
time frame. (CLW 1824).
• May 17 1989 – Letter from Commanding Officer to Commanding General MCBCL concerning Lot
203 test results. Mr. Wood advises MCBCL that preliminary soil test performed on the February
samples indicates the presence of Lead, Chromium and Mercury. The organic analysis was not
performed. A review of current lot 203 employee medical records revealed no abnormalities to
date. Mr. Wood also recommends another round of testing be completed and that the base
review safety procedures for employees of the lot. (Cercla 288).
June 20 1989 –Health Advisory Trichloroethylene (TCE) from EPA. TCE is now cited as a probable
human carcinogen. (CLW 1830).
July 28 1989 – USEPA sends letter to MCBCL concerning recent inspection of the base and notification
of violation of North Carolina’s Hazardous Waste Management Rules. The base was found to be in
violation of the following rules (Cercla 246).
1. A generator of hazardous waste shall not accumulate hazardous waste on site for more than 90
days in an area that is not permitted or have interim status for storage.
2. A generator of hazardous waste shall not accumulate hazardous waste on site for more than 90
days must inspect areas where containers are stored at least weekly. The inspection log will kept
for 3 years. Upon inspection, there were missing weekly logs at building 1775.
3. Hazardous wastes were found to be stored in areas not permitted.
4. Lack of training materials for personnel handling wastes.
5. Various incidents of improper labeling, mixing of types of waste and failure to secure lids.
• July 20 1989 – Newspaper article advising the SOC analysis run for Courthouse Bay, Rifle Range
and Onslow Beach were run in March 1989. (CLW 1853).
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August 9 1989 – Letter from the Commanding General MCBCL to Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Concerning Construction Contract 89-B-2611 Temporary Fuel Farm (Hadnot Point). The purpose of the
letter was to provide HQMC with the background data used to justify the funding of the temporary fuel
farm with M2 funds. (Cercla 96). See page 1.
1. The fuel farm was originally constructed in 1943 and consisted of 17 tanks ranging from 3,000 to
600,000 gallons.
2. Study (O’Brien & Gere) indicate that significant amounts of free fuel are located under the fuel
farm.
3. Several potable water wells in the fuel farm area were shut down due to the detection of benzene
and other chemicals in the water.
4. HQMC project LE201M and LE433R were undertaken in the early 1980’s but during the design of
the project, it was discovered that the cost to replace valves necessary to isolate tanks and allow
leakage testing was not economically feasible due to the age of the tanks (40 years) and a
decision was made that the fuel farm was beyond its expected life. A MILCON project was
submitted to replace the fuel farm.
5. Upon the receipt of the O’Brien & Gere study, the State of North Carolina was notified of the leaks
and the fuel farm would be immediately shut down. Notification of the release of fuel products
was sent to the State of North Carolina May 18, 1988. The fuel farm remained in operation as
noted in the next entry.
6. Despite the May 1988 notification the fuel farm remained in operation.
Aug 31 1989 – Globe news Article “Base Taps into Drinking Water Concerns” the article provides the
Marine Corps viewpoint on the events leading up to and just after the contamination aboard MCBCL was
“officially” discovered. (CLW 1854).
1. Contamination was found and verified at 15 cites. B.W Elston (Dep. Asst. C/S Facilities) stated,
“Even then, none of the contamination found was above the limit described as acceptable by the
EPA.”
2. Mr. Elston also stated, “We closed eight wells in the Hadnot Point Industrial Area and two in
Tarawa Terrace area as a precautionary measure and still had adequate water supply.”
3. Supervisory Chemist Elizabeth Betz stated, “We shut down some wells that were not near the EPA
limit.”
4. Betz was also quoted, “You’d have to look at each VOC individually, but many of them are
carcinogens. That’s the main reason we immediately shut the wells down, although the levels we
found in the tests were not near the EPA limit.”
5. The contamination was caused by long-term spillage and dumping in the Hadnot Point Industrial
Area. Most of the chemicals found were solvents used to clean vehicles.
6. Betz commented in Tarawa Terrace “We were puzzled when that chemical showed up. At first we
couldn’t figure out how it had gotten into Tarawa Terrace’s system. Then we looked across
Highway 24. There was dry cleaning business right across the road from the housing area.”
(Note, please see BUMED 6240.3B and BUMED 6240.3C).
7. The article states that base officials took immediate action to pump safe drinking water into Tarawa
Terrace. No mention is made of the March 1985 action brief and the use of contaminated TT-New
well during the 5 month interim to install the auxiliary pipe line to Tarawa Terrace.
8. Betz also stated, “Once you have identified where the potential for a threat is, you start taking
action to correct it. You can’t leave a contaminant in the ground water.”
September 7 1989 – Globe follow up article. “Efforts Underway to ensure safe drinking water.” The article
is the second part of a three part series written by the Marine Corps to explain the contamination and
clean up of MCBCL. (CLW 1856).
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1. The Marine Corps, Department of the Navy and the EPA will work to coordinate how all parties will
approach the clean up aboard MCBCL.
2. Closing of the Hadnot Point fuel farm was pending funding. According to Elston, “We are awaiting
urgent construction funds from HQMC to build a new facility.”
3. Betz advises that the base water supply systems currently meets all Federal standards and recent
tests have shown no contaminants in the water system.
• Sep 14 1989 – Marine Corps Globe article: “Measures taken to prevent future water contamination.
This is the last in a three part article explaining the contamination and clean up at Camp Lejeune.
(CLW 1859).
1. Mr. Elston, “Most of the problems we are dealing with stem from years ago, when solvents
and fuels were used all over the place and routinely dumped. Over the years, it built up.”
2. Mr. Elston states, “Violations are reported promptly and corrected immediately.”
3. According to the article, the base’s dedication goes beyond mere inspections. ‘The base
recently sponsored a week-long training program for Marines involved with the handling,
storage of hazardous materials and wastes and included briefings about state and federal
regulations and procedures.”
4. The base is awaiting listing on the NPL for additional funding for clean up.
5. Betz states, “The best way to avoid future contamination is to have good housekeeping in
maintenance areas. If someone is sloppy, it will get into the system.”
6. Finally, Mr. Elston ends the article with the following quote, “We always take measures to go
at least a step beyond what is required by law and to ensure we don’t provide water that is
unsafe for those using it. The Commanding General will accept nothing less.”
October 1 1989 – Work Plan for Product Recovery System Design Hadnot Point Fuel Farm at Camp
Lejeune, Contract No. N62470-88-R-5255, prepared by O’Brien & Gere for NavFacEngCom. The purpose
of the report was to provide a basis for the recovery system for the fuel farm at Hadnot Point. (Cercla
381).
1. The fuel farm was constructed in 1941 and was comprised of 15 fuel storage tanks
(795,000 gallons of fuel capacity).
2. The natural drainage area is towards Wallace Creek (note, this is in the direction of well
HP-602 but not cited in the report).
3. Their studies indicated the presence of free phasing product in the groundwater that ranged
from .24 feet to 15.34 feet in thickness. (see page 10 of the report).
4. Two large plumes (pools) of product were identified.
October 4 1989 – Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune and Marine Corps Airs Station New River are place
on the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) National
Priority List as Camp Lejeune Military Reservation. (CLW 4976).
This time line was compiled by Mike Partain for use by The Few, The Proud, The Forgotten and members
of Congress and their staff. Other interested parties should contact us for permission to reprint for
distribution.
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Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune chronology of significant events
concerning contamination of the base drinking water supply©.
Hadnot Point Industrial Area Fuel Farm
Compiled by Mike Partain for use by WWW.TFTPTF.COM

Introduction – This time line was compiled by means of public documents available from the CERCLA
and CLW files kept under requirements of Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980. There are many documents that still have not been released or are
currently being suppressed from public view. As these documents become available, we will update this
time line and promptly post it on our website.
1941 – Hadnot Point Fuel Farm Constructed southeast of Holcomb Blvd adjacent to Ash street. The fuel
farm was comprised of 15 fuel tanks. There was one 600,000 gallon above ground tank, six underground
12,000 gallon tanks, and eight underground 15,000 gallon tanks. The underground tanks were placed at
grade and completely covered with soil. The above ground tank stored diesel fuel while the other tanks
stored gasoline, unleaded gasoline and kerosene. The tanks were located in a highly developed area of
the base where natural drainage had been modified by extensive areas of asphalt, concrete, ditches and
storm sewers. Hadnot Point supply well HP-602 was located 1,200 feet northwest of the Hadnot Point
Fuel Farm. Marine Corps records indicate that 20,000 to 33,150 gallons of fuel were lost over the course
of the fuel farm’s operation. This estimate did not include or account for product lost during transfers or
unreported leaks. (Cercla 417).
1979 – Fuel leak at Hadnot Point Fuel Farm. An estimated 20,000 to 30,000 gallons of fuel product
leaked from the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm. The exact details of the leak and if any clean up was performed
is unknown at this time. (Cercla 417).
June 27 1980 – Condition Survey for POL Facilities (Hadnot Point Fuel Farm) Camp Lejeune. The survey
was conducted by Cal J Ingram of NavFacEngCom (LantDiv) to determine the condition of the POL
facilities for MCAS New River and Camp Lejeune. The survey was necessary due to leakage, problems,
obsolescence and environmental/safety concerns. (Cercla 96). See PDF page 11.
The following recommendations were made for the Hadnot Point fuel farm.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

The fuel facilities were approximately 35 years old. Mr. Ingram noted that because of
age, there has been general corrosion and deterioration of the tanks and pipelines.
Maintenance over the years has been minimal due to insufficient funding. Funding to
keep abreast of the latest state of the art was not available.
Camp Lejeune was deficient in new fueling designs including automatic high liquid
alarms, tank coatings, dead man controls, impervious dikes and containment curbs.
The fuel storage tanks have never been cleaned since they were built.
There were many buried valves and flanges that can not be inspected or maintained.
An automatic liquid level indicator was installed but never made functional.
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18.

19.
20.

21.

22.

Above ground tank S-1009 (the 600,000 gallon tank) exterior coating was beginning to peel
and evidence of rust. The protective dike was insufficient and not impervious. No locks were
noted on the drain valve for the tank.
Tank S- 1031 was discovered to have a leaking valve and pitting in the interior bottom of the
tank.
As a result of the leaking valve in tank S-1031, it was determined that another tank valve also
leaked badly. A recommendation was made to test tank S-1009 as soon as possible to prevent
leakage, loss of product and environmental contamination.
A recommendation was made to replace and install new piping, new tank valves and new
concrete valve pits for all storage tanks. It was essential that all valves be accessible for proper
maintenance.
A recommendation was made to empty and clean the interiors of all underground storage tanks
and then inspect them for leaks.

Note, none of these recommendations were acted upon until 1989. Please see entry for 29 March
1988.
March 6 1981 – Military Construction Data for project number LE201M, repair of POL (Hadnot Point Fuel
Farm) facilities for Camp Lejeune. $537,200 allocated to clean and repair the petroleum/oil/lubricant
tanks, perform vacuum tests, sandblasting and required repairs. The project also included the installation
of high level alarms, reworked dikes and for the piping and valves to be replaced. The projected cited
deterioration leakage problems and potential violation of environmental and safety concerns will continue
if work is not completed. (Cercla 96). See PDF page 17.
Dec 30 1981 – In response to the Defense Environmental Quality Program Policy Memorandum
(DEQPPM) 80-6, the Department of the Navy developed the Naval Assessment and Control of
Institutional Pollutants (NACIP) Program. The purpose of this program was to identify, investigate,
assess, characterize, the release of hazardous substances, and to reduce the risk to human health and
the environment from past waste disposal operations and hazardous material spills at Navy/Marine Corps
activities. Previously, base environmental issues were handled by Utilities, Energy and Environmental
Division, LANTDIV NavFacEngCom in Norfolk Virginia. The NACIP program management plan was given
to the base. This plan states the Initial Assessment Study (IAS) will collect and evaluate all evidence
which indicates the existence of pollutants which may have contaminated a site or pose an imminent
health hazard for people located on or off the installation. (Cercla 2042).
January 14 1982 – NACIP (Naval Assessment and Control of Installation Pollutants) Initial Assessment
Study ("IAS") begins at Camp Lejeune. The intent of this study was to identify, asses, and control
contamination of the environment from past operations. Water Air and Research of Gainesville, Florida
was selected to perform the Initial Assessment Study. The base was instructed to provide the use of a
photocopying facility to duplicate records. The NACIP team was granted permission to review base
records in order to provide information on past operations, environmental contamination, and industrial
processes. (CLW 455).
June 22 1982 – Draft Initial Assessment Study for Camp Lejeune. (Cercla 332).
6. PDF Page 23 of 171. Potable wells at the base are usually deep, but due to voids in the
confining layer, this carries some risk. Also, heavy demands for water at times produce an
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overall decline of pressure in the semi-confined aquifer. Therefore, contaminants can
migrate: (1) laterally to surface water and (2) vertically through gaps in the confining layer.
7. PDF Page 43 of 171. Conclusions point number 5 states that the water table is highly
susceptible to contamination from hazardous waste disposal practices. This conclusion does
not appear in the 1983 Final IAS Report.
8. PDF Page 46 of 171.The detection of pollutants in groundwater samples is generally
conclusive evidence , negative results for a limited number of samples does not prove that
pollutants are not and/or will not be present.
9. PDF Page 52 of 17. The IAS draft recommended that HP well 602 be sampled because it
was located 1,100 feet from and down gradient of the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm. The well was
also identified as an active pumping well.
The draft IAS report reads that Recommendations for the next phase of the NACIP program, a
Confirmation Study, is based on the findings of an IAS. A Confirmation Study is conducted only if
an IAS Concludes that:
3. Sufficient evidence exists to suspect that an installation is contaminated; and
4. The contamination presents a definite damage to (a) the health of civilians in adjoining
communities or personnel within the base fence line or (b) the environment within or
outside the installation.
If these criteria are not met, no further studies will be conducted under the NACIP program.
As explained in this report, a Confirmation Study at MCB Camp Lejeune is warranted. The
criteria and conclusion used to justify a Confirmation Study was significantly altered in the
Final version of the report.
November 10 1982 – NACIP IAS out-briefing held aboard MCBCL. Attendees included LantDiv
personnel, base officials, Marine Corps officers, and a representative from the IAS. No minutes of this
meeting have been found. (Cercla 2058).
December 1 1983 – Letter from LantDiv to MCBCL concerning contract 81-B-3849 Inspection and
Testing of POL tanks. The letter provided criteria for testing and inspection of tanks base wide. (Cercla
1235).
May 1984 – Work and Safety Plan for Confirmation study. The work plan was the verification step in
which the hired contractor will determine whether specific toxic and hazardous materials identified in the
IAS were present in concentrations considered to be hazardous. The study will install ground water
monitoring wells, sample soil, tissue, ground and surface water for contaminants. The verification step will
be a general evaluation of contamination found and will serve as a basis to proceed with the
Characterization step of the Confirmation Study. A draft report will be provided by August 1984 and a
Final report will be provided by September 10 1984. (Cercla 337).
July 1984 – Environmental Science and Engineering sampled the Hadnot Point Industrial area around
the fuel farm and supply well HP-602 as part of their Confirmation investigation. Well 602 tested positive
for VOCs (Benzene 380ppb, Dichloroethane 46ppb, Trans-Dichloroethene 7.8ppb, Ethylbenzene 8ppb,
Trichlororfluoromethane 3 ppb, and Toluene 10ppb). (CLW 1737 & Cercla 388). According to Marine
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Corps and State of North Carolina documents, eight wells of the Tarawa Terrace distribution system were
tested for VOCs in July 1984. The Marine Corps found three of these wells contaminated with TCE.
August 1984 – Groundwater Pollution Source Inventory completed by Rick Shiver. The report lists the
Industrial Area Tank Farm as the source and the indicator for confirmation of groundwater is circled. The
waste is identified as gasoline and diesel. Mr. Shiver also lists a data base cross reference with a date of
27 Jan 1981. (NC UST Files Aug 1, 1984).
November 30 1984 – Throughout the history of the drinking water contamination, the USMC has
maintained that Well HP 602 was shut down after benzene (121ppb), TCE (1,600 ppb), DCE (630ppb)
and PCE (24ppb) were found in the well water. (CLW 1054 & CLW 4971). The figures for these results
were based on a 3 December sample of well HP 602. This sample was taken after the well was taken off
line on 30 November. In fact, well HP 602 was sampled four and a half months prior to the 30 November
closure of well HP 602. On 6 July 1984, Well HP 602 was sampled and found to contain benzene at 380
ppb and trace amounts of solvents. This data was collected while well HP 602 was an active pumping
well for the Hadnot Point water distribution system. (Cercla 388). The incorrect data (i.e. the 3
December samples) was included in the ATSDR 1997 Public Health Assessment (withdrawn April
2009), the 2007 GAO report on Camp Lejeune and the 2009 NRC Committee report on Camp
Lejeune.
December 3 1984 – Well 602 and several other wells from the Hadnot Point water system were sampled
by base officials and analyzed for VOCs. (Cercla 250).
• Dec 4 1984 – VOCs were detected Hadnot Point water system. Samples were taken again and
shipped to the lab via Federal Express. (CLW 1054).
• Dec 6 1984 – Robert Alexander, base environmental engineer, returned a call to J.R. Bailey at
LantDiv. Mr. Bailey informed him that benzene was found in well 602, trichloroethylene was
found in wells 602,601,603 and 608 as well as the finished tap water at the treatment plant.
They agreed that confirmation testing should be initiated as soon as possible on these and
other nearby wells. Mr. Bailey advised that a message containing an action planning was
forthcoming. Mr. Alexander briefs Assistant Chief of Staff, facilities, Col. Lilley and Lt Col.
Fitzgerald later that afternoon. Mr. Alexander advised base utilities to shut down wells 601 and
608. (Cercla 250 & CLW 5635).

Contaminant
Benzene
Chloroform
BRCL2Mthne
TCE

Hadnot
Point
Raw
water

Hadnot
Point
Treated
water

601

602

603

608

0

0

0

121

0

0

10

16

0

0

0

0

6

10

0

0

0

0

46

200

207

1600

4.6

110

117

DCE

15

83

88

630

0

5.4

PCE

0

3.9

0

24

0

0

Readings are in PPB

• Dec 10 1984 – December 4th samples results revealed continued VOC contamination of raw water
and wells 601,602,605,608 and now wells 634, 637 and 642. (CLW 1054).
• Dec 10 1984 – Robert Alexander, base Environmental Engineer, called Mike Bell, Regional
Engineer, State of North Carolina and advised him VOCs have been found in the Hadnot Point
water system. He stated that four wells have been shut down and further testing was
underway. (CLW 1051).
• Dec 12 1984 – Finished water at Hadnot Point tested and found to contain 30 PPB Chloroform. 2.3
ppb DCE and 2.3 ppb TCE. A 13 December test of raw (before treatment) Hadnot Point water
did not detect any PCE/TCE/DCE in the water. (CLW 5644).
• Dec 12 1984 – Article appeared in Marine Corps news periodical, The Globe. The article reads:
“Environmental officials are taking precautionary measures to ensure drinking water is free
from possible contamination. As a result of water samples taken on 3 Dec, four wells in the
Hadnot Point industrial area were found to contain some traces of organic compounds
according to Base Environmental Engineer, Bob Alexander.” The article goes on to read that
none of the organic compounds are listed under the Safe Drinking Water Act. The article ends
with a quote from Mr. Alexander, “every effort will be made to maintain the excellent quality
water supply traditionally provided to residents of Camp Lejeune.” (Cercla 523).
• Dec 14 1984 – Hadnot Point Wells 634 and 637 were shut down after testing positive for methyl
chloride. (CLW 1647 & CLW 4546).
January 8 1985 – NavFacEngCom quality control lab checked and verifies the validity of JTC
Environmental Consultanst’s findings concerning VOCs in the Hadnot Point water system. Cheryl Barnett
of NavFacEngCom advised that ESE results were not yet available and a letter from LantDiv will follow
soon. (CLW 1103).
• Jan 14 1985 – Environmental Science and Engineering (ESE) released Evaluation of Data from
First Round of Verification Sample Collection and Analysis. This report was the raw data from
the first round of sampling (June to November 1984) and was provided to the Marine Corps
during the time the base was scrambling to determine the extent of the potable water
contamination. (Cercla 388).
1. The data presented in this report consist of analytical results for samples of surface and
ground waters, sediments, soils and fish tissue collected at 21 sites of potential
contamination.
2. 55 shallow ground water monitoring wells and 75 samples were collected.
3. 17 existing potable water supply wells were sampled.
4. On the margins for site 1 (page 2-8) there was a handwritten note that reads, “It appears
that we do not have a true up gradient well. How will we explain away contamination in
up gradient wells or should we expand well field now or in characterization.”
5. On the margins of site 6 (2-18) aka Lot 201 and 203 there is a handwritten note that
reads, “sample 3 potable water wells on Piney Green Road for pesticides, dioxin and
contaminants found in MCBCL work. And on Holcomb Blvd. It was not clear if well HP651 was one of these wells discussed.
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6. On the margin for site 22 (2-34) aka Hadnot Point Industrial Area Tank Farm there was a
handwritten note that reads, “We must send them our (1141’s) report on well data, what it
means and what wells to keep shut down.
7. PDF Page 48. Hadnot Point Fuel Farm Site 22. “of extreme importance is the high level
of benzene (380ppb) detected on the sample collected from deep water supply well no.
602. This benzene concentration far exceeds the 10 minus 5 human health risk limit of
6.6 ppb; therefore the use of this well should be discontinued immediately.”
8. PDF page 52 Hadnot Point Fuel Farm Site 22. “The absence of contamination at well
22GW2 indicates that the migration pathway is deep, not shallow.”
Note, the Confirmation Study contractor’s monthly progress reports (August, October,
September and November) a draft report and an evaluation of data scheduled for completion
by September 1984 in the May 1984 Work and Safety plan for the Confirmation study are
missing. The reports fall in between the actual sampling of well HP-602 on 6 July 1984 and
the January release of this report. (Cercla 388.)
April 22 1985 – Message from Commanding General MCBCL to LantDiv concerning inspection of POL
tanks and a request for field investigation. The General’s staff advises, in an attached report from ESE,
that extremely high levels of VOCs (Benzene, Ethylbenzene, Toulene) and lead were detected in a
monitoring well around the tank farm area. The presence of these chemicals “further documents the
leakage of large quantities of fuel at this site.” The fuel farm was selected as an investigation site
because of the large amount of fuel stored at the site along with the age and condition of the facility. A
request to expedite field investigations and testing to characterize the extent of the fuel leakage was
made to LantDiv. Contained in the memo is a reference indicating that a recommendation was made to
remove the earthen berms covering the fuel tanks and their piping. (CLW 1235).
May 10 1985 – News article Jacksonville Daily News. The article reads that a Navy study has found
volatile chemicals in 10 deep water wells at MCBCL. “According to the memo from chief of staff, facilities,
no federal or state regulations mandate an unacceptable level of these organic chemicals.” Gunnery Sgt.
John Simmons from Lejeune’s Joint Public Affairs Office (JPAO) also advised that he had no information
on whether the well water was dangerous to humans. The article also reads that the 10 wells were all
taken off line in December instead of December through February as what actually occurred. Finally,
Gunnery Sgt. Simmons stated that Tarawa Terrace can barely meet the current demand for water and
that an auxiliary line was being constructed. Nothing was said about the continued operation of
contaminated well TT-23 at Tarawa Terrace to prevent system shut down due to the ongoing water
shortages. (CLW 4784).
May 11 1985 – Article in Wilmington Morning Star. This article contains surprisingly more detail than the
Jacksonville Daily News article. The article quoted Lee Mittelstadt, public information officer for the Solid
and Hazardous Waste Management Brach of the N.C. Dept. of Human Resources. She listed some of the
chemicals found by name and stated “(they) are toxic”. Because the base was a federal reservation, the
Marine Corps can not be fined by the state. Chuck Rundgren, head of the state Water Supply Branch,
advised that “he did not think Camp Lejeune residents need to worry about getting bad drinking water. I
think we kind of caught it right at the beginning.” The article ends with Gunnery Sgt. Simmons reiterating
the same half truth and half incorrect information given to the Jacksonville Daily News. (CLW 4784).
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May 31 1985 – Message from Commanding General MCBCL to NavFacEngCom concerning contract 81B-3849, Inspection and Testing of POL tanks. The Commanding General requested a field investigation
for the fuel farm at Hadnot point after extremely high levels of benzene, ethybenzene, toluene and lead
were detected in ground water monitoring wells in the fuel farm area. The testing performed during the
July 1984 Confirmation study indicated the leakage of large quantities of fuel at the site. (Cercla 0092).
Sept 15 1985 – News article from Raleigh News and Observer. The article discusses in depth the
environmental transgressions that occurred at the base and is in contrast to the articles which appeared
in cities closer to the base. The article is a testimony to a public relations campaign waged by the base to
minimize the magnitude of the problem aboard MCBCL. (CLW 4855).
1. Base Environmental Engineer, Robert Alexander is directly quoted in the article as
saying: “the 22 sites are not considered dangerous because only trace amounts of
contaminants have been found to have escaped from the dumps. People had not been
directly exposed to pollutants.”
Oct 8 1985 – Report from Rick Shiver titled: An Assessment of Groundwater Pollution Sources at Camp
Lejeune. The report is an overview of the NACIP program and an assessment of the State’s authority to
participate in the groundwater remedial projects aboard the base. Mr. Shiver noted the results of the July
1984 ground water studies were documented in a report provided to the Marine Corps in February 1985.
He also stated in the letter that: “As the Marine Corps disagrees with the conclusions in this report, it will
not release a copy of it to any outside agency. Recently, however, the Marine Corps did agree to provide
DEM copies of the technical data for review and interpretation.” (CLW 4871-73).
November 1 1985 – Conference aboard Camp Lejeune between base officials and EPA representatives
Wayne Mathis and Jim Holdaway concerning findings of the NACIP study and the groundwater
contamination aboard the base. The minutes of the meeting were preserved by Rick Shiver in his
handwritten notes. (CLW 4903).
7. The EPA “advises” Camp Lejeune to identify specific sources which resulted in the contamination of
the community water supply. It was pointed out to the EPA representatives that the EPA has no
authority to require action aboard MCBCL.
8. Mr. Holdaway countered and advises recent changes in RCRA permitted the EPA to address
environmental issues after 08 Nov 1984 for inactive sites on base.
9. Mr. Mathis advised existing data substantiates a risk to a population thus triggering consideration
for MCBCL to be included in the National Priority List (NPL). The Department of Defense was
responsible for implementing CERCLA on behalf of military installations.
10. Base officials refused to release the initial Confirmation Report from January 1985 and countered
that the report is erroneous. The EPA representatives explain that the Confirmation Study initial
report will be the basis for listing MCBCL on the NPL. Base Environmental Engineer Robert
Alexander resisted this idea and advised the report is erroneous. Mr. Shiver adds a postscript
note to himself, “CERCLA imposes punitive measures only for failure to report and concealment
of data. “
Nov 18 1985 – Letter from Arthur Linton of the EPA addressed to Commander Atlantic Division
NavFacEngCom to the attention of J.R. Bailey, Environmental Quality Branch. This letter highlights some
of the EPA’s input and concerns with the NACIP study.
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a. Phase 1 reports are heavily dependent on the use of indicator parameters to make
conclusive decisions about the releases of pollutants at a given location.
b. The EPA recommends that samples of groundwater and/or surface water be collected
and analyzed from each site.
c. The NACIP study should contain sufficient geologic and hydrological data to support
conclusions regarding the hydro-geology and drainage of a general area. This data will
also be necessary for a valid assessment of probable direction of possible horizontal
and/or vertical migration of contaminants.
d. When studies indicate a significant potential release or detect migration of pollutants,
then data should be collected that address potential risks of exposure to human
populations.
e. Based in information and preliminary data presented by MCBCL staff during the 1
Nov 1985 meeting, the USEPA believes that there is sufficient data indicating
potential extensive contamination of groundwater in several areas of Camp
Lejeune to warrant immediate consideration of this site (MCBCL) for inclusion on
the National Priority List (NPL) due to the potential risk to a population dependent
on potable ground water as is the case aboard MCBCL.
Nov 19 1985—The Hadnot Point water treatment plant tested positive for benzene at 2,500ppb, 2,600ppn
methylene chloride and 100ppb toluene. The analytical data sheets for these results are missing. There is
also a notation “not representative” written above the entry. (CLW 1406).
December 10 1985 – The Hadnot Point water treatment plant tested positive for benzene at 38ppb,
10ppb toluene. The analytical data sheets for these results are missing. (CLW 1406).
January 24 1986 – Internal memo from Director NREAD to Facilities, Environmental Engineer, facilities
Dept, and Base Maintenance Officer MCBCL concerning analysis of drinking water systems aboard
Camp Lejeune. Periodic readings of Benzene were dismissed as a quality control problem and were
arbitrarily discounted. Shortages in NREAD personnel have affected the base laboratory’s ability to
produce certified data concerning the water systems aboard the base. Finally, Mr. Wooten advised that
careful planning will be required to offset additional cost. The base will hold actual sampling (for water
systems aboard base) to the essential minimum which protects public health and provides compliance to
standards, laws and regulations. The last paragraph contains an instruction to the base Environmental
Engineer but the instructions are blacked out. (CLW 1406).
February 3 1986 – Letter from Arthur Linton of the EPA to Commander Atlantic Division NavFacEngCom
attention J.R. Bailey regarding 01 Nov 85 meeting aboard MCBCL and Confirmation study. In particular,
the quality of the water obtained from wells in the Hadnot Point area of MCBCL were reviewed at some
length. (CLW 5430).
5. Mr. Linton advises that during the discussions on 01 Nov 85, Mr. Mathis and Mr. Holdaway became
aware that there was evidence derived from sampling in 1983 or1984 of diffuse contamination of
ground water with unspecified organic substances (this information given to the EPA is in
direct contradiction to documentation which indicated that at least 2 potable water
systems contained tetrachlororethylene and trichloroethylene as early as October 1980).
6. The EPA representatives were led to believe that the contamination did not extend to the treated
potable water. “It was also established that there was no contamination detected in treated
potable water distributed at Camp Lejeune.” Once again this is in contradiction of known
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documentation that named and confirmed the presence of specific VOCs in raw AND
treated potable water aboard MCBCL.
7. At the recommendation of Mr. Mathis, Mr. Linton made a formal request for the NACIP Confirmation
Study results for monitoring wells and potable wells so they can insure there was no
contamination present in the Camp Lejeune water supply. This report was denied to the EPA
because that the data was still in raw form and under review. Mr. Linton countered by requesting
a brief on the report and copy of the report when it was published.
8. Mr. Linton finishes by informing Mr. Bailey that the EPA was concerned that a potential for human
exposure to hazardous substances and hazardous waste via the Camp Lejeune water supply
may exist due to the presence of such materials in ground water in the general vicinity of the
potable well field. The existence of such a potential exposure would warrant immediate
consideration for MCBCL for inclusion on the National Priority List. At the time that this letter
was written, the EPA was unaware that a documented contamination event had already
occurred involving the treated potable water systems aboard MCBCL.
• Feb 6 1986 – Letter from J.R Bailey to Arthur Linton of the EPA regarding the 18 Nov 85 EPA letter.
Mr. Bailey concurs with all of the points outlined in Mr. Linton’s letter with the sole exception of
the last point regarding the National Priority List. Mr. Bailey disagreed with the idea of
including MCBCL on the NPL and stated that the NPL will result in slower cleanup time and
delays. He informed Mr. Linton the state and public were being kept informed through meetings
with the state and news paper articles in local papers (Please see entries dated 12 Dec 84, 10
May & 11 May 1985, and 15 Sep 85.) Mr. Bailey stated that they were proceeding as quick as
possible with the confirmation study and will provide the report as soon as it becomes
available. (CLW 5415).
March 7 1986 – Letter to DR. Spell, Head of the Environmental Branch, NAVFACENGCOM Southern
Division from Arthur Linton EPA Region IV. Mr Linton wrote to reinforce the need for EPA and the Navy’s
NACIP program to better coordinate their work together. He cited the recent change in RCRA (Hazardous
and Solid Waster Amendments of 1984, HSWA). A meeting for March 27 1986 in Charleston SC was
requested. (Cerlca 536).
Apr 1 1986 – Memorandum for file regarding SouthNavFacEngCom and EPA Region IV meeting to
discuss ANCIP-RCRA interface written by Cheryl Barnett, LantDiv. The meeting took place in Charleston
SC on 27 March 1986. The attendees were Cheryl Barnett, Wayne Mathis and Jim Holdaway (EPA) and
James Malone, Joe McCauley (SOUTHNAVFACENGCOM). The purpose of the meeting was to discuss
the implementation EPA’s role of overseer for Cercla and regulator under RCRA. (Cerlca 675).
1. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Section 3004u requirements were the
an area of concer. The only sites which were not impacted by the regulations were nonpermitted facilities (i.e. generators) and facilities which already had a permit (i.e. Camp
Lejeune).
2. The EPA sought to develop a standardized approach so when the states took over the
program, an existing guideline was established.
3. RCRA permitting people at Region IV were accepting IAS reports (NACIP generated) as
the initial submissions under HWSA but at the time, there was no clear guidance from
EPA headquarters regarding procedure.
4. According to Barnett, cites appearing in both RCRA and CERCLA caused confusion. She
felt the EPA was not clear on how it would work and between the two programs.
5. Wayne Mathis was identified as the focal point for the technical review under CERCLA.
6. EPA requested draft form of reports for comment from LANTDIV.
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7. During the meeting, Mathis expressed the EPA’s concern that they still had not received
data from Camp Lejeune. He indicated that the EPA felt Camp Lejeune would make the
NPL. Cheryl Barnett stated in her notes surprise, surprise and explained that placing
Camp Lejeune on the NPL would not expedite clean up at the base. Barnett felt that Mr.
Mathis was motivated by a “CYA syndrome” if anyone should ask what the EPA was
doing about the contaminated groundwater that 14,000 people were drinking at Camp
Lejeune, that the EPA could point to the NPL.
Apr 25 1986 – Letter from J.R. Bailey to Arthur Linton, EPA regarding EPA letter 03 Feb 1986 concerning
the groundwater contamination aboard MCBCL and the NPL. (CLW 4927).
1.

2.
3.

Mr. Bailey agrees to provide the EPA with the analytical data from testing and monitoring
of ground water and potable wells aboard MCBCL. The NACIP Evaluation of Data report
(Cercla 388) was listed in the enclosures and was discussed in the letter as preliminary
report prepared by ESE.
The Grainger, Jennings and Army Lab results dating back to October 1980 were not
included in the documents provided to the EPA.
Mr. Bailey advises it was the receipt of ESE’s raw analytical data which prompted the
testing of the base well system in beginning in December of 1984 for VOCs.

Jul 31 1986 – Meeting aboard MCBCL concerning NACIP study. Details of this meeting were preserved
in the handwritten notes of Rick Shiver. (CLW 4955).
5. Mr. Linton of the EPA advises that changes in the regulations over the next 18 months
will impact MCBCL and the NACIP study. The EPA contends that MCBCL will rank high
on the hazards ranking system for the National Priority list.
6. The EPA feels that the NACIP program and study was not consistent with the National
Contingency Plan and wants the NACIP study aligned with RIFS (Remedial Investigation
Feasibility Study).
7. The EPA will now require facilities to assess active sources (I.E. Tank Farms & land fills)
in addition to inactive sources as previously required.
8. The EPA agrees that the Hadnot Point area was the primary area of concern. Note the
source of contamination for well HP-651 was not determined at the time of this
meeting. Well HP-651 is outside the Hadnot Point area referenced in this meeting.
September 24 1986 – Memo from Commanding General to base commands. AC/S Facilities, Col Dalzell
advised all commands on the base that on September 29th, extensive sampling will begin for a detailed
survey of the Hadnot Point Industrial Area. The Colonel states “Although there are no known human
health or dangerous environmental hazards present, a policy of caution and thorough documentation is in
effect.” (CLW 1523).
December 8 1986 – EPA memo from Marcia Williams, Director Office of Solid Waste to Waste
Management Directors regarding the Department of Defense Installation Restoration Program and
RCRA. Ms. Williams described the IRP program as comparable to the EPA’s RCRA process and urged
the directors to use DOD IRP process when implementing RCRA corrective action authorities under
section 3004(u). (Cercla 547).
January 08 1987 – Letter from AC/S Facilities, Col Dalzell to HQMC. Col. Dalzell requests that HQMC
participate in an upcoming meeting with State hazardous waste, water supply, groundwater protection,
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coastal management offices, and EPA CERCLA officials regarding how the USMC was complying with
CERCLA/CRRA. The agenda listed the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm (Site 22) and showed the groundwater
contaminant as trichloroethylene (TCE) and not benzene. The letter also noted that EPA region IV was
given a similar briefing in July of 1986. (CERCLA 442.)
February 5 1987 – MCON Project P-853 proposed to relocate Hadnot Point’s outdated and leaking fuel
farm. (CLW 1737). The actual project brief is not available to the public.
May 7 1987 – Letter from USGS to AC/S Facilities, Col. Dalzell regarding results of Phase one of the
USGS survey aboard MCBCL. The results of Phase one reveal that the water supply aquifer aboard
MCBCL was readily recharged by precipitation and was a very dependable source of water. However, the
aquifer was not well protected from potential surface contamination because clay layers above the water
supply aquifer that might serve as a barrier are thin and discontinuous. Results suggest that with some
relatively inexpensive modifications to future placement of supply wells could significantly improve well
yields and reduce overall cost. (Cercla 1998).
Sept 16 1987 – Meeting with LantDiv and Environmental Science and Engineering inc. regarding
Installation Restoration Program (new name for NACIP). Base Engineer Robert Alexander was the
attendee from MCBCL. LantDiv was represented by Jerry Wallmeyer (the original Engineer in charge of
CL’s Confirmation Study) Paul Rakowski and Cheryl Barnette. The purpose of the meeting was to review
the IR program status, specifically to review the proposed remedial actions for the Hadnot Point
groundwater problems and to examine data collected to date on the remaining 22 IR sites aboard
MCBCL. (Cercla 261).
9. 15 Volatile Organic Compounds have been identified in the shallow aquifer. Four of the most
serious compounds violate recommended state and EPA standards.
10. Two large plumes have been identified in the shallow aquifer. The first includes a portion of the
industrial area between building 1700 and Burger King (Holcomb Blvd to Louis Street). The
second includes the area from the fuel farm on Ash St NW to Sneads Ferry road and from
Holcomb Blvd to Louis Street. . The constituents of the plume were not specified in the memo.
However, the location of the plumes (The area adjacent to the PX gas stations and the Hadnot
Point Fuel Farm) indicate that the plumes discussed were fuel plumes.
11. Discussion was also held on “how clean is clean” as neither the state nor the EPA had standards
in place to remediate the groundwater.
12. Deep well monitoring has identified Methol Ethyl Ketone (MEK a compound used for cleaning
and stripping) in the deep aquifer. The presence of this compound in the deep well aquifer will
compound the problem as treatment options for VOCs do not work to remediate MEK.
13. ESE described a tentative list of short and long term remedial options. However, these options
will cause additional environmental emissions through one of three possible media 1. Sewage
treatment plant. 2. Air emissions (note this option involves a known viable pathway for
exposure.) 3. Package VOC for hazardous waste disposal off base.
14. Mr. Alexander recommends that the pumps and equipment from the eight contaminated Hadnot
Point supply wells be pulled and reused.
15. ESE was tasked to provide draft report in the next few months after the meeting. The state and
EPA were to be provided a copy for their review. This was to be followed by a briefing. As for the
other 22 IPR sites, nine were recommended for closure due to lack of documented evidence of
contamination, six needed a risk analysis and seven were to require continued monitoring and
development of a cleaning program.
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16. Mr. Hubbel of CMC LFL recommends that MCBCL and LantDiv should work to release some of
this information to the public in accordance with superfund amendments. Mr. Alexander adds
that they will need to review this will JPAO and develop a cooperative effort in light of these rules
and the possibility that Camp Lejeune sites could be named to the EPA NPL.
October 23 1987 – Focused Feasibility Study for Hadnot Point Industrial Area by Environmental Science
and Engineering. The report’s objectives to develop clean up standards for the HPIA, evaluate current
groundwater treatment options. evaluate remedial alternatives, make recommendations on the
appropriate long term alternatives and identify additional date needed for the design and implementation
of the long term alternative. (CLW 6202).
1. Drinking water supply wells in the HPIA were sampled as part of the assessment. The report read
that if contamination of a water supply well was found, that well was to be immediately shutdown
and replaced with an alternate source of supply. PDF p 16.
2. The location of all underground storage tanks at the HPIA was requested. Leak testing was
directed once the tanks were located. If any leaks were discovered, the subject tank was to be
emptied and closed through filling it with sand or removal. PDF 18.
3. Contaminants subject to remediation were identified as lead, benzene, chloromethane, trans 1,2
dichloroethene, methylene chloride, trichloroethene, vinyl chloride, xylene, toluene, and MEK.
PDF 44.
4. ESE recommended the onsite Sewage Treatment Plant (STP) option was the most feasible
alternative for remediation. Air Stripping was ranked second. PDF 53.
February 25 1988 – Article in base newspaper The Globe featuring Assistant Chief of Staff Facilities,
Colonel Thomas Dalzell. The article was written for base personnel and explained the contamination
problem aboard Camp Lejeune and why the base was to be listed on the National Priority List. During the
interview, Colonel Dalzell stated that prior to 1983 “we were not aware of these particular compounds that
might have been in the ground water and we have no information that anyone’s health was in any danger
at that time.” The Colonel went on to identify the source of the groundwater contamination as the motor
pools that existed in Hadnot Point. He stated that “at that time oils, greases, solvents, gasoline, cleaning
fluids, and other types of chemical compounds that were used in our everyday processes were just being
dumped in the ground or dumped in sewers or things like that; and we really were not aware back in the
60’s and 70’s of the effects of ground water contamination.” (Cerlca 132 pp 28 & 29)
March 23 1988 – The Assistant Chief of Staff Facilities notified the Commanding General of the situation
concerning the leaking fuel farm. He is advised that a MILCON project is scheduled in the out-years for
replacement of the leaking UST’s with a possibility that replacement could be moved up to a near year.
(Cercla 96).
• Mar 29 1988 – Letter from Staff Judge Advocate, A. P. Tokarz, MCBCL to Assistant Chief of Staff
Facilities MCBCL. The letter is in reference to the leaking underground storage tanks (USTs) at
the Hadnot Point fuel farm. (Cercla 96). See pp 33-34 of the document.
6. Base Environmental Engineer, Robert Alexander, advised, at a workshop held prior to the
letter, the USTs at Hadnot Point were in such a deteriorated stated that they continue to leak
at a rate of approximately 1,500 gallons per month.
7. Mr. Alexander advised the Staff lawyer on 25 March that the base planned to address the
problem by installing more monitoring wells to identify the plume, design recovery wells, receive
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8.

9.

10.

11.

bids to construct a recovery system, determine the disposition of the recovered fuel and then
award a contract.
Mr. Tokarz recommended that pressure be applied to HQMC to move up the replacement of
these leaking USTs to the immediate future. He stated that the loss of 1,500 gallons per month
will be difficult for taxpayers to understand, and the extremely high cost of recovering that lost
fuel exacerbated the problem. He also advised that the value of recovered fuel would be
diminished due to the presence of other contaminants in that area.
Mr. Tokarz also pointed out that a delay in replacing the tanks will result in an indefensible
waste of money, and a continuing potential threat to human health and the environment. He felt
that formally applying to HQMC for expedited action would assist in demonstrating to the public
and the residents of Camp Lejeune that the Command took swift, reasonable action.
A recommendation was made to notify the state of North Carolina Department of Environmental
Management. Mr. Tokarz advised that a crucial objective in the NPL process was for the base
to establish credibility with the state and the public.
Tokarz noted that the base was forming a Technical Review Committee (TRC) as required by
CERCLA and that the “nature of the Hadnot Point groundwater contamination will be fully
explained to the members.” The meeting was help in August. Please see August 9 1988 (items
4,5,6 and 12) for the TCR meeting.

April 26 1988 – O’Brien & Gere letter to Base Environmental Engineer, Robert Alexander updating him
on field activities completed to date at the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm through 21 April 1988. (CLW 1708.)
1. A total of 20 ground water monitoring wells were installed. The wells were screened so that any
floating product layer would lie within the screened intervals. Monitoring Wells MW1 and MW2
were 17 feet deep and screened at 7 and 17 feet. MW3 through MW 10 were 15 feet deep and
screened at 5 and 10 feet deep. MW 11-20 were 25 feet deep and screened at 5 and 25 feet.
2. An engineering survey was completed at the site on 19 April 1988 to establish horizontal
locations and elevations of each monitoring well. Samples were collected on 20-21 April 1988.
3. Product samples were collected from five of the six wells containing a floating product layer and
analyzed by GC/FID (Gas Chromatograph/Flame Ionization Detector to scan for petroleum
hydrocarbon identification.
4. A chart detailing the thickness of free floating product was included with the letter. According to
this chart, the free floating product thickness ranged from .35 feet to 15.34 feet deep in the
groundwater.
May 18 1988– Letter to NC Division of Environmental Management attn Preston Howard. AC/S Facilities,
Col Dalzell advised the State, the Commanding General ordered the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm closed and
an interim fuel farm opened while a new facility was constructed. Col. Dalzell also forwarded the state a
letter from O’Brien identifying the specific fuel products in the groundwater underlying the fuel farm. The
attached enclosure is CLW 1708, the O’Brien letter 26 April 1988. (Cercla 1734).

• May 11 1988 – ESE Confirmation Study Characterization Step Report for Hadnot Point Industrial
Area. (Cercla 258 & Cercla 48) Summary of findings:
6. Buildings 901,902,903,1202,1502, and 1601 appear to be the sources for the three TCE
contaminated areas at the Hadnot Point Industrial Area.
7. Soil and Gas investigation confirmed the presence of TCE at these three sites and in limited
quantities at several other sites.
8. The potable water obtained for MCBCL is derived from a sand/limestone interval which is highly
permeable. Groundwater flow was generally towards the New River. The flow into the deep
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aquifer zone could not be definitively established by the current data due to a scarcity of
sampling points.
9. Pdf page 111, Two contaminated plumes of VOCs and petroleum hydrocarbons were found to
exist. The northern plume consists of 2 sources of contamination centered around building 901
(maintenance shop) and the Hadnot Point Fuel Tank Farm. The data suggests that these two
plumes have coalesced into one large plume of contamination. The southern plume was
centered around the maintenance facility associated with buildings 1601 and 1709. Voc
contamination of the deep aquifer has not been established but is assumed to have occurred
due to the presence of contaminated supply wells adjacent to the Hadnot Point Industrial Area.
10. Pdf Page 18. “Data strongly indicated that contamination from the tank leaks was
migrating significant distances from the source area via the deep potable aquifer.”
• May 18 1988 – Letter from AC/S Facilities, Col. Dalzell to Preston Howard (North Carolina Division
of Environmental Management) regarding notice of release from underground fuel storage
facilities at Hadnot Point fuel farm. Col. Dalzell informs the State that engineers have located and
defined a plume emanating from MCBCL’s fuel farm at Hadnot Point. He further advises that the
Commanding General has order the farm closed and the tanks along with their lines drained. He
advised an interim fuel farm be established with all environmental precautions to prevent further
contamination. (CLW 1734).
• May 18 1988 – Letter from Commanding General MCBCL to Commandant Marine Corps
concerning documented groundwater contamination at Hadnot Point fuel farm. The General
makes the request to expedite funding for the 05 Feb 87 MCON proposal to relocate the aging
and leaking Hadnot Point fuel farm. The General confirms that gasoline derivatives and other
volatile organic compounds have been found in the water supply aquifer and the deep water
aquifer underneath the fuel farm. The General also advises that inventory records indicate a
continued loss of fuel into the ground and that a “positive and swift action” will demonstrate their
commitment to the environment to the various regulatory agencies overseeing MCBCL. (CLW
1737).
August 3 1988 – Letter to commanding General MCBCL concerning Installation Restoration Contract
Report. The enclosed report indicates in section 3.5 (CLW 6298). ESE recommends the evaluation and
discontinuation of practices at Hadnot Point Industrial Area (HPIA) which may result in contamination of
the soil and groundwater. All current disposal practices should be evaluated for environmental
contamination potential. Fuel tanks and underground tanks should be tested for leaks. (CLW 6298 + CLW
6300).
• Aug 9 1988 – Technical Review Committee as required by the 1986 Superfund Amendment and
Re-authorization Act established at Camp Lejeune. The purpose of the committee it to keep the
community informed of actions occurring on a superfund site such as Camp Lejeune. (Cercla
496). The meetings were intended to encourage fluid discussion and to provide the Chairman
with comments on studies and remedial action. EPA and state agency members were expected
to serve as their agency’s spokesperson and positions advanced by these members during the
meetings are considered the agency position. (Cercla 489).
1. The Committee was informed that the 1983 Initial Assessment study evaluated 76 sites
aboard the base and recommended that 22 sites could present a threat to human health
and the environment. The IAS served to fulfill the EPA’s preliminary assessment
requirement. Cercla 496 PDF 19
2. The TRC was told that new EPA requirements included a public health evaluation and
risk assessment. Cercla 496 PDF 19.
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3. LantDiv spokesperson Cheryl Barnett stated that in their studies in 1984 the groundwater
contamination was discovered. Cercla 496 PDF 19.
4. Robert Gregory, Environmental Science and Engineering (ESE) describe the fuel
contamination as limited to the area around the fuel farm. “As we move out this way,
these fuels dissipate almost completely, and you see a little bit of lead there, but not
much else. So any fuel problems related here doesn’t seem to move far.” Cercla 496
PDF 33. Mr. Gregory’s January 1985 ESE report on the fuel farm read. “The absence of
contamination at well 22GW2 indicates that the migration pathway is deep, not shallow.”
(CERCLA 388).
5. Mr. Bittner (City Manager of Jacksonville) asked whether or not they were going to
review past contamination and at what point a well would be removed if contaminants
were present. Mr. Gregory responded by stating they were doing a rigorous public health
evaluation which will address his concerns. Cercla 496 PDF 33.
6. Mr. Bittner later asked what kind of test (results) were you getting when you were running
those contaminated wells in terms of water quality? He added that he imagined that it
would be pretty much diluted but that they were probably getting some readings. The
base environmental engineer replied that they had very little, if any data before they
realized their ground water was contaminated. He added it was practically impossible to
track down what specific wells were contaminated at what time. Cheryl Barnett
erroneously adds that it was during the course of the 1984 investigation that they
discovered the problem. (Note, Mr. Alexander was privy to prior VOC testing and
warnings beginning in 1980.). Cercla 493 PDF 54-55.
7. Victor Weeks, EPA region IV, in describing the RI/FS and ROD process for NPL sites
projects a 1990-1992 time frame but added that it all depended on what the deep aquifer
possessed, what kind of problems it posed and how long it would take to remediate. Mr.
Downing, citizen member of the TRC, added “In other words we haven’t hit anything
that’s critical enough yet to change any of those dates.” Cercla 496 PDF 61.
8. Victor Weeks suggested that LantDiv allow the EPA to review their work plans before
they are implemented in order for the EPA to comment and make suggestions which
would ensure what LantDiv proposed fit what the EPA needed or required. Cercla 496
PDF 65.
9. Major Stewart Wagner from the base Public Affairs office commented that in “Public
Affairs we’re the single source spokesman for the base and we believe in maximum
disclosure, minimum delay.” He described how they released information on spills and
clean up and damage to the environment regardless whether it was “5 gallons or 500”.
Cercla 496 PDF 66.
10. Mr. Weeks complimented Camp Lejeune on the public affairs outreach and stated that
“Camp Lejeune was way ahead of the game and we’re real confident it’s going to be a
fairly smooth operation.” Cercla 496 PDF 70.
11. Mr. Bittner observed that the five year proposed time frame for remediation may not be
long enough and was concerned that the issue would be glossed over. Mr. Weeks if the
contamination was in the deep aquifer, then it would have to be remediated. Cercla 496
PDF 72.
12. When Mr. Southerland and Mr. Mader asked about monitoring other sites including site
22, they were told by LantDiv that they just didn’t have any data to present at the
meeting. Cercla 496 PDF 74.
Sept 29 1988 – Letter from EPA Chief Lucius (Site Investigation and Support Branch) to AC/S Facilities,
Col. Dalzell concerning comments for Characterization Step Report from ESE. The EPA recognized
MCBCL for their attempts to comply with CERCLA requirements before MCBCL was listed on the NPL
(Formation of the TRC and development of a Community relations plan). The EPA provided comments
concerning the upcoming remedial work at MCBCL. (Cercla 262).
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1. Efforts to determine the extent, concentration, rate and direction of migration of
contamination need to be expanded to include all 40 CFR Section 261 requirements.
2. Characterization of the Deep water has not been completed and will need to be
addressed in order to comply with CERCLA.
3. EPA requested details on the proposed remediation and recovery strategies.
4. The Feasibility Study (ESE) read that the clean up for contaminated water in the deep
aquifer will be developed separately after collecting additional data. However, the EPA
notes no plan for collecting this data was presented.
5. Five years was considered an unreasonably short time for clean up of the groundwater
system contaminated with an large plume as existed at MCBCL. Thirty years was
recommended as a more realistic time frame.
6. The EPA requested a written response before the next TRC meeting scheduled for
Jan/Feb 1989.
7. The EPA recommended early negotiations with the Marine Corps to enter into an
Interagency Agreement (IAG) to facilitate the clean up of Camp Lejeune.
8. Camp must develop and submit a Health Risk Assessment to the EPA to include all IRP
sites which pose a potential threat to public health or the environment.
October 5 1988 – Letter from Commanding General MCBCL to NavFacEngCom regarding IR program
Hadnot Point Industrial Area. The General requests NavFacEngCom to evaluate ESE’s Feasibility Study
for Hadnot Point and provide any recommended revisions. (Cercla 260).
December 7 1988 – Contaminated Ground Water Study Report for the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm. The
report was prepared by O’Brien & Gere engineering for NavFacEngCom. (Cercla 417).
1. Fuel losses of gasoline occurred predominantly through leaks in the transfer lines or
valves resulting in the formation of 2 plumes.
2. The geology of the area consists of primarily silty sand with occasional discontinuous clay
layers. Note this means contaminants were not confined to the areas where there were
originally spilled.
3. Their studies indicated the presence of a free phasing product in the groundwater that
ranged from .24 feet to 15.34 feet in thickness. Analysis of the ground water identified
significant levels of dissolved petroleum compounds including benzene, toluene, xylene
and ethylbenzene.
4. The extent of the benzene plume was not fully defined and exceeded the EPA’s
maximum containment level of 5 parts per billion.
5. Traces of other VOCs including tetrachloroethylene and trichloroethylene were detected
at the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm.
6. The engineers recommended review of past inventories to help identify which tanks were
leaking. Once the assessment was completed, then integrity testing was recommended
for the tanks and lines. However, MCBCL ruled out this recommendation due to the high
cost of conducting such test. This same recommendation and conclusion was reached in
1983 and 1985 independent of ESE. Please see Cerlca 96.
7. Instead, the tanks were recommended to be removed in aacordance with the National
Fire Protection Association and Federal, State and local UST regulations. The
surrounding soils were recommended to be remediated down to at least to the depth of
the groundwater. (Cerlca 417 Pdf 22.)
December 12 1988 – Letter from Paul Rakowski Head, Environmental Programs Branch Utilities, Energy
and Environmental Division (Navy) to Dr. Barry Johnson Agency for Toxic Disease Registry (ATSDR)
regarding Health Assessment MCBCL. Mr. Rakowski makes the formal request per CERCLA law for
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ATSDR to perform a Public Health Assessment for MCBCL. He also requests a review and comment on
the draft before it’s release to the public. (CLW 4989).
December 28 1988 – EPA letter from Site Investigation and Support Branch to AC/S Dalzell MCBCL. The
letter advises the base that the EPA and The North Carolina Hazardous Waste Branch will conduct a
RCRA Facility Assessment (RFA) at MCBCL in January of 1989. (Cercla 265). The purpose of this
assessment is:
1. Identify and gather information on Solid Waste Management Units.
2. Make preliminary determinations regarding known or suspected releases of hazardous
wastes or constituents from SWMUs.
3. Make determinations of the need for further actions.
4. co-ordinate RCRA and CERCLA activities and responsibilities.
January 9-13 1989 – RFA site inspection for Camp Lejeune completed by the Federal Facilities Section
(FFS) of EPA and DEHNR as part of section 3004(u) of RCRA. The 1983 Camp Lejeune IAS report was
accepted as the Preliminary Assessment as required under section 120 or CERCLA. The NACIP
confirmation study was used to satisfy the Remedial Investigation (RI) requirement. The report stated that
Jan and Feb 1985 analysis of Camp Lejeune’s drinking water by DEHNR indicated deep aquifer
contamination by TCE, DCE and methylene chloride which led to the closure of eight potable water wells
including well 602. Note the July-November 1984 benzene contamination readings were not discussed as
part of this report. (Cercla 320.)
August 9 1989 – Letter from the Commanding General MCBCL to Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Concerning Construction Contract 89-B-2611 Temporary Fuel Farm (Hadnot Point). The purpose of the
letter was to provide HQMC with the background data used to justify the funding of the temporary fuel
farm with M2 funds. (Cercla 96). See page 1.
7. The fuel farm was originally constructed in 1943 and consisted of 17 tanks ranging from 3,000 to
600,000 gallons.
8. Study (O’Brien & Gere) indicate that significant amounts of free fuel are located under the fuel
farm.
9. Several potable water wells in the fuel farm area were shut down due to the detection of benzene
and other chemicals in the water.
10. HQMC project LE201M and LE433R were undertaken in the early 1980’s but during the design
of the project, it was discovered that the cost to replace valves necessary to isolate tanks and
allow leakage testing was not economically feasible due to the age of the tanks (40 years) and a
decision was made that the fuel farm was beyond its expected life. A MILCON project was
submitted to replace the fuel farm.
11. Upon the receipt of the O’Brien & Gere study, the State of North Carolina was notified of the
leaks and the fuel farm would be immediately shut down. Notification of the release of fuel
products was sent to the State of North Carolina May 18, 1988. The fuel farm remained in
operation as noted in the next entry.
12. Despite the May 1988 notification the fuel farm remained in operation.
Aug 31 1989 – Globe news Article “Base Taps into Drinking Water Concerns” the article provides the
Marine Corps viewpoint on the events leading up to and just after the contamination aboard MCBCL was
“officially” discovered. (CLW 1854).
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9. Contamination was found and verified at 15 cites. B.W Elston (Dep. Asst. C/S Facilities) stated,
“Even then, none of the contamination found was above the limit described as acceptable by the
EPA.”
10. Mr. Elston also stated, “We closed eight wells in the Hadnot Point Industrial Area and two in
Tarawa Terrace area as a precautionary measure and still had adequate water supply.”
11. Supervisory Chemist Elizabeth Betz stated, “We shut down some wells that were not near the
EPA limit.”
12. Betz was also quoted, “You’d have to look at each VOC individually, but many of them are
carcinogens. That’s the main reason we immediately shut the wells down, although the levels we
found in the tests were not near the EPA limit.”
13. The contamination was caused by long-term spillage and dumping in the Hadnot Point Industrial
Area. Most of the chemicals found were solvents used to clean vehicles.
14. Betz commented in Tarawa Terrace “We were puzzled when that chemical showed up. At first
we couldn’t figure out how it had gotten into Tarawa Terrace’s system. Then we looked across
Highway 24. There was dry cleaning business right across the road from the housing area.”
(Note, please see BUMED 6240.3B and BUMED 6240.3C).
15. The article states that base officials took immediate action to pump safe drinking water into
Tarawa Terrace. No mention is made of the March 1985 action brief and the use of contaminated
TT-New well during the 5 month interim to install the auxiliary pipe line to Tarawa Terrace.
16. Betz also stated, “Once you have identified where the potential for a threat is, you start taking
action to correct it. You can’t leave a contaminant in the ground water.”
September 7 1989 – Globe follow up article. “Efforts Underway to ensure safe drinking water.” The article
is the second part of a three part series written by the Marine Corps to explain the contamination and
clean up of MCBCL. (CLW 1856).
4. The Marine Corps, Department of the Navy and the EPA will work to coordinate how all parties will
approach the clean up aboard MCBCL.
5. Closing of the Hadnot Point fuel farm was pending funding. According to Elston, “We are awaiting
urgent construction funds from HQMC to build a new facility.”
6. Betz advises that the base water supply systems currently meets all Federal standards and recent
tests have shown no contaminants in the water system.
• Sep 14 1989 – Marine Corps Globe article: “Measures taken to prevent future water contamination.
This is the last in a three part article explaining the contamination and clean up at Camp Lejeune.
(CLW 1859).
7. Mr. Elston, “Most of the problems we are dealing with stem from years ago, when solvents
and fuels were used all over the place and routinely dumped. Over the years, it built up.”
8. Mr. Elston states, “Violations are reported promptly and corrected immediately.”
9. According to the article, the base’s dedication goes beyond mere inspections. ‘The base
recently sponsored a week-long training program for Marines involved with the handling,
storage of hazardous materials and wastes and included briefings about state and federal
regulations and procedures.”
10. The base is awaiting listing on the NPL for additional funding for clean up.
11. Betz states, “The best way to avoid future contamination is to have good housekeeping in
maintenance areas. If someone is sloppy, it will get into the system.”
12. Finally, Mr. Elston ends the article with the following quote, “We always take measures to go
at least a step beyond what is required by law and to ensure we don’t provide water that is
unsafe for those using it. The Commanding General will accept nothing less.”
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October 1 1989 – Work Plan for Product Recovery System Design Hadnot Point Fuel Farm at Camp
Lejeune, Contract No. N62470-88-R-5255, prepared by O’Brien & Gere for NavFacEngCom. The purpose
of the report was to provide a basis for the recovery system for the fuel farm at Hadnot Point. (Cercla
381).
5. The fuel farm was constructed in 1941 and was comprised of 15 fuel storage tanks
(795,000 gallons of fuel capacity).
6. The natural drainage area is towards Wallace Creek (note, this is in the direction of well
HP-602 but not cited in the report).
7. Their studies indicated the presence of free phasing product in the groundwater that ranged
from .24 feet to 15.34 feet in thickness. (see page 10 of the report).
8. Two large plumes (pools) of product were identified.
October 4 1989 – Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune and Marine Corps Airs Station New River are place
on the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) National
Priority List as Camp Lejeune Military Reservation. (CLW 4976).
May 10 1990 – Information brochure for Camp Lejeune Community Relations. The brochure discusses
the ongoing remediation at Camp Lejeune and identifies five priority sites on the base including site 22,
the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm. The brochure reads:
“Testing performed to date shows that none of this contamination represents an immediate threat to
public health or the environment.” (Pdf page 8).
The brochure states that the site study involved the U.S. EPA, NAVFACENGCOM, Defense Reutilizationmarketing service and the N.C. State Department of Environmental Health and Natural Resources.
(Cerlca 3439).
June 1990 – Design of the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm product recovery system completed. PDF p 85.
(Cerlca 1513).
July 25 1990 – Technical Review Committee meeting at Camp Lejeune. The purpose of the meeting was
to review site summary report which detailed the first two rounds of sampling (completed by ESE 1984
and 1987).
1.

The Hadnot Point Fuel Farm was not part of the work plan because the tank farm was handled
under LantDiv’s Underground Storage Tank program. However, it was included in the overall
study of the HPIA.
2. LantDiv’s UST program is not part of the Federal Facility Agreement (FFA).
3. Plans were being finalized to bid for construction of a fuel recovery system for the HPFF
groundwater.
4. Camp Lejeune Installation Program Manger, Stephanie Delre-Johnson advised the state of
North Carolina covered the base’s UST program and as such the HPFF was not part of the
Federal Facilities Agreement and thus out of the purview of the EPA. The basis for this decision
was that the FFA has not been open for public comment nor have all three parties signed the
document. The DON argued that because the FFA was not signed, the state would have lead
because of the UST program under RCRA.
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5. Victor Weeks of EPA region IV disagreed and observed that in the HPIA there was a mixing of
solvent plumes and fuel plumes and as such, groundwater cleanup in the HPIA is all
interconnected. “Just because it’s an underground storage tank at this point doesn’t matter to
us because we have a combined plume.” Mr. Weeks went on to conclude “If this was an
isolated area separated from Hadnot Point, we could agree with that (Handling under the
state’s UST program) ~ we feel like it’s part of the CERCLA program as well”. He also warned
that the Navy was doing work at their own risk.
6. Ms. Johnson stated that the basis for their actions with the HPFF was that the FFA was not
signed and therefore they were operating under RCRA authority.
August 2 1990 – EPA letter from James Scarbrough, RCRA and Federal Facilities Branch to Camp
Lejeune Chief of Staff, Col. James Cathcart. The letter represented the EPA recommendations for the
development of Operable Units (OUs) for Camp Lejeune’s Hadnot Point Industrial Area (HPIA). (Cercla
320).
1. Technical Review Committees (TRC) forum will not be effective unless all parties to the FFA
meet during the early development of Statements of Work (SOWs) which provide the basis for
RI/FS and RD/RA work plans.
2. First submittal documents should be considered draft and not “final drafts.”
3. EPA felt that the scope of the investigation was unlikely to fully characterize the nature and
extent of contamination in the deep aquifer. DON was requested to revise the “Draft Work Plan
and Draft Scope of Work.”
4. As discussed in the July 1990 TRC meeting, EPA was “exceedingly concerned” about further
delays in initiating necessary focused investigation and study for the design of response
actions for the HPIA shallow aquifer.
5. Delaying decisions addressing the shallow aquifer contamination until the deep aquifer
contamination was fully characterized was deemed not appropriate by the EPA.
6. DON has initiated without EPA concurrence the design of a remedy addressing the floating fuel
contamination at site 22.
7. The EPA stated that they strongly believed that response action can not be separated from the
final response action (deep groundwater remediation). “The mixing of solvent based
constituents with fuel based constituents has occurred within the HPIA groundwater aquifers.”
September 1990 – Site Summary Final Report for Camp Lejeune prepared by ESE. The purpose of the
Interim Remedial Investigation report contract for ESE was to consolidate all documents produced
concerning the 22 potentially contaminated sites at MCBCL. The RI objectives were:
• Describe the geo-hydrological settings at the 22 areas of concern.
• Determine, to the extent possible, the degree of environmental contamination in the groundwater,
surface water, sediment and soil.
• Determine the rate and direction of groundwater flow and consequent contamination migration.
• Identify gaps in existing data base and make recommendations for future work.
The results of the 1983 Initial Assessment study identified 22 sites for study but determined that none of
the sites posed and immediate threat to human health or the environment (this included site 22, the
Hadnot Point Fuel Farm HPFF). There is no mention of the July 1984 testing of well 602 (380 PPB
benzene) in the site previous investigation section (PDF 238). In 1988, O’Brien and Gere was retained by
LantDiv under their Underground Storage Tank Program to investigate the hydrogeology and evaluate the
extent of fuel leakage at the HPFF.
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1. Site 22, the HPFF covers an area of 4 acres with 14 underground storage tanks and one above
ground tank. PDF 84.
2. The fuel farm was constructed in the 1940’s and several leaks have occurred through the
years, the latest of which was in 1981 at 100 gallons. In 1979 an underground fuel line leaked
and an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 gallons of fuel was lost. PDF 84.
3. Well 602 is identified as being sampled in 1984 and found to contain benzene at 380 ppb. The
well is located within 1,200 feet of the fuel farm but there is no mention whether the well was
producing potable water at the time of the sample. PDF 87.
4. Since 1984, sampling efforts identified the deep aquifer was contaminated. PDF 87.
5. The 1988 O’Brien Gere report identified a 15 foot thick layer of fuel on the Western edge of the
tank farm. The report noted that the extent of the plume had not been fully defined. PDF 88.
(CERLCA 214).
September 7 1990 – Letter to Mindy Sayers, ESE from Paul Rakowski, Head Environmental Programs
Branch LantDiv regarding government review of ESE Installation Restoration Program Documents for
MCBCL. (CERCLA 679).
1. Mr. Rakowski requested that the June 1990 ESE work be revised to incorporate LantDiv’s
response to EPA Region IV comments along with other corrections to their report.
2. The attachment is listed in the letter but missing from the document.
October 3 1990 – Message from LantDiv to MCBCL regarding EPA comments and the Federal Facilities
Agreement. LantDiv advised MCBCL that they were discontinuing discussions concerning changes,
clarifications and corrections until the FFA is signed. Once the FFA was signed, all changes were subject
to the amendment process which required unanimous agreement and a 90 day process. (Cercla 254).
November 1990 -- Information Bulletin from Naval Energy and Environmental Support Activity (NEESA),
Port Hueneme, California regarding the measurement of floating petroleum product thickness and
determination of hydrostatic head in monitoring wells. (CERLCA 1941).
1. Leaking Underground petroleum storage tanks are frequently encountered on military
installations. Proper design of remedial systems depend upon accurate characterization of the
fate and distribution of contaminants.
2. Product thickness can be influenced by tidal flow, lunar cycle, ground water migration and
influence of wells.
3. Product density in situ does not conform to previously known values.

January 1991—Draft Final Sampling Plan Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study HPIA by ESE.
(Cercla 335).
March 1991 – Construction of Hadnot Point Fuel Farm recovery system begins. PDF page 85. (Cercla
1513).
April 8 1991 – Letter from James Scarbrough P.E. Chief RCRA and Federal Facilities Branch to Laurie
Boucher, LantDiv regarding EPA Environmental Monitoring Data Reporting Requirements. Mr.
Scarborough informed LantDiv that MCBCL was required to report environmental monitoring data under
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CERCLA and RCRA. The purpose of the requirement was to ensure that all environmental monitoring
data reported under CERCAL and RCRA is readily available, reliable and consistent in order for EPA to
fulfill its role as regulator and oversight Agency. (Cercla 554).
May 16 1991 – Letter from Daryl Hutson NUS Corporation to A.R. Kissell Acting Head Environmental
Program Branch LantDiv in response to 5 April 1991 Government Review Comments of NUS Installation
Restoration Documents MCBCL. Mr. Hutson explained to Mr. Kissel that “if benzene is present (as it is
found in many types of fuel such as gasoline and jet fuel), it will drive the risk assessment. Benzene is a
Class A carcinogen (known human carcinogen).” Instead he suggested using the TPH method for
screening. “TPH results can not be used in the risk assessment because the results are not chemical
specific and therefore potential risk can not be underestimated. (Cercla 137).
June 12 1991 – Letter to Jack Butler State of North Carolina Department of Environmental Health and
Natural Resources from Paul Rakowski Head Environmental Programs Branch LantDiv regarding the site
management plan for MCBCL. (Cerlca 659).
1. The letter was notification to the State and EPA that the Navy required a twenty day extension
for the submittal of the Draft Final Site Management Plan.
2. The extension was needed to address EPA concerns from an undated letter received 19 May
1991.
3. The Navy reported that their contractor underwent personnel changes which affected their time
line.
June 26 1991 – Letter from Col. H. L. Inabinet, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff MCBCL to Carl Froede
Waste Management Division EPA Region IV regarding 11 June 1991 EPA letter concerning Community
Relations Plan. (Cercla 485).
July 02 1991 – Letter from Paul Rakowski, LantDiv to Carl Froede, Waste Management Division EPA
Region IV regarding Extension for RI/FS for Hadnot Point Deep Aquifer/Soils, MCBCL. (Cerlca 319).
1. The letter was in response to EPA Region IV’s 25 June correspondence concerning the 71 day
extension request for the Hadnot Point RI/FS.
2. The Navy advised they revised the Site Management Plan (SMP) based on approval derived
from a 7 June 1991 phone conversation between Mr. Froede and Ms. Boucher, LantDiv.
3. The Navy objected to the 25 June 1991 EPA letter indicating the Navy’s request for an
extension did not constitute sufficient justification for the 71 day extension.
4. The Navy advised that their contractor had been “counseled” on two separate occasions over
the delays. However, the Navy advised that replacement of the contractor with another would
result in further delays.
July 10 1991 – June progress report from ESE to LantDiv regarding the RI/FS for MCBCL from June 130 1991. Mr. Geden of ESE reported that ESE had completed and submitted the RI for the HPIA. He also
advised that work on the RA for the HPIA continued and work on the FS was already underway. Work
was reported to be 85% completed and expected to be completed by next month. (Cercla 3438).
July 26 1991 – Review of ESE Preliminary Draft Reports RI for Hadnot Point and SA Sites 6 48 and 69
conducted by Laurie Boucher, LantDiv. (Cerlca 688).
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July 29 1991 – Letter from Paul Rakowski, LantDiv to Carl Froede, Waste Management Division EPA
Region IV regarding extension for RI/FS Hadnot Point Deep Aquifer/Soils. (Cercla 165).
1. The Navy agrred to incorporate all comments cited in Mr. Froede’s 16 July 1991 letter and
forward the final SMP by 31 July 1991.
2. The Navy also advised that they intended to revise the SMP on June 1st of each year as
opposed to the November 15th as requested by the EPA.
July 31 1991 – Letter from H.L Inabinet MCBCL to LantDiv regarding. MCBCL comments on ESE’s
Remedial Investigation Report for Hadnot Point Industrial Area (HPIA). (Cercla 340).
August 8 1991– Baker Environmental Inc. comments to LantDiv on ESE’s 1991 HPIA Risk Assessment
Evaluation. The letter was directed to Ms. Laurie Boucher. (Cercla 2430).
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

Assumptions presented were acceptable for occupational exposure provided the assumption
was that the worker was wearing long sleeves and gloves. Confirmation that this was this case
was requested by Camp Lejeune EMD.
Information and maps showing the locations of deep groundwater and water supply wells were
not included. Tables representing risk values for groundwater were not included.
Baker requests the rationale for limiting the exposure to on-site workers only. Baker requested
that ESE indicate whether or not on-base residents had the potential for exposure.
Baker noted that other contaminants other than PAHs were present in the HPIA.
Baker concluded that the risk assessment had no significant problems but a number of
clarifications were needed.

August 12 1991 – Letter to Michael Geden ESE from Paul Rakowski LantDiv regarding Government
review of MCBCL Risk Assessment Report for Hadnot Point. (Cercla 682).
Aug 14 1991 LantDiv Comments to the Preliminary Draft Feasibility Study. This document is an
attachment to an unknown letter. (Cercla 692).
Aug 14 1991 – Baker Environmental Inc. comments to LantDiv regarding ESE’s 1991 HPIA Feasibility
Study Report. The letter was directed to Ms. Laurie Boucher. (Cercla 2431).
1.

Baker noted that the Feasibility Study dismissed the need to remediate the deep aquifer at the
HPIA because the Risk Assessment indicated the risk was acceptable (less than the 10-6 risk
factor). Baker noted that ESE assumed that the groundwater would not be used as a water
supply for residential purposes. Baker pointed out that four water supply wells in the HPIA area
were closed due to contamination from volatile organic compounds. According to Baker, it
appeared the ESE developed thir assessment of the groundwater based on three areas of
concern which were based on bldgs 900,1200, and 1600 (TCE contamination). Baker
emphasized that the aquifer as a whole needed to be addressed.
2. The FS report centered on bldgs 900, 1,200 and 1,600 and not other areas including site 22,
the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm. A better explanation was needed to indicate that the areas (bldgs
900, 1,200 and 1,600) discussed in the report were associated with solvents only.
3. The FS report failed to accurately determine the most feasible alternative to remediate the soil
at HPIA.

December 1991-- Baseline Risk Assessment for Hadnot Point Industrial Area Operable Unit One Draft
Final prepared by ESE.
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1991 December 19 – Letter from Paul Rakowski, LantDiv to Carl Froede, US EPA concerning
Navy/USMC response to comments on Draft RI/RA/FS for HPIA Shallow Soils/Deep Groundwater.
(Cercla 27).

1.

2.
3.
4.

5.

6.

7.

8.
9.

10.

The EPA identified that the Castle Hayne aquifer was the source of drinking water for Camp
Lejeune and based on information provided, the superficial aquifer is a potential source of
recharge to the Castle Hayne aquifer. The EPA recommended the monitoring of all aquifers to
determine the potential threat to the deep water aquifer.
According to the EPA, Single round sampling of from intermediate and deep water wells could
not represent condition in the subsurface groundwater.
The EPA showed repeated concern over sampling schemes used by LantDiv to characterize
the groundwater plume.
A recommendation was made to remove the TCE/PCE contaminated USTs at Bldgs 901, 902,
903 (TCE) and Bldg 1100 (PCE) because the contaminated soil around the tank would
continue to contaminated the groundwater. LantDiv advised that they did not confirm the
presence of a soil contamination plume and that they intend to remove any remaining tanks
under the appropriate regulatory guidance while keeping the EPA informed. Other tanks in the
HPIA were also identified by the EPA for removal for the same reasons. LantDiv concluded that
either the tank was not there or the soil did not contain a contamination plume.
The EPA advised that the Feasibility Study report did not adequately address the amount and
extent of contamination found in the deep aquifer and asked the DON to remove the deep
aquifer from the document. The DoN stated that their investigation will continue and a sampling
plan would be provided by March 1992.
LantDiv advised the EPA that residential units in the form of barracks do currently exist within
the HPIA. However, the units are only used by military personnel who area assigned to the
barracks for a maximum of two years and are reassigned. As a result, the risks are insignificant.
The EPA was told that no family housing was planned in the HPIA.
LantDiv agreed to use the term “surficial aquifer” instead of “shallow aquifer” to avoid confusion
over which aquifers are referenced. Surficial aquifer was defined as the shallowest unconfined
aquifer.
LantDiv agreed to provide maps showing the hydrology of the HPIA which were noted missing
by the EPA.
The EPA stated that they did not accept the Navy’s proposal of no remedial action on either the
shallow of deep aquifer until the free product recovery has been completed from the HPFF. The
EPA did not accept the Navy’s proposal to remove the deep aquifer from selected sites. They
observed that the deep aquifer is contiguous under the entire HPIA facility and any remedial
efforts on the deep aquifer will encompass all “sites” above the aquifer. LantDiv advised that
their shallow remedial activities are expected to be in conjunction with product recovery. They
advised that the need for deep aquifer remediation would be evaluated following further
investigations.
LantDiv informed the EPA that a Feasibility Study was not required since the risks evaluated for
the shallow soils for the HPIA were below the acceptable EPA levels and the deep aquifer
would be evaluated in further investigations.

December 19 1991– Letter from Paul Rakowski, LantDiv to Jack Butler, State of North Carolina
Department of Enviornment Health and Natural Resources regarding MCB Camp Lejeune response to
EPA comments on Draft RI/RS/FS for Hadnot Point Shallow Soils/Deep Groundwater.
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December 31 1991 – Letter from Jack Butler State of North Carolina Department of Environment Health
and Natural Resources to Commander LantDiv regarding North Caolina review of the Draft Remedial
Investigation for Shallow Aquifer at the Hadnot Point Industrial Area (HPIA). (Cerlca 110).
January 1 1992 – Final Site Management Plan for MCBCL FY 1992. Prepared by Halliburton NUS. The
Hadnot Point Industrial area was described as being comprised of 75 buildings/facilities including
maintenance shops, gas stations, administrative offices, warehouses, etc. The site also contained UST,
storm water drains and oil/water separators. Sites 21 and 22 were considered in separate investigations.
The HPIA was also known as IR site 78 and the report read that a RI/FS including source characterization
was slated to begin in 1992. Site 22 was listed on the description. Under section 5.0 Scope of work
summaries, OU 1 (Site 78) a RI/FS was slated to address the source of the contamination and to further
characterize the deep aquifer contamination. The free product recovery operation was managed under
the UST program (pdf page 41) and scheduled to begin in FY1991-1992. PDF Page 67 of the reports
reads that “Most of the sites have been previously investigated in various stages of the NACIP program,
and there have been no sites identified that pose immediate threats to human health and the
environment. The institutional controls that are in place at the facility (the existing base security) are
adequate in providing the public with proper protection.” (Cercla 1513).
January 18 1992 – Letter from Paul Rakowski LantDiv to Michelle Glenn EPA Region IV Waste
Management Division regarding MCBCL Operable Units re-assignment of Operable Units which are
discrete areas of contamination within a specified boundary. Mr. Rakowski advised Ms. Glenn that the
areas of contamination discussed in the RI/FS had already been grouped into sites and that further
delineation of the site boundaries was not possible. (Cercla 64).
January 22 1992 – Letter from Michelle Glenn, EPA Region IV to Laurie Boucher, LantDiv regarding
Camp Lejeune Draft Feasibility Study for the Hadnot Point Shallow Soils/Deep Groundwater. Ms. Glenn
advised that the section dealing with risk must be rewritten in accordance with the revised Baseline Risk
Assessment. The Feasibility Study must address the threat posed by contaminated soil to the shallow
aquifer. (Cercla 63).

January 27 1992 -- Letter from Michelle Glenn, EPA Region IV to Laurie Boucher, LantDiv regarding
Camp Lejeune regarding the EPA review of the Interim Action ROD, the Draft Focused Feasibility Study
and the Draft Remedial Investigation/Baseline Risk Assessment for the shallow aquifer at the Hadnot
Point Industrial Area. (Cercla 62).
EPA Comments Interim Action Proposed Plan for the shallow aquifer HPIA.
1. EPA recommends a through air pathway analysis to evaluate impact of TCE and benzene
emissions.
2. Soil excavation was needed to assist the pump and treat process for HPIA remediation.

EPA Comments on Interim Action Remedial Investigation for the shallow aquifer HPIA.
1. Data gaps for deep aquifer including the disposition of the benzene plume for the HPFF must
be addressed as part of the plan for reaching a final record of decision for the shallow aquifer.
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2. Ms. Glenn asked for further clarification on the benzene plume. Specifically, whether or not the
benzene plume in the shallow aquifer was addressed in the interim action proposed plan and
why wasn’t the benzene plume further delineated as part of the characterization process.
EPA Comments Interim Remedial Action Focused Feasibility Study.
1. Ms. Glenn notes that “overall this is a very poorly written document.”
2. Documents and information supporting the documents arguments are ignored or not submitted.
3. Data gaps including time to achieve remediation of the aquifer, total volume of estimated
contaminated water and volume of water to be extracted.

Need to review remainder of RA/FS comments with finished document.

January 28 1992 -- Letter from Michelle Glenn, EPA Region IV to Laurie Boucher, LantDiv regarding
Camp Lejeune regarding the EPA review of the Draft Final Remedial Investigation Report and Baseline
Risk Assessment for the Hadnot Point Shallow Soils/Deep groundwater. (Cercla 501).
EPA Review of the Draft Final Remedial Investigation Report.
1. Ms. Glenn advised that the Baseline Risk Assessment must be revised.
2. The threat posed by contaminated soil to the shallow aquifer must be addressed.
3. More information is needed to truly characterize the site.
4. Ms. Glenn notes “Many of the sections provide only a cursory overview of activities while not
adequately addressing the substantive requirements of a remedial investigation report. This not
minor.”
5. The EPA recommended that the document be considered an “initial” report until the additional
information needed to characterize the horizontal and vertical direction of the contamination
was collected. At the point a final remedial investigation report could be produced.
6. The exclusion of areas within the site was acceptable provided the areas were addressed prior
to the approval of the Risk Assessment document.
7. The EPA requested raw aquifer test data for review.
8. Ms. Glenn asked why weren’t samples collected from pits and tanks during their investigation
as these samples were needed to determine the full range of contamination.
EPA Review of the Draft Final Baseline Risk Assessment for Hadnot Point Shallow Soils/Deep Aquifer
1. The risk assessment did not complete an analysis of the HPIA because there was no
discussion about the present or future use of the surficial ground water which is a source for
potable water.
2. No assessment was done on the quality control of the data thus no conclusions could be drawn
from this data.
3. A proper risk assessment could not be completed when potential source areas are exempted
from the scope of the assessment. In particular, Ms. Glenn noted site 21 (transformer yard), site
22 (the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm), site 24 (fly ash dump), and site 28 (Hadnot Point burn dump).
PDF 17.
4. Exemptions of these sources may underestimate the risks involved.
5. Site 22 was not sampled for soil contamination and thus exposures can not be assessed.
6. Groundwater data for site 22 was missing from table 3-5.
7. Ms. Glenn advised that the HPIA Operable Unit area has not been thoroughly characterized.
The EPA strongly recommended more sampling data for the soils and groundwater before the
Baseline Risk Assessment can be completed.
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February 19 1992 – Letter from Jon Johnston, Chief Federal Facilities Branch EPA Region IV to Paul
Rakowski, Head Environmental Programs Branch, LantDiv concerning a series of disturbing letters and
telephone conversations between personnel in our respective offices. The issue centered upon the EPA’s
revised requirement that the Navy conduct a Feasibility Study for the HPIA shallow soils and deep aquifer
unit. The EPA was particular concerned over the Navy’s position that it would not respond to EPA
comments submitted after 23 October 1991. Mr. Johnston noted the Navy’s position was not a positive
and cooperative means of conducting business, nor would it assist the Navy in meeting its obligations and
requirements of the National Contingency Plan. (NCP). The dispute was the result of clarification from
EPA headquarters of previous Feasibility Study risk assessment requirements. Mr. Johnston also advised
that the Navy must comply with the NCP and could not agree to perpetuate any inadequacies in order to
continue to move toward an unacceptable Record of decision just to maintain schedules.(Cercla 45).
February 20 1992 – Technical Review Committee meeting held at Camp Lejeune. The topics of the
meeting were the Hadnot Point Industrial Area, Site 6, Site 48 and Site 69. Michelle Glenn and Glenn
Adams are new EPA representatives attending for the first time. The HPIA is identified as consisting of 75
buildings ranging from industrial shops, offices, the commissary and a Burger King. Mr. Wattras
representing Baker Environmental Engineering states that a pump and treat system for site 22 is ready to
commence operations to remediate floating jet fuel on the ground water. Mr. Wattras then quickly states
that he will exclude a lot of discussion over site 22 because of plans to turn over site 22 to the Resource
Conversation and Recovery Act (RCRA). Mr. Wattras refutes ESE’s, the original confirmation study
contractor, finding that there is a definite connection between the deep and shallow aquifers at Hadnot
Point. He feels that the presence of contamination in the deep aquifer was more the result of pumping
from the now closed supply wells. He also adds that there is not enough information to conclude either
way. Ms. Boucher, Lantdiv, stated that there is an indication that the ground water flow is from shallow to
deep aquifer. Ms. Boucher also stated site 22 was going to be turned over to North Carolina’s USTA
program. Later in the discussion, Mr. Wattras returned to the fuel farm and again discussed jet fuel. He
stated that the fuel farm had a floating layer of product associated with jet fuel. The aquifer was described
as unconfined and wells in the HPIA area were shut down due TCE and benzene contamination. Two
TCE and one fuel plume were identified in the HPIA area. Cercla 001.
April 10 1992 – Letter from Paul Rakowski, LantDiv to Michelle Glenn, Waste Management Divison EPA
Region IV regarding Site 22, the Hadnot Point Industrial Area Tank Farm. Mr. Rakowski advised Ms.
Glenn that on the 19th and 20th of February the Navy stated that sampling around the fuel farm indicated
that the tanks at site 22 were the only source of contamination. He added that the tanks contained jet fuel
and therefore were exempt from CERCLA under the petroleum exclusion. Mr. Rakowski added that all
parties agreed that if petroleum related products were the only apparent source of contamination at the
site, then site 22 would be best handled under the Navy/Marine Corps and State of North Carolina UST
program. Mr. Rakowski then requested written confirmation of the EPA’s position. (Cercla 724).
April 16 1992 – Draft Final Interim Remedial Action Focused Feasibility Study for the Shallow Aquifer
Hadnot Point Industrial Area (HPIA) Operable Unit by Baker Environmental Inc. Submitted to
NavFacEngCom (LantDiv). (Cercla 704).
1. The report documented the interim remedial action (IRA) focused feasibility study (FS)
completed for the shallow aquifer at the HPIA.
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2. An interim remedial action is appropriate in two circumstances 1. A quick action is needed to
protect human health and the environment from and immediate threat while a long term
solution is sought and/or 2. Temporary measures can be instituted to stabilize the site to
prevent further degradation while a solution is sought.
3. The IRA FS was based on data collected from the Department of the Navy and ESE since
1983. Based on the review of the below cited data, two contaminated groundwater plumes
were identified in the shallow aquifer at the HPIA. Contaminants in the plume were benzene,
DCE, TCE, antimony, arsenic, beryllium, chromium, iron, lead, manganese, nickel and
oil/grease. PDF 8
• IAS report April 1983. (CLW 709).
• Confirmation Study, 1984-1988.
• Contaminated Groundwater Supply at the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm 1988.
• Feasibility Study for HPIA 1988.
• Supplemental Characterization 1990-1991.
• Remedial Investigation for HPIA 1991.
• Preliminary Risk Assessment 1992.
4. The Hadnot Point Fuel Farm was not administered under Cercla and was not considered in the
HPIA. A separate recovery/groundwater treatment option was undertaken. The Tank farm
appeared in the report for the purpose of evaluating potential remedial alternatives for the
shallow aquifer. PDF 18.
5. When SARA was passed in 1986, the Navy aborted their NACIP program in favor of the
Installation Restoration Program which adopted EPA Superfund procedures. PDF 20.
6. The report erroneously states under the Investigational and Study History section that the prior
contractor detected benzene in supply well HP 602 at 38 PPB (July 1984). PDF 21.
7. The Hadnot Point Fuel Farm (HPFF) contained diesel fuel, leaded gasoline, unleaded gasoline
and/or kerosene. PDF 22.
8. The 1988 O’Brien HPFF study concluded that fuel losses were the result of leaks in the transfer
lines or valves. Floating product resulted in significant levels of dissolved petroleum compounds
(BTEX) into the ground water. Trace levels of VOCs including TCE and PCE were also
detected within the fuel farm. PDF 22
9. The HPFF Pump and Treat System began operating in the later part of 1991 and consisted of
four recovery wells, a product recovery tank, an oil water separator, an air stripper and an
activated carbon canister. PDF 22.
10. The pump and treat recovery system addressed the recovery of free product. Since the HPFF
is a leaking underground storage tank problem, it was not included as part of the CERCLA
RI/FS process. PDF 22.
April 20 1992 – Letter from Michelle Glenn, EPA to Byron Brant, NavFacEngCom regarding Paul
Rakowski’s 10 April to the EPA concerning the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm. Ms. Glenn advised that the EPA
concurred with the Navy’s proposal to handle site 22 under the State of North Carolina’s UST program.
(Cercla 727).
July 22 1992 – Final Proposed Remedial Action Plan (PRAP) for Operable Unit One (Sites 21,24 and 78)
prepared by Baker Environmental Inc. The PRAP briefly summarizes information that can be found in
greater details in the RI and FS reports and other documents referenced in the RI/FS reports prepared for
OU No 1. The purpose of the PRAP was describe the Navy’s preferred remedial plan. (Cercla 1254).
1. Site 22 was referenced on PDF page 15. The groundwater for site 22 was contaminated with
fuel related compounds. It was noted that floating product had contributed significant levels of
dissolved petroleum compounds including benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene and xylenes into the
ground water. Trace levels of solvents were also detected in the fuel farm area.
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2. The Hadnot Point Fuel Farm was described as being remediated under a separate investigative
program. PDF 16.
3. The qualitative RA concluded that benzene and TCE could impact human health if shallow
groundwater were to migrate into the deep portions of the aquifer. PDF 16.
4. Benzene, TCE, DCE, vinyl chloride and dichloromethane were the most prevalent VOCs
detected at the intermediate wells (screened at the deeper portion of the surficial aquifer) at site
78. PDF 21.
5. Benzene, DCE and TCE were the only organics detected in the deep wells sampled at site 78.
Contamination levels in the shallow groundwater appear to have decreased over time while
increasing at the same time in several of the deeper monitoring wells. PDF 21.
6. “No additional actions will be implemented at Groundwater AOC 3 since this is the area of the
Hadnot Point Fuel Farm (Site 22). A fuel recovery system/groundwater treatment is currently
operating at this area. Investigations/remediation related to the fuel farm are being handled
under the UST Program, not CERCLA. Therefore, only monitoring will be conducted near this
area under this proposed cleanup plan. PDF 36.
September 17 1992 – Final Interim Remedial Action Record of Decision for the Shallow Aquifer at the
HPIA MCBCL, prepared by Baker Environmental for LantDiv. (Cercla 1161).
1. PDF Page 5. The principal threat at this time involves the potential migration of the contaminant
plumes in the shallow aquifer away from the site and into the deeper (drinking water) aquifer.
2. PDF Page 5. The primary goal of the IRA is to contain the contaminated groundwater in the
shallow aquifer thereby preventing the human consumption of contaminated groundwater.
3. PDF page 5. The ROD noted that “institutional controls included restricting the use of nearby
supply wells (which are screened in the deep aquifer) and restricting the installation of any new
water supply wells in the area.”
4. PDF page 8. “The fuel farm is an underground storage tank facility which is not being
administered under CERCLA regulations. Therefore the site is not included as part of the HPIA
Operable Unit.
5. PDF page 11. “The investigations indicate that contamination has resulted at HPIA due to
former improper waste disposal, underground storage tank leakage, solvent spills and sludge
disposal.
6. PDF page 11. In 1984 “Benzene was also detected in supply well 602 at concentrations of 38
ppb, which exceeds the Federal MCL of 5 ppb.”
7. PDF page 12. VOCs were detected in the shallow monitoring wells but no mention made of
detections in deep wells. In-organics including mercury were noted in the deep aquifer but
detected levels were within Federal MCLs or ambient water quality criteria guidelines. There is
a note that the deep aquifer was to be investigated separately. Based on prior investigations it
was determined that two contamination plumes existed within the HPIA site in the shallow
aquifer.
8. PDF page 14. The report stated that both the shallow and deep aquifer were interconnected
and there was a potential for human and environmental exposure to the contaminated detected
in the shallow aquifer. The primary pathway was through ingestion of contaminated water.
9. PDF page 14. Vocs were identified in five on site supply wells screened in the deep aquifer and
the wells were closed. “It is not know whether or not the contaminants detected in the shallow
aquifer have contributed to the contamination of the deeper wells.”
10. PDF page 16. The risk assessment determined that TCE, DCE, antimony, arsenic, beryllium,
chromium, iron, lead, manganese, mercury, and nickel are the contaminants of concern for the
northern plume at site 78.
11. PDF page 28. Physical/Chemical Treatment (Air Stripping) was chosen as the remedial action
alternative for site 78.
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12. PDF page 34. No private citizens attended the public comment period. The lack of public
involvement in the HPIA was attributed to the fact that the site was located within an industrial
area at the base.
13. PDF page 35. The ATSDR expressed concern of air quality and monitoring as well as if
whether or not the sewage treatment plant at Hadnot Point could handle the VOC contaminated
groundwater. Nothing was stated about past exposures or deep aquifer.
February 28 2002 – Partnering meeting regarding the HPFF. According to the minutes of the meeting, a
recent report indicated that 1 million gallons of fuel was lost at the HPFF. It was also noted at the meeting
that all excavated soils at the HPFF and Building 1115 were backfilled into the old tank basins and were
not removed from the site for remediation. (
June 13 2003 – Revised Corrective Action Plan for the HPFF prepared by Catlin Engineering. In the
report, Catlin summarizes the site history for the HPFF. Closure began in 1988 and was completed with
the removal of the tanks in 1993. Catlin advised that records indicated that all soils excavated to facilitate
UST removal and closure were backfilled into the old tank basins. There were no records found to
indicate that the soils associated with the closure of the HPFF were removed from the site. Between
October and December of 2000, over 8,000 linear feet of piping was removed that connected the HPFF to
buildings 1115, 1502 and 1601. During the removal of the piping, 165 gallons of fuel was recovered and
790 gallons of water/fuel mixture was removed from the piping system. (Navy UST HPFF Revised CAP
June 2003).
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APPENDIX C: VAPOR INTRUSION HADNOT POINT TIMELINE
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Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune chronology of significant events
concerning Vapor Intrusion at the Hadnot Point Industrial Area.©
Compiled by Jerry Ensminger, Jim Fontella and Mike Partain for use
by WWW.TFTPTF.COM

Introduction – This time line was compiled by means of public documents available from the State of
North Carolina, CERCLA and CLW files kept under requirements of Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980. We recently obtained a redacted release
of a previously undisclosed Navy Underground Storage Tank (UST) Portal for Camp Lejeune. However,
there are many documents that still have not been released or are currently being suppressed from public
view. As these documents become available, we will update this time line and promptly post it on our
website.
May 1 1988 – Feasibility Study for Hadnot Point Industrial Area (HPIA) prepared by Environmental
Science and Engineering for MCB Camp Lejeune. As a result of the contamination of groundwater and
soil found aboard Camp Lejeune, the contractor recommended five interim alternatives implemented to
reduce immediate health risks at the HPIA. The second recommendation was ambient air monitoring for
the interiors of buildings near “hot spots” of contaminated groundwater or high levels registered during the
soil and gas analysis. Benzene, toluene, xylene, TCE, DCE and vinyl chloride were all listed as chemicals
of concern. The contractors advised that the compounds could be measured by a HNU photo-ionizer and
organic vapor analyzer. ESE stated that sampling should be taken during varying climatic conditions and
that if a compound was detected above the threshold limit, immediate measures should be taken to
reduce health effects until permanent remediation measures can be taken. (CERCLA 428). Soil and gas
readings taken by ESE indicated the presence of contaminants bear buildings: 1100, 1202, 1300, 1302,
1502, 1601,1602, 1701 and 1710. (CERCLA 258). Draft forms of this document were also found
containing an October 1987 date.
August 1 1988 – Letter from AC/S Facilities, Colonel Dalzell to AC/S Manpower U.S. Naval Hospital
Camp Lejeune concerning 5 interim measures recommended by the Navy’s contractor (ESE) to address
deal with immediate health risks in the Hadnot Point Area. Colonel Dalzell also scheduled two meetings
to address these concerns immediately prior to a Technical Review Committee meeting scheduled for 9
August 1988. Colonel Dalzell requested the Hospital’s Preventive Medicine Unit to address Ambient Air
Monitoring for VOCs including benzene, toluene, xylene, TCE, and vinyl Chloride in selected buildings
within the Hadnot Point Industrial Area. (CERLCA 260 Pdf 2).
Aug 9 1988 Technical Review Committee meeting held at Camp Lejeune. Representatives from the State
of North Carolina, the US EPA, the community, Navy and Base Personnel attended the meeting. One of
the highlighted topics for discussion was the Interim measures recommended in the Focused Feasibility
Study conducted by ESE to protect against health risks and prevent further contamination at the HPIA.
(CERCLA 47).
1. High soil and gas samples were identified at buildings 1202 (37,000 ppb) and towards the 1500,
1600, and 1700 series there was a reading at 703,000 ppb (pdf 20).
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2. Base Environmental Engineer, Robert Alexander, reported that they were working closely with the
base’s Safety and Occupational Health personnel to accomplish the ambient air and underground
work space monitoring to make sure “no compounds (were) present inside the work spaces in
these buildings that may be near these things which could have a long term chronic adverse
health affect on the occupants of the building (pdf 39).”
3. Mr. Alexander later went on to report that they were waiting for approval of a key piece of
equipment from the Navy in order to complete the ambient air testing for the HPIA buildings (pdf
41).
Aug 25 1988 – Letter from Commanding Officer Naval Hospital Camp Lejeune to Commanding General
Camp Lejeune in response to Colonel Dalzell’s 1 August 1988 request for assistance with ambient air
monitoring aboard Camp Lejeune. H. P. Scott advised the Naval Hospital was unable to perform the
requested testing due to a lack of personnel and recommended contracting out the needed services. The
Hospital Commander did agree to provide actual worker exposure monitoring and/or medical surveillance
if the ambient air monitoring results were found to be excessive. (CERCLA 260 pdf 8).
September 9 1988 – Letter to Tom Caulfield (TRC member) from Colonel Dalzell advising him that the
interim measures to deal with any immediate health risk in the HPIA have been or are being
implemented. The measures cited included ambient air monitoring. Mr. Caulfield (along with the other
TRC members) was advised that a full report of these interim measures was to be made at the next TRC
meeting expected to be held in January 1989. (CERCLA 587). It is not known whether the January 1989
TRC meeting was held. We have been unable to locate the transcripts.
October 5 1988 -- Letter from AC/S Facilities, Colonel Dalzell, to NavFacEngCom regarding
recommendations from the Hadnot Point Feasibility Study. Colonel Dalzell advised LantDiv, that the base
Naval Hospital did not have the capabilities to conduct work place monitoring as recommended in the
Hadnot Point Feasibility Study. (CERCLA 260 pdf 1).
August 1 1989 – Letter from Perry Nelson, State of North Carolina Groundwater Section to Commanding
General Camp Lejeune updating the state’s previous notice of violation dated May 15 1985 notice of
violation. In the letter, Mr. Nelson advised that in 40 CFR 280.62 (Initial abatement measures and site
check) the base was required to monitor and mitigate any additional fire and safety hazards posed by
vapors or free product that have migrated from the UST excavation zone and entered into subsurface
structures (such as sewers and basements). (NC State Archives August 01 1989).
September 1989 – Letter to Rick Shiver Wilmington Regional Office from AC/S Facilities B. W. Elston,
Camp Lejeune regarding the 1 August 1989 Letter from Perry Nelson. Mr. Elston advised Mr. Nelson that
the base’s position on 40 CFR 280.61 a, b and c was that the requirements were met. No mention was
made about 40 CFR 280.62. The base also advised they believed they were no longer leaking fuel and as
such continued to operate the fuel farm.
January 8 1990 – Letter from Commanding General Camp Lejeune to Commander NavFacEngCom
concerning Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) contract response to agency comments on
Hadnot Point RI/FS. In this letter Camp Lejeune agreed with the EPA’s concern that a risk assessment be
conducted on all sites as well as addressing all affected media in the revised Feasibility Study for Hadnot
Point. (CERCLA 326).
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December 19 1991 – Letter to Carl Froede, EPA Waste Management Division from Paul Rakowski Head
Environmental Programs Branch LantDiv regarding responses to EPA comments for the Draft RI/RA/FS
for Hadnot Point Shallow soils/Deep Groundwater. The EPA wanted inhalation to be considered as a
legitimate pathway. Mr. Rakowski responded “Inhalation was considered to be an insignificant pathway
since groundwater to air could not be established as an exposure pathway. (CERCLA 27 Pdf 15).
1996 Hadnot Point Fuel Farm Product Evaluation. A contractor for the Navy estimated the fuel loss total
to be 1,061,901 gallons of product based on a 50 year operational period and an average loss of 21,200
gallons of fuel per year. (1996 HPFF Product Eval, Navy UST).
June 6 1997 – Letter from ATSDR (most likely Carole Hossom) to Rick Raines at Camp Lejeune MCB.
Mrs. Hossom sends three draft final release copies of ATSDR’s Public Health Assessment for an
“informal” review by Cmap Lejeune personnel. According to the letter, such reviews are not ATSDR policy
and she requests that the comments be made by phone. (CLW 2806).
July 21 1997 – Memorandum from Kate Landman, LantDiv to David McConaughy at the Navy
Environmental Health Center discussing the “informal” review of ATSDR’s final draft version of their
Public Health Assessment for Camp Lejeune. Mrs. Landman states that she discussed the comments
with Mrs. Hossom and that substantial changes will be made to the document regarding most issues
mentioned in her comments. (CLW 2833 redacted from public view).
June 20 1997 – Leaking Underground Storage Tank Comprehensive Site Assessment HPFF prepared by
Catlin Engineering. Catlin advised that several buildings were located near the project site and as such
there was a risk that the utility trenches for these buildings could act as a preferential pathway for
contaminant migration. Catiln also identified vapor inhalation as a possible pathway exposure at the
project site. (NAVY UST 457 Pdf 22).
August 1997 – ATSDR released their Public Health Assessment for Camp Lejeune. Vapor intrusion was
not listed as an exposure pathway or risk for the personnel working in the Hadnot Point Industrial Area.
(ATSDR 1997 PHA for Camp Lejeune).
Aug 4 1997 – ATSDR sends letter to Commanding General of Camp Lejeune advising that ATSDR has
placed U.S. Marine Corps Camp Lejeune Military Reservation in the category of no apparent public
health hazard. (CLW 2846).
April 30 1998 – Leaking Underground Storage Tank Corrective Action Plan (CAP) prepared for
NavFacEngCom by Catlin Engineering. Catlin Engineering identified that prolonged or repeated
exposures to some petroleum substances in liquid or vapor form may cause serious illness including
cancer in laboratory animals. Existing buildings (1100, 1103, 1108 and 1115) were at risk for exposure to
petroleum hydrocarbon vapors because of the existence of contaminated underground plumes located
underneath them. Catlin also stated that the main control building for the Temporary Fuel farm (building
1005) had been evacuated several times due to the presence of petroleum hydrocarbon vapors. (NAVY
UST 456 pdf 24 and 27). According to the Occupational Safety and Health Standards, an eight hour time
weighted average for benzene exposure is 1 ppm with an acceptable ceiling concentration of 5 ppm and
an acceptable peak of 50 ppm for 10 minutes. (NAVY UST 456 pdf 486).
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April 1 1999 – Complaint made about fuel odors at building 1101. (Navy UST 670 Pdf 54).

May 1 1999 -- Complaint made about fuel odors at building 1101. (Navy UST 670 Pdf 54).

May 10 1999 -- Complaint made about fuel odors at building 1101. (Navy UST 670 Pdf 54).

June 1 1999 -- Complaint made about fuel odors at building 1101. (Navy UST 670 Pdf 54).

July 1999 – OHM responded to additional odor complaints at building 1101. OHM cored the outer grade
beam beneath the office in building 1101 which had the highest FID levels (these test results have not
been located) and procured samples of soil for a distance of five feet. The samples were found not to be
contaminated. (NAVY UST 22 Pdf 39).
November 30 1999 – Monthly Progress report for the Construction and Operation of the Bio-Sparge and
Air Sparging for the HPFF and Building 1115. The report noted that odor complaints were made at
building 1101 during the month. OHM Representatives met with base personnel on several occasions.
(NAVY UST 257 Pdf 4).
Nov/Dec 1999 -- Odors reported in building 1101. Building 1101 housed the Marine Corps Community
Services Warehouse, Information Management Division and Base Communications. (Power Point
Presentation for HPFF Vapor Intrusion/Risk Communication.)
December 10 1999 – Three workers reported nausea, headaches, eye irritation and respiratory irritation.
Two patients reported to the Occupational Health Clinic. Samples were collected by Industrial Hygiene
and Base Safety. They found high readings of gasoline vapors. The building was evacuated and
ventilation fans were installed. The HPFF AS system was suspected to be a cause for the vapor intrusion
and shut down. (Power Point Presentation for HPFF Vapor Intrusion/Risk Communication.)
January 8,11, and 13th 2000 – During this time, three Jacksonville Daily News articles concerning
reported odors and subsequent evacuation of Building 1101 were published. The building was evacuated
on 29 December and the problem was first thought to be a gas leak under building 1101. Three days
later, Joint Public Affairs Officer (JPAO) Major Scott Fazekas attributed the odors of gasoline within
building 1101 to lost fuel from the base’s fuel farm. He stated that 100,000 gallons of the fuel had leaked
into the ground over a period of 30 years and the Environmental Management Division had recovered
30,000 gallons of that fuel. This statement was then subsequently revised on 13 January when Maj
Fazekas upped the total of lost fuel to 200,000 gallons (Please see the prior entry for the year 1996). The
Major stated that “people had smelled fumes in the building a few weeks before but that day, they noticed
more vapors in the building than they had before.” The Major then added that building 1101 was
evacuated as a precautionary measure because they “were more worried about the worker’s risk of
inhaling fumes than anything exploding.” In the final article Major Fazekas offered an explanation for the
presence of fuel vapors in building 1101. “the Flood of the century that we had pushed the groundwater
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higher. As the groundwater rose, it pushed the gas floating on it up through the soil into the air. “the Major
was also quoted as stating “The safety of our workers and Marines is paramount. We won’t be using the
building until the problem has been resolved.” (JDN Articles Jan 8,11,13 2000).

February 9 2000 – A ten foot interceptor trench was installed along the East side of building 1101. A
vacuum was applied to extract vapors out and exhaust them to the atmosphere. Upon the installation of
the trench, vapor levels in the building dropped. (NAVY UST 1185 Pdf 523.)
March 2000 – The Air Sparging System was reactivated and the Navy determined that vapor levels in the
buildings was the result of rainfall and not the air sparging system for the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm. (2010
NAVY PP Presentation Glenee Smith). Note, this assertion was made 10 years after the fact.
March 15 2000 – Camp Lejeune re-energized the Air Sparging and Biosparge systems to test the
effectiveness of the SVE trench at building 1101. Air monitoring results remained “undetectable”. (NAVY
UST 1185 Pdf 523).
April 14 2000 – Email to Brent Rowse and Nicole Hall from Lori Reuther, NavFacEngCom regarding the
modified scope of work for the HPFF and Building 1115. Ms. Reuther advised Camp Lejeune that time
was running out for funds to either demolish, caulk or excavate soil for the buildings affected by vapor
intrusion in the HPIA. The attached scope of work read: (NAVY UST 1185 Pdf 431-433).
1. An ongoing effort is underway to permanently eliminate vapors in building 1101 and prevent
associated problems in other buildings located in the HPFF site.
2. A baseline reconnaissance survey and daily monitoring exercise is being conducted for all
inhabited buildings along Ash Street in proximity to the remediation system.
3. The buildings involved are 1100, 1102, 1103, 1104, 1105, 1108, 1111, 1113, 1114, and 1115.
4. Buildings 1102, 1103, 1104, 11111, 11113, and 1114 were slated to be caulked to prevent
further vapor intrusion.
May 2000 – The Base Safety Manager recommended building 1101 be reoccupied provided there was
fixed VOC/Benzene monitoring equipment installed and maintained, remediation efforts continued, mobile
personnel be allowed in the building, IH, Fire Protection and Base Safety continue to monitor for vapors.
(NAVY PP Presentation Glenee Smith).
July 2000 – LantDiv Recommended demolition of non mission critical buildings 1102, 1103, 1104, 1113
and 1114, Base Safety and Fire Department personnel conduct Low Explosive readings, and that the
1101 be returned to its orginal purpose as a warehouse including thr removal of the enclosed office
spaces within the building. (2010 NAVY PP Presentation Glenee Smith).
October 31 2000 – The SVE (Soil Vapor Extraction) Trench system installed in January 2000 at building
1101 to assist with mitigating vapor intrusion removed 9,326 gallons of fuel contaminated vapor and was
still in operation at the time of the report. (NAVY UST 670 pdf 30).
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November 2000 – Naval Environmental Health Center Consultative Assistance Team (CAT)
recommended against full time occupancy of building 1101 and instead use it as a storage facility. This
recommendation was implemented 22 November 2000. (2010 NAVY PP Presentation Glenee Smith).
November 22 2000 – Progress report for HPFF. Contractor reported that buildings 1108, 1115 and 1068
were re-caulked to close potential vapor pathways in October. The contractor also began work on
“pigging” and grouting of the old HPFF fuel transmission lines. Some of these lines ran adjacent and/or
underneath buildings in the HPIA including building 1101. (NAVY UST 474 Pdf 11).
February 8 2001 – Power Point Presentation from OHM Remediation Services Corp to the Navy’s UST
Environmental Division to explain the Persistence of Free Product in the Subsurface. In November of
1999, odors were detected in building 1101 on Hadnot Point. Although odors had been reported for years,
no quantitative readings for the building existed prior to activating the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm Air
Sparging System (AS). The Navy believed the AS system and excessive rains from three hurricanes
(note that odors were first reported prior to hurricane season) were the causes for the odors and added a
trench SVE system alongside building 1101 in February 2000 to help remediate the problem. (NAVY UST
676).
August 6 2001 – Letter to Regional Supervisor North Carolina Division of Air Quality from Scott Brewer,
Director Environmental Division, Camp Lejeune regarding the Air Sparge and Soil Vapor Extraction
(AS/SVE) groundwater remediation system operating adjacent to building 1068 in the HPIA. Mr. Brewer
advised the state that the system was emitting VOCs and toxic air pollutants which exceeded the state
limits and as such would need to be permitted by the state. (NAVY UST 1185 Pdf 243).
June 28 2002 – Phone conversation between Bruce Reed, North Carolina and Nikki Hall, Camp Lejeune
regarding building 1101 and the Air Sparging system for the HPFF plumes. Ms. Hall advised that the
system had been shut down since November of 2001 as they had still detected fuel vapors in the building
as late as October 2001. She also advised that the building was used as a warehouse with the doors
open most of the time. Ms. Hall also advised that no offices were located in the building. Mr. Reed
commented that he did not understand why the Air Sparging system had been cut off because that meant
the ground water plume was not being treated. (NC State Archives June 28 2002).
October 31 2002 -- Email from Rick Raines, Camp Lejeune to Kirk Stevens LantDiv regarding the Site 78
Draft Pilot Study Project Plans. Mr. Raines advised that section 4.5 of the report did not discuss the
potential for Vinyl Chloride build up at site 78 South if ORC/HRC were to be injected into the ground at
high pressure. He asked Mr. Stevens what contingency plans were available to address the possibility.
(CERCLA 2999).
December 3 2002 – Letter from Commanding Officer Navy Env. Health Center to Commanding Officer
NavFacEngCom regarding the Medical Review of Draft Pilot Study Project Plans site 78 (HPIA), OU 1,
Camp Lejeune. During his review, Dr. Rennix noted that two plumes were located near corners of
buildings within site 78 (HPIA) but the groundwater directly under these buildings were not sampled thus
establishing the possibility for air vapor intrusion into these buildings. (Navy UST 3548).
June 11 2003 – Revised Corrective Action Plan for HPFF by Catlin Engineering. In this report the Main
Control room for the new HPFF (located NW of Building 1005) was evacuated sometime prior to the
report due to the presence fuel vapors. A forced air ventilation system was installed to exhaust the vapors
from a utility manhole outside the building. (NAVY UST HPFF Revised CAP).
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July 16 2003 – Letter to EPA Region IV Project Manager, Gena Townsend from Scott Brewer, Director
Environmental Management Camp Lejeune. Mr. Brewer submitted the Interim Final Documentation of
Environmental Indicator (EI) Determination package for EPA review. The EIs were explained as important
indicators used to measure progress for Government Performance and Results Act. Ambient Air was
categorized to not be reasonably suspected to be contaminated above appropriately protective risk base
levels. The submitted report indicated that several buildings in the HPIA had experienced vapor intrusion
but no indoor air contamination had been detected during the last two years of monitoring. The indoor air
contamination was identified in 2000. Mr. Brewer stated that Camp Lejeune responded by immediately
evacuating all permanent employees and initiated an indoor air quality program. Buildings 1102, 1103
and 1113 were demolished. (CERCLA 3555).
February 11 2004 – 1100 Block Building Occupancy Update. The published fact sheet advised base
personnel that as a result of sampling, clean up and engineering measures that Naval Environmental
Health Center specialists agreed that it was safe to re-occupy buildings 1108 and 1115 on a full time
basis. Base personnel were informed that Naval Hospital Industrial Hygiene and EMD personnel would
continue to conduct close surveillance for vapor intrusion within the 1100 block area. According to the
March 16 2005 update, building 1101 was later included in this release, though it does not appear as
such in the announcement located in this document. (NAVY PP Presentation Glenee Smith)
November 2004 -- 1100 Block Building Occupancy Update. The published fact sheet advised base
personnel that as a result of sampling, clean up and engineering measures that Naval Environmental
Health Center specialists agreed that it was safe to re-occupy building 1100 on a full time basis. Base
personnel were informed that Naval Hospital Industrial Hygiene and EMD personnel would continue to
conduct close surveillance for vapor intrusion within the 1100 block area. (NAVY PP Presentation
Glenee Smith)
March 16 2005 -- 1100 Block Building Occupancy Update. The published fact sheet advised base
personnel that as a result of sampling, clean up and engineering measures that Naval Environmental
Health Center specialists agreed that it was safe to re-occupy buildings 1104 and 1114 on a full time
basis. Base personnel were informed that Naval Hospital Industrial Hygiene and EMD personnel would
continue to conduct close surveillance for vapor intrusion within the 1100 block area. (NAVY PP
Presentation Glenee Smith)
November/December 2006 – Elevated low explosive levels (LEL) greater than 10 percent once again
necessitated the evacuation of building 1101. The Air Sparging system and electrical power to the
building were secured. After this incident, Sub-slab Vapor Extractors were installed in buildings 1101,
1108, 1200, 1201, 1202, and 1301 to prevent vapor intrusion into the building’s slab. The system was
ventilated to through an exterior window. (NAVY PP Presentation Glenee Smith).
January 22 2007 – Email from Andrew Smith, Environmental Engineer Camp Lejeune to Bruce Reed,
State or North Carolina concerning continued vapor readings in building 1101. Mr. Smith advised the
base continued to detect vapors in the northern end of building 1101. Because vapor reading were in
excess of “hot work” limits and low explosive level (LEL), the final phase of the vapor extraction system
for building 1101 was not completed. Mr. Smith stated that once this critical step was completed (the
vapor collection system in building 1101) that he believed it would have the same effectiveness in building
1101 as it did in the surrounding buildings. (NC State Document Library).
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December 2008 – Building 1104 reported multiple interior fuel vapor readings between 1-12 ppm by a
photo-ionization detector (PID). After several days of follow up resulted in non detections, no further
action was taken. (NAVY UST HPFF 2009 Final AMR).
April 2010 – Final 2009 Annual Monitoring Report June 2009 through January 2010 Hadnot Point Fuel
Farm/Building 1115 sites completed by Rhea Engineers and consultants. The risk of vapor intrusion
necessitated the installation of active soil depressurization systems (ASD) at buildings 1101, 1108, 1200,
1201, 1202 and 1301.. The system consisted of a 2 inch diameter well screen installed beneath a building
and connected to an electric blower to maintain negative air pressure. During the June 2009 to January
2010 monitoring period, 56,101 pounds of hydrocarbons was recovered from building 1101. (Navy UST
Final HPFF AMR 2010).
August 15 2010 – Former Hadnot Point Fuel Farm (HPFF) Block 1100 Vapor Intrusion/Risk
Communication briefing facilitated by Glenee Smith, Head Industrial Hygiene. During this briefing she
recaps the history of the vapor intrusion problem at site 78. (NAVY PP Presentation Glenee Smith)
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Good Morning Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank the Chairman, Ranking member and members of the Veteran’s Affairs Committee
for permitting me to testify this morning.
My Name is Michael Partain and I am the son and grandson of U.S. Marine Corps Officers. My parents
were stationed aboard Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune shortly after my father graduated from the
United States Naval Academy. I was conceived, carried and then born at the base Naval Hospital while
my parents lived in base housing. During the time of my mother’s pregnancy, we were exposed to high
levels of tetrachloroethylene (PCE), trichloroethylene (TCE), dichloroethylene (DCE), benzene and vinyl
chloride in the tap water provided to my family by the Marine Corps. Two years ago, I was diagnosed
with male breast cancer at the age of thirty-nine. In fact, I am one of about forty men who share this
unique commonality of male breast cancer and exposure to contaminated tap water aboard Camp Lejeune.
Beginning on 31 October 1980, Navy and Marine Corps officials received what would later become a
litany of warnings that the base’s drinking water supply was highly contaminated with chlorinated
hydrocarbons (Exhibit A). The United States Army Environmental Hygiene Agency (USAEHA)
laboratory located at Ft. McPherson, Georgia was tasked to analyze the base’s tap water for
trihalomethane’s (TTHMs) in preparation for a new EPA Safe Drinking Water regulation. As part of their
analysis for Hadnot Point’s tap water, the laboratory stumbled across interferences caused by chlorinated
hydrocarbons which inhibited the laboratory’s ability to quantify the chemical they were testing for in the
samples. The laboratory’s supervisor documented these findings upon the analytical results sheet
provided to Navy and Marine Corps officials. He advised that the base’s tap water samples from Hadnot
Point were highly contaminated with chlorinated hydrocarbons and they needed to test their water by Gas
chromatography-mass spectrometry. This machine is used by scientist to identify specific compounds
while in solution. The Army lab’s warnings were repeated three more times between December 1980 and
154

March of 1981. For some unknown reason, the Army lab further spelled out the issue by placing the word
(SOLVENTS!) at the end of their March 1981 warning (Exhibit B). Curiously, this key word was omitted
from the 2007 Government Accountability Office (GAO) review of the Camp Lejeune Drinking water
contamination when this document was cited on the GAO’s timeline of events. Between October 1980
and December 1981, no documented action was taken by Navy or Marine Corps officials to identify the
source of the contamination. Later the following year, the Army lab reports were referred to in the base’s
Initial Assessment Study (IAS) draft report being prepared for the Navy’s NACIP program. The Army
lab’s reliability was called into question in the review comments submitted by the base’s Assistant Chief
of Staff for Facilities, Colonel John T. Marshall,
“it is important to note that accuracy of data provided by the U.S. Army laboratory is
questionable. It is recommended that the TTHM information be de-emphasized throughout
the report.” (Exhibit C).
How could these reports be questionable if they were never investigated or verified? Oddly enough,
Colonel Marshall’s review was written fifteen days after the base received a written report from yet
another lab verifying the legitimacy of the Army lab warnings. The other lab’s data was not included in
the final IAS report released in April 1983. The IAS report concluded that none of the twenty sites
aboard Camp Lejeune slated for further study posed an immediate threat to human health.
The Navy and Marine Corps’ lack of action was not the case for the entire base. Within weeks of the
March 1981 USAEHA warning that solvents were contaminating Hadnot Point’s water, Navy and base
officials discovered organic contamination at the base’s Rifle Range water distribution system located
near the base chemical dump. Between March and May of 1981, Navy and base officials sampled the
Rifle Range’s tap water and the system’s potable water wells for contamination. Then on 31 July 1981, J.
R. Bailey from the Navy’s Facilities Engineering Command wrote to the Commanding General of Camp
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Lejeune advising the General that Rifle Range potable water well RR-97 contained organic contamination
and that two other wells should be used in preference over this well due to lower levels of contamination
found in those wells. (Exhibit D). The Rifle Range water distribution system only served a handful of
permanent residents, unlike Hadnot Point’s system which served enlisted barracks, bachelor officer’s
quarters, the base Naval Hospital and other facilities located on Hadnot Point. What is puzzling is why the
Navy and Marine Corps went through the trouble of testing specific potable water wells for a remote
potable water system on the base and then failed to test the other systems serving the vast majority of
people on the base for another three and a half years. Why were the USAEHA lab warnings to the base
ignored?
In September of 1981 the USAEHA Lab experienced equipment problems and a back log of tests. As a
result, the lab was unable to perform further TTHM testing for Camp Lejeune. A replacement was
needed. In April of 1982, Grainger laboratory was contracted to perform TTHM testing for Camp
Lejeune. At this time, the testing was expanded to include a new water distribution system aboard the
base. That distribution system was for the Tarawa Terrace (TT) family housing area. The initial samples
were collected in April of 1982 and analyzed by the laboratory. Then on 6 May 1982 Mike Hargett, coowner of Grainger Laboratory, phoned the base chemist, Elizabeth Betz and advised her that PCE and
TCE contamination was found in the tape water samples sent for TTHM analysis. (Exhibit E page 4). Ms.
Betz then notified the Supervisory Ecologist, Danny Sharpe, of the Grainger findings and these findings
were then sent up the chain of command to Billy Elston, Deputy Base Maintenance Officer and to the
Utilities Director, Fred Cone. A week later , on 14 May 1982, Betz was summoned to a briefing involving
the base’s facilities command staff. The purpose of the briefing was to explain April’s TTHM analysis
results to Colonel Millice, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Facilities, and Lt Colonel Fitzgerald, Deputy Base
Maintenance officer. Betz documented in her memorandum for the record that
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“it appeared to me that they had not been informed about the findings. I did not inform
them.”
The findings mentioned in the memorandum were the existence of PCE and TCE in the tap water for
Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace’s potable water distribution systems. (Exhibit E, page 4).
Shortly after the briefing, a second round of TTHM sampling was collected for Camp Lejeune.
However, some of these samples had problems with air bubbles and interfered with the testing performed
by Grainger Labs. A new round was collected and sent to Grainger. Nonetheless, Mike Hargett and
Grainger labs found that the solvent peaks discovered in the April samples were still present but the
comparison with the duplicate samples indicated poor repeatability. Betz and Hargett agreed to collect yet
another sample for testing. This sample was taken at the end of June. The Grainger Lab report indicated
interference in one of the samples but there is no explanation of what was causing the interference. As a
result of the continued interference, Betz specifically collected samples from both the Tarawa Terrace and
Hadnot Point water treatment plants for special testing of these two systems. One sample was taken from
the raw water entering the plant which represented the well fields providing untreated water to the plants
and the other from the treated water distributed from the plants to the consumers. One can logically
conclude that the ensuing test results from these samples would clearly demonstrate whether the
interference problem was emanating at the water treatment plant(s) or in well(s) supplying raw water to
the treatment plants. The samples were collected and packed in ice and then shipped to Grainger Labs in
Raleigh North Carolina.
Immediately following the sample shipment, Betz called the state of North Carolina and spoke to Linda
Sewall concerning TTHM reporting requirements. At the end of the conversation, Betz asked Linda
Sewall which Safe Drinking Water Act secondary contaminants were required to be reported. PCE and
TCE were not listed among the SDWA secondary contaminants. Betz did not inform Ms. Sewall that PCE
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and TCE were found in the potable water aboard the base (Exhibit F).
The Grainger report arrived at the base on August 10th 1982:
“Interferences which were thought to be chlorinated hydrocarbons hindered the
quantization of certain trihalomethanes. These appeared to be at high levels and hence
more important from a health standpoint than the total trihalomethane content. For these
reasons we called the situation to the attention of Camp Lejeune personnel.” (Exhibit E, pg.
2).
The Grainger Lab memo documented in writing that the contamination in the potable water systems
aboard the base was a serious issue. Grainger’s chemist, Bruce Babson, correctly concluded that the
contaminants were in the well fields for both Tarawa Terrace and Hadnot Point. If the contamination was
emanating from wells there could be but one logical conclusion. The groundwater supplying the wells
aboard the base was contaminated! No further action was taken by Navy or Marine Corps officials.
In her 19 August 1982 memorandum for the record, Betz incorrectly states the presence of PCE in the
base's potable water is linked to the presence of vinyl lined asbestos coated pipes in the base’s water
distribution system. This scenario was based on a 1980 Suggested Action Guidance Report on
Tetracholorethylene issued by the EPA (Exhibit G), that the contamination could be a result of vinyl lined
asbestos coated water pipes. There was no documented action taken to test this theory. In fact, according
to base records dating back to 1983, vinyl lined asbestos cement pipes were not used as construction
materials for any of the base’s water distribution systems (Exhibit H). The question remains, after the 10
August 1982 warning from Grainger laboratory, why did Navy and Maine Corps officials fail to go out
and test the individual wells supplying the water distribution systems for Hadnot Point and Tarawa
Terrace?
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Then on 1 June 1983, Colonel Marshall compiled data for what was supposed to be a routine report on
the TTHM analysis for the State of North Carolina. (Exhibit I) He sent the data in the form of a table
contained in a letter to Charles Rundgren of the State’s Water Supply Branch. The original analytical
Grainger lab TTHM data sheets were not included in this letter. These data sheets contained Grainger’s
findings for the TTHM readings including notations that PCE and TCE were contaminating the samples.
Several months ago I spoke to Mr. Hargett, former co-owner of Grainger Laboratory, and he indicated to
me that he had secretly tipped off the state of North Carolina that there was a problem with the base’s
TTHM testing program. Colonel Marshall’s letter was supposed to be a routine communication to
document base compliance with the new TTHM regulations slated to take effect by November 1983.
Later that month, Colonel Marshall received a reply from the State’s Environmental Engineer, William
Elmore. Mr. Elmore thanked Colonel Marshall for the data compilation but informed him that the State
required the raw analytical data on the actual forms used by Grainger Laboratory (Exhibit J). The reports
requested by Mr. Elmore were the very same reports upon which Grainger Lab had documented the
existence of tetrachloroethylene and trichloroethylene within the potable water supply systems for Hadnot
Point and Tarawa Terrace beginning in 1982. Colonel Marshall stalled and did nothing. His successor,
Colonel Lilley then inherited the problem of what to do with Mr. Elmore’s request. On 30 November
1983, Colonel Lilley called the North Carolina's water supply branch and spoke with Dick Caspers. We
do not know what was said in the conversation with Mr. Caspers, but two weeks later, Col Lilley wrote
Mr. Elmore and advised him that per this conversation with Mr. Caspers, Marine Corps Base Camp
Lejeune was not required to provide the requested Grainger Laboratory reports and thus they were not
submitted to the State (Exhibit K).
It took another year before the drinking water contamination aboard Camp Lejeune was “officially
discovered”. Today the Marine Corps maintains that “once the source of the chemicals was determined to
be the wells, the wells were immediately taken out of service.” The Marine Corps also now states that
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“taking care of Marines, Sailors, their families and civilian workers is our top priority.” My previous
testimony belies the former statement and the following will cast serious doubt on the latter.

Two weeks after the first well was removed on service on at Hadnot Point, an article appeared in the
base’s newspaper. The article advised the reader that as a result of samples taken on 3 December 1984,
four wells were removed from service due to traces of organic compounds. The article also read that none
of the organic compounds were listed under the Safe Drinking Water Act. The article went on to quote the
Base Environmental Engineer, Robert Alexander:
“every effort will be made to maintain the excellent quality water supply traditionally
provided to residents of Camp Lejeune.” (Exhibit L).
What the article failed to mention was that on 6 July 1984, Hadnot Point well HP-602 was sampled and
found to be highly contaminated with benzene. This well remained operational until November 1984. The
well was situated down gradient from the Hadnot Point fuel farm and thus exposed to the fuel leaking
from the underground tanks. The Base Environmental engineer also failed to disclose to the readers the
presence of a 20,000-30,000 unreported and un-remediated fuel leak dating back to 1979. This fuel plume
was in the ground water and was fifteen feet thick! Environmental Engineering Company’s report warned
the presence of benzene far exceeded the human health risk and therefore the use of the well (HP-602)
should be discontinued immediately (Exhibit M).
The deception did not end there. On 30 April 1985, the Commanding General of Camp Lejeune
advised that residents of Tarawa Terrace that two wells had to be taken of line because minute (trace)
amounts of several organic chemicals were detected in the water. The General also stated:
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“There are no definitive State of Federal regulations regarding a safe level of these
compounds, but as a precaution, I have ordered closure of these wells.” (Exhibit N).
Four months later, the Base Environmental Engineer, Robert Alexander, was directly quoted in a
newspaper article:
“people had not been directly exposed to the pollutants.” (Exhibit O).
The misrepresentation did not end with the public and the media, it extended to the EPA. On 1 November
1985, there was a meeting at Camp Lejeune between base officials and EPA Representatives. During this
meeting, base officials including Robert Alexander told the EPA that the contamination had not reached
the distribution plants. (Exhibit P). Three years later another base official, Assistant Chief of Staff
Facilities, Colonel Thomas J Dalzell was quoted in the media that prior to 1983:
“At that time we were not aware of any of these particular compounds that might have
been in the ground water and we have no information that anyone’s health was in any
danger at that time.” The Colonel also stated that the sources of the contamination were the
base’s motor pools and that these compounds were being dumped in the ground or in the
sewers and that they were not really aware of the effects on ground water back in the 1960’s
and 1970’s. (Exhibit Q).
Beginning with the very first public announcement of the drinking water contamination aboard Camp
Lejeune, there has been a constant drum beat by the Marine Corps that they did not violate any Federal
Safe Drinking Water Act standard or any State of North Carolina standards. On September 24th 2009,
Maj-General Jensen appeared on CNN’s Campbell Brown show and reiterated the Marine Corps official
position. What the Marine Corps has failed to disclose to members of Congress, the media, the public and
prior investigations into the Camp Lejeune’s drinking water contamination was that the Marine Corps
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was in violation of their own orders dating back to 1963. These orders if followed would have prevented
most of the human exposures at the base.
In September of 1963, the Navy’s Bureau of Medicine and Surgery issued a set of instructions known
as BUMED 6240.3B. These instructions were revised in 1972 with version C and then replaced in 1988.
The purpose of BUMED 6240.3B was to establish standards for water for drinking throughout the Naval
establishment including Camp Lejeune (Exhibit R). Contained within the instructions were preventive
measures, including the requirement for frequent surveys to locate and identify health hazards which
might exist in the system. Health Hazards were specially defined within the instructions as to be any
conditions, devices, or practices in the water supply system and its operation which create or may create a
danger to the health and well being of the water consumer. Supply wells were also defined as part of the
water supply system. Pollution was defined as the presence of any foreign substance (organic, inorganic,
radiological or biological) which tended to degrade its quality so as to constitute a hazard or impaired the
usefulness of the water. Perhaps the most disturbing part of the regulation is found under the chemical
characteristics limits. Paragraph 7 subparagraph C:
“Substances which may have deleterious physiological effect, or for which the physiological
effects are not known, shall not be introduced into the system in a manner which would
permit them to reach the consumer.”
These standards have yet to be publicly addressed or explained by the Navy. Instead the Navy and Marine
Corps summarily dismisses this potable water regulation as being to general to be a standard of care.

During our research of Navy and Marine Corps documents we discovered another key document which
undermines the Marine Corps and Navy’s official statements that they had little knowledge that these
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chemicals could contaminate the ground water at Camp Lejeune. Base Order 5100.13B was the third
revision of an order from the Commanding General of Camp Lejeune. The order dates back to June 1974
and may date back to the creation of the base’s chemical dump in 1959. We will not know the actual
beginning date of the order until the Marine Corps produces the prior two versions of the order and the
higher headquarter guidance which created the order in the fist place. The purpose of Base Order
5100.13B was for the safe disposal of contaminants or hazardous wastes (Exhibit S). The order identified
organic solvents as hazardous materials and ominously warned that improper disposal of contaminants
and hazardous materials created hazards such as contamination of drinking water. As I read BUMED
6240.3B and Base Order 5100.13B a line from a famous movie called “A Few Good Men” comes to
mind. “We follow orders, or people die. It’s that simple” At Camp Lejeune, orders were not followed and
people have died or made sick due to the negligence of the United States Marine Corps.
Submitted with this testimony is our copy of the historical time line of events for the Camp Lejeune
drinking water contamination. The time line was painstakingly researched using authentic Navy and
Marine Corps documents. Each entry is referenced to an actual document. We have also provided a copy
of the document library for members of the committee and their staff. The document library was provided
to us by the ATSDR.
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APPENDIX E: 2010 CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY
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My Name is Michael Partain and I am the son and grandson of United States Marine Corps
Officers. My parents were stationed aboard Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune shortly after my father
graduated from the United States Naval Academy. I was conceived, carried and then born at the base
Naval Hospital while my parents lived in base housing. During the time of my mother’s pregnancy, we
were exposed to high levels of tetrachloroethylene (PCE), trichloroethylene (TCE), dichloroethylene
(DCE), benzene and vinyl chloride in the tap water provided to my family by the Marine Corps. Three
years ago, I was diagnosed with male breast cancer at the age of thirty nine. In fact, I am one of about
sixty four men who share this unique commonality of male breast cancer and exposure to contaminated
tap water aboard Camp Lejeune. There is no history of the disease in my family and I tested negative for
the hereditary breast cancer markers BRCA 1 and 2. I do not drink nor do I smoke.
The history of the Camp Lejeune drinking water contamination has been chronicled in many forms
over the past twenty six years since the first announcement made by the United States Marine Corps
revealing the existence of drinking contamination problem aboard the base. Currently, the Department
of the Navy and the Marine Corps beat a constant drum that the health, safety and welfare of their
Marines, Sailors and their families has been and always will be a top priority for the Marine Corps96. In
July of this year, the USMC distributed an informational booklet on the Camp Lejeune drinking water
contamination to every member of Congress. This booklet is a testament to the mountain of lies and
years of open deceit the service men, women and their families have endured since the drinking water
contamination was first revealed.
Discovery of Camp Lejeune’s Drinking Water Contamination.
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165

The recent Marine Corps informational booklet first describes the discovery of the Volatile Organic
Compound (VOC) problem at the base in the Executive Timeline by stating that “unidentified VOC’s
interfered with total trihalomethane (TTHM) testing between 1980-1982. 97 A few pages later, the
reader then discovers that “targeted” sampling in August 1982 identified the contaminants as
tetrachloroethylene (PCE) and trichloroethylene (TCE). The reader is then told the chemicals were
unregulated by the Safe Drinking Water Act at the time. 98 A careful examination of Marine Corps and
Navy documents reveal a totally different scenario unfolded at Naval Facilities and Engineering
Command (LantDiv) and the base after the initial warnings about the contamination poisoning the
drinking water surfaced.
On 1 October 1980 a representative from LantDiv arrived at Camp Lejeune to collect a composite
sample from all eight water treatment plants in an effort to ensure there was no “Love Canal” present
aboard the base. 99 Seven months prior to this visit, the State of North Carolina assumed primacy for the
enforcement of the Safe Drinking Water Act. 100 Officials at LantDiv were worried that the State might
find a problem with Camp Lejeune’s water that the Navy had not previously uncovered. If a problem was
discovered, then further analysis of the eight individual systems would be done to locate the source of
the problem.101 The results from the composite sample were released to LantDiv on 31 October 1980
and the composite samples showed contamination of the drinking water from PCE, TCE,
dichloroethylene (DCE), and vinyl chloride just under the detection limits set for the laboratory.102
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According to the Base Supervisory Chemist, Elizabeth Betz, these results were not received at Camp
Lejeune until June 1982. Ms. Betz documented in her memorandum for the record that she did not
know how LantDiv determined the amount of water to take from each system to comprise the volume
used in making the composite sample. Betz also recognized the percentage of total volume did not
accurately reflect the corresponding usage for each system sampled or the daily flow of each system.
Ms. Betz ominously noted that the 1980 analysis showed no problems for the priority pollutants listed
for the eight water treatment systems aboard Camp Lejeune as a whole, but the same may not
necessarily be true for each individual water treatment system aboard the base.103 No further
investigation was initiated.
The second laboratory to find contamination in Camp Lejeune’s drinking water was the U.S. Army
Environmental Hygiene Agency (USAEHA lab) located in Ft. McPherson, Georgia. The laboratory was
tasked by LantDiv to sample Camp Lejeune’s treated water for an upcoming EPA regulation concerning
dangerous compounds formed during the treatment of potable water known as trihalomethanes
(TTHMs). The initial samples were collected on 21 October of 1980 and the sample was read on 31
October 1980. The water system sampled was Hadnot Point and the sampling included a sample
collected from the Naval Hospital’s emergency room sink. The Laboratory Chief, William Neal, was
apparently concerned enough to take the time to hand write:
“Water is highly contaminated with low molecular weight halogenated hydrocarbons”
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upon the analytical sheet delivered to LantDiv.104 This initial warning began a series from the USAEHA
laboratory about the treated water produced by the Hadnot Point water treatment plant (WTP). These
warnings took place between October 1980 through December 1981.

1.

“Heavy Organic Interference at CHCL2BR, You Need to Analyze for Chlorinated Organics by GCMS.” 105

2.

“You need to Analyze for Chlorinated Organics by GC/MC.” 106

3.

“Water Highly Contaminated with other Chlorinated Hydrocarbons (SOLVENTS)!” 107

4.

“Interferences on this Peak (CHCL2BR).”108

Concurrently with the warnings from the USAEHA lab, another problem was discovered at the base’s
Rifle Range water treatment plant (WTP). Potable water sampling was initiated at the Rifle Range WTP
in 1981 at the request of LantDiv. The tests were ordered in response to concerns about the water
system’s location to a nearby chemical dump.109 This chemical dump was registered with the EPA and
had been in operation from sometime in 1959 until 1976.110 Between March and May of 1981 a series of
potable water sampling revealed a similar organic contamination within the Rifle Range water
distribution system. The findings precipitated a letter from LantDiv in July of 1981 which stated that Rifle
Range well RR-97 contained low levels of organic contamination and two other wells were to be
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operated in preference to well RR-97.111 The Commanding General of Camp Lejeune then wrote the
State of North Carolina and informed the state regulators that:
“based on the laboratory analyses mentioned above and on-site inspections of the landfill and the Rifle
Range system, LANTNAVFACENGCOM (LantDiv) officials have concluded that the Rifle Range drinking water
meets current drinking water standards.”

There was no mention to the State of the organic contamination found at the Rifle Range potable water
system between March 1981 and May 1981.112 During this time, no known testing was performed on
any of the 35 Hadnot Point potable water supply wells despite concurrent warnings from the USAEHA
laboratory that Hadnot Point treated water was highly contaminated with (SOLVENTS)! Surprisingly,
LantDiv did have prior experience with VOC/organic contamination problems within Naval owned and
operated water distribution systems. One year prior to the discovery of VOCs in Camp Lejeune drinking
water systems, two Naval installations experienced PCE and TCE contamination. However, something
different occurred at Warminster Naval Air Warfare Center and Willow Grove Naval Air Station. The
contaminated wells producing PCE and TCE in the base’s drinking water were identified and closed.113
Why did the Navy fail to implement testing of the potable water wells for each water distribution system
aboard Camp Lejeune after the first indication of contamination was discovered? Why was the Rifle
Range potable water distribution system treated differently from the Hadnot Point potable water
distribution system? At the time of the testing in 1981, the Rifle Range WTP served only a few
permanent houses and Marines temporarily training at the range. During this same time, the Hadnot
Point WTP served the what is known as Main-side which included the base barracks, the Naval Hospital,
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and with that thousands of Marines, Sailors and their families. Where was the Marine Corps’ concern for
the health, safety and welfare for their Marines, Sailors and their families?
By the Fall of 1981, the USAEHA laboratory experienced an equipment breakdown which
resulted in a back log of work from Camp Lejeune and other Department of Defense installations. 114 A
replacement laboratory was needed and a state certified laboratory was selected to continue Camp
Lejeune’s mandated TTHM testing. Grainger Laboratory was owned by Fred Grainger and Mike Hargett.
The laboratory entered into a contract with Camp Lejeune to test the Tarawa Terrace and Hadnot point
WTPs for TTHMs. This testing did not include testing for VOCs. The first sample for each of the
distribution systems was collected in late April of 1982. The samples were analyzed for TTHMs, and as
was the case with the USAEHA lab, solvents were found not only in the Hadnot Point samples but also in
the newly tested Tarawa Terrace water distribution system. Mr. Hargett then contacted Camp Lejeune’s
Base Supervisory Chemist, Elizabeth Betz, and informed her that the synthetic organic cleaning solvents
PCE and TCE were found in both samples submitted for both Handot Point and Tarawa Terrace. Ms. Betz
then reported the findings to her supervisor, Danny Sharpe who then pushed them up the chain of
command which included the base Utilities director Fred Cone. Eight days later, Ms. Betz briefed Col
Millice , Assistant Chief of Staff, Facilities, and LtCol. Fitzgerald about the April TTHM test results. Ms
Betz stated in her memorandum for the record that:
“It Appeared to me that they had not been informed about the findings, I didn’t inform them.”115

Later that same month, a second series of samples were taken from the Hadnot Point and
Tarawa Terrace water distributions systems. This time there was a problem with the caps for the
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samples taken. However, Mr. Hargett advised Ms. Betz the solvents noted on the 6 May phone call were
still present.116 A second Grainger contract was written in July 1982 for additional testing of four
samples taken from the water treatment plants for Tarawa Terrace and Hadnot Point. The first set of
samples were collected from the raw water line which fed each plant from a distinct well field. The
second set of samples were collected from the respective plant’s reservoir containing treated water.
117

The results of this special testing for the Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace WTPs were compiled in a

formal letter to the base on 10 August 1982 by Grainger Laboratory chemist Bruce Babson. Mr. Babson
wrote the Assistant Chief of Staff, Facilities:
“Interferences which were thought to be chlorinated hydrocarbons hindered the quantification of certain
Trihalomethanes. These appeared to be at high levels and hence more important from a health standpoint than
the total Trihalomethane content. For these reasons we called the situation to the attention of Camp Lejeune
personnel.”118

Mr. Babson also concluded that the well fields for the WTPs were the source of the contamination found
in the water treatment plants. He identified the contaminants as PCE and TCE. 119 Disturbingly, Grainger
Laboratory quantified TCE in a sample taken from the Camp Lejeune Naval Hospital at 1,400 ppb.
Instead of immediate action to test each and every potable water well for VOCs/organic and ensure the
health, safety and welfare of the service personnel and their families aboard Camp Lejeune was
protected, an excuse was given to explain away Grainger’s confirmation of what the USAEHA and
Jennings Laboratories both found in the potable water samplings from October of 1980.
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According to the recent USMC informational booklet for the Camp Lejeune Historic Drinking
Water problem:
“Base officials compared these results against EPA recommended levels and found the average levels of TCE and
PCE were within those levels and thus not thought to be a health concern.” 120

The immediate problem with the current Marine Corps rendition of why no further action was taken
after Grainger’s warnings is that their assertion that the TCE and PCE levels were within the EPA’s
recommended levels is not true. The Base Supervisory Chemist, Elizabeth Betz noted in her findings that
the levels of PCE at Tarawa Terrace exceeded the EPA’s recommended level of 40 ppb for long term
exposures. Furthermore, the May TCE reading of 1,400 ppb taken from the Emergency Room sink of the
base Naval Hospital was summarily dismissed with no explanation offered to explain the existence of the
extreme levels of the chemical found in the sample or why the levels dropped to 20 ppb in subsequent
testing. Only by arbitrarily dismissing the May 1,400 ppb TCE value does the Hadnot Point sampling fall
into line with the EPA’s recommended values for chronic exposure to TCE.121Three months after Betz’s
August 1982 memorandum for the record, the base performed the quarterly testing for TTHMs and sent
the samples to Grainger Laboratory. Once again the analytical data sheets noted interference in the
samples from Tarawa Terrace and Hadnot Point.122 Ms. Betz then called the Grainger Chemist, Bruce
Babson to discuss a typographical error on his report. Mr. Babson then expressed his concern that the
solvents which interfered in Hadnot Point’s testing which had previously dropped were relatively high
again. 123Ms. Betz memorandum was forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Facilities and then on to
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the newly hired base Environmental Engineer, Robert Alexander.124 From that point on, the prolific note
keeping and memorandums written by Elizabeth Betz inexplicably cease.

A prior flawed Government Accountability Office (GAO) sponsored investigation into the Camp Lejeune
drinking water contamination cited entirely different reasons why the base failed to act after Grainger’s
warnings in August 1982:
“they had limited knowledge of these chemicals; second there were no regulations establishing enforceable
limits for these chemicals in the drinking water; and third they made assumptions about why the levels of TCE
and PCE varied and about the possible sources of the TCE and PCE.”

“Specifically, because the levels of TCE and PCE varied, they attributed the higher levels to short term
environmental exposures, such as spilled paint inside a water treatment plant, or to laboratory or sampling
errors. Additionally, in an August 1982 memorandum, a Camp Lejeune official suggested that, based on the
sampling results provided by the private laboratory, the levels of PCE detected could be the result of using
coated pipes in the untreated water lines at Tarawa Terrace. 125

Missing from the GAO’s limited review of the Camp Lejeune document inventory are two key
documents which undermine the validity of the GAO investigation. The first document is an unusual
Base Order written in 1974. Unlike most military orders, there are no references indicating on what
authority or guidance the general issued the order. Base Order 5100.13B was written to inform the
general’s command about the “Safe Disposal of Contaminants or Hazardous Waste.” What is significant
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about this order was that it clearly demonstrated that the Marine Corps knew at least by 1974 , or
perhaps earlier if the prior copies of this order are ever found:
•

Organic solvents were hazardous materials, and

•

Improper disposal practices create hazards such as the contamination of drinking water.

The designated disposal sites were the dumps located at the Rifle Range.126 Last year the Marine was
asked by Senators Burr and Hagan from North Carolina whether the Marine Corps agreed that Base
Order 5100.13B declared organic solvents hazardous. The official Marine Corps reply signed by Brigadier
General Regner was:
“The 1974 Base Order Speaks for itself.”127

The second document was a set of potable water instructions dating back to 1963. The instructions are
known as BUMED 6240.3B (1963) and revision 3C (1972). The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED)
was the entity within the Department of the Navy responsible for setting potable water standards for
the Navy. While there were no set specific standards for VOCs/organic solvents within the instruction,
there were preventive measures and requirements that if followed should have led to the
disqualification for use, of most if not all, of the contaminated wells found at Camp Lejeune. The
regulations contained a set of definitions to clearly specify the meaning of terms used within the
document. Three key terms illustrate and provide a clear understanding that the Marine Corps had the
ability to protect their Marines, Sailors, and families as early as 1963.
Health Hazards means any conditions, devices or practices in the water supply system and its operation which create, or may create, a danger
to the health and well-being of the water consumer. An example of a health hazard is a structural defect in the water supply system whether of
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location, design, or construction, which may regularly or occasionally prevent satisfactory purification of the water supply or cause it to be
polluted from extraneous sources.

Pollution as used in these standards, means the presence of any foreign substance (organic, inorganic, radiological, or biological) in water which
tends to degrade its quality so as to constitute a hazard or impair the usefulness of the water.

Chemical Characteristics Drinking water shall not contain impurities in concentrations which may be hazardous to the health of the consumers.
It should not be excessively corrosive to the water supply system. Substances used in its treatment shall not remain in the water in
concentrations greater than required by good practice. Substances which may have deleterious physiological effect or for which physiological
effects are not known, shall not be introduced into the system in a manner which would permit them to reach the consumer. 128

To date, the Marine Corps has failed to provide Congress, the media and their Marines, Sailors and their
families with a clear answer as to why these orders were not reviewed in the Commandant’s Blue
Ribbon panel and why the Navy’s BUMED 6240.3B and 3C regulations were not followed. Four years
after the closure of Hadnot Point well HP 602, the BUMED 6240.3C order was canceled and revised with
NAVMEDCOMIST 6240.1. Missing from the new instructions were the definitions for Health Hazards,
Pollution and the strong language found within the Chemical Characteristics section of BUMED 6240.3B
and C. The new regulations replaced what was then a more advance and comprehensive potable water
standard with a new standard which was in agreement with the Safe Drinking Water Act.129 The
existence of Base Order 5100.13B married with BUMED 6240.3B and C meant that the Marine Corps
possessed at least an operational knowledge that organic solvents and other hazardous materials could
and did contaminate the groundwater aboard Camp Lejeune as early as 1974 and as such their
groundwater wells were vulnerable. Another word for this type of knowledge and lack of due care is
called gross negligence.
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The other fallacy cited above and contained in the GAO report was the assertion that vinyl lined
asbestos coated pipes were the possible source for PCE contamination for the base. The basis for this
fallacy is contained in a memorandum written by Elizabeth Betz asserting her opinion that she believed
the contamination was possibly the result of vinyl line asbestos coated pipes in the raw water lines at
Tarawa Terrace.130 The basis for this assumption was apparently due to a 9 April 1980 EPA bulletin which
cited vinyl lined asbestos coated pipes as a source for drinking water contamination. The EPA also noted
that their suggested action guidance did not condone the presence of any level of PCE contamination in
drinking water. 131The problem with Betz’s conclusion was that according to base construction records,
no vinyl lined asbestos coated pipes were ever used in any of the base’s potable water distribution
systems.132
Shortly after the Bruce Babson’s August Grainger Laboratory report arrived on the desk of the
Assistant Chief of Staff, Facilities, a draft copy of the Navy’s Naval Assessment and Control of Installation
Pollutants (NACIP) Initial Assessment Study (IAS) for Camp Lejeune arrived as an attachment to a 5
August 1982 letter from Wallace Eakes of LantDiv to Col Marshall at Camp Lejeune. Mr. Eakes requested
Col. J. T Marshall, Assistant Chief of Staff, Facilities to review the Draft IAS for completeness, accuracy
and concurrence for recommendations no later than 25 August 1982.133Col. Marshall completed his
assigned task and replied on 25 August 1982. Contained in his comments for the Draft IAS:
“It is important to note that accuracy of the data provided by U.S. Army Laboratory is questionable. It is
recommended that TTHM information be de-emphasized throughout the report.”134
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There was no mention of the August 1982 Grainger letter confirming the U.S Army laboratory’s findings
from October 1980 and warning him that the potable water for Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace was
highly contaminated with VOCs/Organic solvents in the Colonel’s 25 August reply to LantDiv. Four
months later a change order to the IAS was executed to include two new disposal sites located on the
base after the IAS team departed in March 1982. The base’s potable water contamination was not
mentioned in the change order, nor were there any requests made to test the wells for Hadnot Point
and Tarawa Terrace to locate the specific wells with VOC/Organic solvent contamination. 135
The Initial Assessment Study for Camp Lejeune was released in April of 1983 and listed 76
potentially contaminated sites aboard the base and 22 of these sites warranted further investigation in
the form of a Confirmation Study phase of the NACIP program. “The Study concludes that, while none of the
sites pose an immediate threat to human health or the environment, 22 warrant further investigation under the
Navy Assessment and Control of Installation Pollutants (NACIP) Program to assess potential long-term impacts.
A confirmation study is recommended to confirm or deny the existence of the suspected contamination and
quantify the extent of any problems which may exist.” 136

Nowhere in the 221 page document were there any recommendations to test any of the potable water
wells for Tarawa Terrace and only 2 out of 35 wells were recommended for testing at Hadnot Point.
137

How could the official Navy environmental (NACIP IAS) study for Camp Lejeune conclude there was no

immediate threat to human health aboard the base if the report failed to address the Army and
Grainger laboratory’s findings of VOC/Organic solvents in two of the base’s potable water system? A
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month after the release of the IAS, LantDiv Environmental Engineer and Engineer in charge of the
Confirmation study for Camp Lejeune wrote a letter apparently addressing the ongoing VOC/Organic
solvent contamination aboard the base. Unfortunately, that letter has since vanished. Sixteen years later
the Wallmeyer letter, as it has since come to be known, was the subject of a four week document search
at LantDiv.138 The letter was reportedly never found. According to a subsequent reference in a message
from April of 1985, the Wallmeyer letter attempted to address the VOC/Organic Solvent contamination
problem with the base’s potable water system.139 The problem was that the official Confirmation Study
did not include any of the measures described in the message referencing the Wallmeyer letter. Was
LantDiv attempting to quietly remediate the VOC/Organic solvent drinking water contamination without
full disclosure of the problem to the State and Federal agencies?
As part of our investigation into what transpired aboard Camp Lejeune prior to the official
announcement of the drinking water contamination in December 1984, we located and interviewed
Mike Hargett and Bruce Babson, both formerly of Grainger Laboratory. Curiously, neither of them were
ever contacted by either the GAO or the Commandant’s investigations into the Camp Lejeune drinking
water contamination. Mr. Hargett informed me that he had been asked by the Base Supervisory Chemist
to accompany her in a meeting to explain the significance of Grainger’s findings. Mr. Hargett stated that
the meeting lasted less than five minutes before they were dismissed. Frustrated by the Marine Corps’
recalcitrance, Mr. Hargett then tipped off the State of North Carolina about the problems with the
base’s potable water system. In June of 1983, a letter from the State’s environmental engineer, Mr.
Elmore, arrived on Col. Marshall’s desk requesting the original copies of Grainger’s analytical data

138
139

CLW 3039, Pdf pp 5&6, February 1999.
CLW 1195, April 1985.

178

sheets instead of the tables summarizing them previously submitted by the Marine Corps.140 The
analytical data sheets were exclusive property of the Marine Corps and written upon them were Bruce
Babson’s warnings that PCE and TCE were interfering with the TTHM testing. Six months later this
request was formally denied by the new Assistant Chief of Satff, Facilities, Col. Lilley. Col. Lilley advised
Mr. Elmore that the original reports were not required and thus not submitted to the state.141 Sadly, the
State of North Carolina agreed with the Marine Corps assertion and another opportunity to stop the
drinking water contamination aboard Camp Lejeune slipped by and was forgotten. Bruce Babson’s
notations and warnings were toned down but the asterisk notating interferences with the TTHM testing
remained on almost every known Grainger Laboratory analytical data sheet through the Sumer of 1984.
Ironically, it was another contamination problem with a different chemical which forced the
VOC/Organic solvent drinking water contamination issue to the surface. When it did surface, the
VOC/Organic solvent drinking water contamination was subsequently used to hide a more sinister
contaminant, benzene.
Massive fuel leaks at the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm.
The Hadnot Point Fuel Farm (HPFF) was constructed on the Southeast corner of Holcomb Blvd
and Ash Street sometime in 1941. The fuel farm was comprised of fourteen fuel tanks buried in the
ground and one large 600,000 gallon tank located above ground. The fuel farm was located in what is
now known as the Hadnot Point Industrial area and within 1,200 feet from potable water well HP-602
which was also constructed in 1941.142 The first documented fuel leak at the HPFF occurred in 1979
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when an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 gallons of fuel leaked from an underground valve.143 A condition
survey for the HPFF was scheduled the following year and other problems were found at the HPFF. The
LantDiv engineer concluded that because of age, failure to clean the tanks, and lack of maintenance,
there had been a general condition of corrosion and deterioration of the tanks and connecting pipelines.
Many of the interconnecting valves and flanges could not be inspected because they were buried and/or
could not be located. The engineer recommended replacing the connecting piping, the inspection of all
of the tanks for leaks and repair existing leaks.144 The Condition Survey was followed in 1981 with a
Military Construction Data project number LE201M to repair the HPFF facilities and $537,200 was then
allocated to clean and repair the petroleum tanks.145 By March of 1983, Navy and Marine Corps officials
determined that piece meal rehabilitation of the HPFF was not cost effective and in 1985, the
recommendation was made to replace the HPFF with a new facility.146 The fuel farm was finally replaced
in 1990.
There are no known records indicating that the Marine Corps made any attempt to remediate
the 20,000 to 30,000 gallon 1979 fuel leak between 1980 and 1988. In May 1988 correspondence, the
Assistant Chief of Staff, Facilities finally notified the State of North Carolina that a 15 foot thick fuel
plume was contaminating the groundwater underlying the bulk fuel facility. 147The base Staff Judge
Advocate, Col. Tokarz, noted that the fuel farm was losing fuel into the groundwater at the rate of 1,500
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gallons per month. The colonel also warned that delays will result in an indefensible waste of money and
a continuing threat to human health and the environment.148
Knowing the existence of a massive 20,000 – 30,000 gallon fuel leak in 1979 which drained into
the ground at the Hadnot Point Industrial area with no attempts to remediate or recover the lost fuel
until at least 1989, leads a rational, prudent person to speculate why it took the Marine Corps five years
to sample the nearest potable water well (HP-602) to ensure the well was free of fuel contamination.
After all, BUMED 6240.3B and version C carried an obligation for the Marine Corps to make sure potable
water was obtained from the most desirable source feasible and efforts be made to prevent or control
pollution of the source.149 Where are the documents detailing these required efforts? Instead, the
Marine Corps relies on their assertion that VOCs, including the SVOC benzene, were not regulated by the
Safe Drinking Water Act until the late 1980’s and early 1990’s to avoid addressing the issue.150 Does
there have to be a set standard or maximum containment level for a polluter to be negligent in their
duties to protect human health? Where does common sense enter into the equation? Prior to 1984,
there are no known records indicating that the Marine Corps took any action to protect the water
supply for well HP-602 from fuel contamination and consequently the entire Hadnot Point water
distribution system.
One of the few potable water wells selected for sampling by the Navy’s NACIP program was well
HP-602. The 1982 draft copy of the IAS report stated that well HP-602 was designated for sampling in
the Confirmation study because it was located 1,100 feet down-gradient from the HPFF and actively
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pumping.151 The final IAS report released in April 1983 detailed the fuel losses for the HPFF totaled
somewhere between 20,000 to 50,000 gallons of fuel. This figure became the basis for the fuel loss
estimates for the public, Congress and more importantly, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry (ATSDR), the agency tasked with studying the health effects resulting from the potential
exposures at Camp Lejeune. This misconception remained until 2010 when it was discovered that the
fuel losses at the HPFF amounted to much more than what was previously disclosed by the Navy and the
Marine Corps. Once again a reference from the current Camp Lejeune informational brochure is
appropriate. According to the Marine Corps:
“Question: Has the Marine Corps intentionally withheld information from ATSDR in order to delay their studies?
Answer: No. The Marine Corps has made extraordinary efforts to provide ATSDR access to any potentially
relevant information we control. We recognize that this issue deals with complex science, and we have been
working with ATSDR to get our former residents the answers they deserve in a timely manner.
The Marine Corps does not benefit in any way from delays to ATSDR’s work. The people who were exposed are
our family members and fellow Marines. We are much as anyone, want to be able to give them accurate
answers in a timely manner.”152

In March of last year, the ATSDR stumbled across a previously undisclosed web portal belonging to the
Navy. A sub contractor to ATSDR was inadvertently given access to this portal by a Marine Corps’
librarian. Contained within the NavFacEngCom’s Underground Storage Tank (UST) web portal were
documents previously withheld from the ATSDR including details on the size and scope of the fuel loss
from the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm underground storage tanks. According to documents discovered in the
portal, the Marine Corps lost 1.1 million gallons of fuel at the HPFF over the course of the 49 year
operational history of the facility. Much of this fuel was located within 300-1,100 feet away from well
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HP-602. The fuel was found at all levels in the aquifer including the deep aquifer. 153Where is the Navy’s
notification to ATSDR advising them of the existence of this portal and the 1.1 million gallons of fuel
trapped in the ground at Hadnot Point? What does the Navy and the Marine Corps stand to gain if the
public, the scientists and Congress were not aware of the extreme nature of the loss fuel at the HPFF?
The Confirmation Study for Camp Lejeune commenced in May of 1984 with the release of the
Work and Safety Plan. The work plan detailed how and where the sampling for the Confirmation Study
was executed. The plan also detailed the schedule of the project and what reports were required by the
contractor. The contractor was an Environmental Engineering firm from Gainesville, Florida known as
Environmental Sciences Engineering (ESE). A monthly progress report was required by the 15th day of
each month for the duration of the contract. The tests results were scheduled to be evaluated between
June and August and a draft report prepared by the end of August. The Final report was scheduled to be
completed by 10 September 1984 and the presentation made on the same date.154 According to the
May/June progress report, work was underway and 14 ground water monitoring wells were installed.
The engineer noted a one week delay due to decontamination of equipment. 155 The June/July progress
report advised the LantDiv engineer in charge of the Confirmation study that 36 of 75 wells (this number
included monitoring wells drilled for the study) were sampled. The sampling included site 22, the
Hadnot Point Fuel Farm and well HP-602 (sampled 6 July 1984). A two week delay was noted due to
equipment problems and the re-drilling of five new wells to replace wells inadvertently contaminated by
an ESE subcontractor. The project was scheduled for completion on 4 August 1984. The samples were
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shipped to ESE laboratory in Gainesville, Florida for analysis.156After the 15 July progress report all
documentation regarding ESE’s efforts on the Confirmation Study ceased until January of 1985. The
August progress report and all subsequent progress reports are missing, as is the draft report
summarizing the evaluation of data from the sampling.
The only clue to what transpired during the missing months between July 1984 and December
1984 recently surfaced a few months ago when we located a State of North Carolina document written
by Rick Shiver, N.C. Regional Hydrologist. The document was titled Groundwater Pollution Source
Inventory and discussed the HPFF and the multiple leaking underground storage tanks (UST). The
inventory is dated 1 August 1984 and located in the groundwater pollution box is a handwritten circle
indicating that the groundwater pollution was confirmed.157 At the time of this report, the State of North
Carolina was supposedly not privy to the details of the Confirmation Study then underway at Camp
Lejeune. The contractor was not required and did not report their findings to anyone else but the Navy
personnel at LantDiv. What basis did Mr. Shiver have to conclude that the groundwater at the HPFF was
contaminated with gasoline three months before the Marine Corps allegedly received ESE’s
Confirmation Study report revealing fuel contamination at the HPFF and potable well HP-602.
Last year Senators Burr and Hagan posed a series of questions about Camp Lejeune to the
Marine Corps. One of these questions asked why the Navy and Marine Corps waited until 30 November
1984 to close well HP-602. The Navy/Marine Corps replied:
“According to the record, the Marine Corps did not “wait” to shut down well HP-602. Well HP-602 was taken out
of service as of 21 November 1984 as part of the normal rotation of well (CLW 1089). Records indicate that the

156
157

Cercla 3429, July 1984.
North Carolina Groundwater Pollution Inventory, Rick Shiver, August 1980

184

results from the 6 July 1984 sample were received by the base on 30 November 1984 (CLW 4546). Upon receipt of
the sample results, well HP-602 was never reactivated and was permanently taken out of service.” 158

The document titled CLW 1089 is a Question and Answer sheet prepared for the base Environmental
Engineer, Robert Alexander in advance of a media interview concerning the contamination found at
Camp Lejeune. Judging from the context of the document, mainly the omission of well HP-651
discovered contaminated in February 1985, the document was most likely written in December 1984.
Mr. Alexander stated that benzene and industrial solvents were found in well HP-602 and then cited test
results implying they were the results which closed well HP-602 in November of 1984. In fact, the test
results on the Q&A sheet were collected on 3 December 1984, after the 30 November 1984 date in
which the Marine Corps states that the base was allegedly notified that well HP-602 was contaminated
and then closed. This mischaracterization of why well HP-602 was closed remained a fact until 2009.
Mr. Alexander then wove a false sense of security for those potentially exposed by informing the
community that all of the wells were located in the industrial area approximately 1 mile from the
barracks.159 Did this mean that the wells only served the shops and offices in the industrial area and not
the barracks? If well 602 was closed as a result of the receipt of ESE’s Confirmation Study results, then
why was the July 1984 380 ppb finding omitted from the Q&A sheet? If well HP-602 was taken off line
due to a normal rotation, then where are the well and plant production log books to support the
Navy/USMC position? To date, the log books are all missing from the historical record for Camp Lejeune.
The Navy and Marine Corps also cite CLW 4546 as evidence that they closed well HP-602 upon receipt of
the ESE Confirmation Study. The document was written after the Bob Alexander Q&A sheet and at least
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three months after well HP-602 was closed.160 The lack of primary supporting evidence on how the
contamination at Hadnot Point was discovered is extremely disturbing. Why is everyone trusting the
very entity who polluted the drinking water aboard Camp Lejeune to tell and not show us how it
happened? Where is the November transmittal sheet for the ESE Confirmation Study? Where is the
draft ESE Confirmation Study due in August 1984? Where is the telephone record log or memorandum
to the base ordering them to close well HP-602 on 30 November 1984? Why was the Hadnot Point WTP
tested for benzene only after the contaminated well was closed? Where are the missing progress
reports from ESE? Where are the missing well and plant production log books? Every shred of evidence
which would either condemn the Navy and Marine Corps or exonerate them is missing. Why?

A December 1984 base news paper article assured their readers that none of the organic
compounds found in the base’s water were listed under the Safe Drinking Water Act. The article ended
with a chilling quote from the base environmental engineer, Robert Alexander:
“Every effort will be made to maintain the excellent quality water supply traditionally provided to the
residents of Camp Lejeune.”161

Finally on 8 January 1985 a memo from LantDiv indicated that the Navy agreed to officially look at the
other systems on the base for possible drinking water contamination. ESE, the Confirmation Study
contractor was then assigned the task to sample all of the wells on the base for VOCs.162 The ESE
Evaluation of Data Report was released a week later. According to the project schedule previously
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discussed, the report was due in September 1984 and was four months late. Within the report, ESE
indicated that there was extensive fuel contamination at the HPFF. The contractor wrote in their report:
“Of extreme importance is the high level of benzene (380 ppb) detected in the sample collected from the deep
water supply well No. 602 (Well 22GW3). This benzene concentration far exceeds the 10 to minus 5 human
health risk limit of 6.6 ppb; therefore, the use of this well should be discontinued immediately.”
On the margin a curious handwritten from an unknown LantDiv official note reads:
“We must send them our (1141’s) report on well data, what it means and what wells to keep shut down.”
“ The absence of contamination at Well 22GW2 indicates that the migration pathway is deep and not
shallow.”163

The Evaluation of Data report did not discuss the VOCs found in Tarawa Terrace beginning in 1982 and
no wells in that system were sampled during the July 1984 testing period. The report also noted that
subsequent to the July 1984 testing, well HP 602 experienced a dramatic increase in organic solvents
after further testing by LantDiv. They concluded that the main industrial area was a logical source of the
solvents. 164This industrial area included the HPFF, the base maintenance shops, and building 1115 (the
former Fleet Refueling and Service area). Also included in the industrial area were several water supply
wells, among them was well HP-602. These wells all served the Hadnot Point WTP and were a source of
drinking water for the service men, women and their families living within the treatment plant’s service
area. Later that year, when the State of North Carolina asked for copies of the ESE report, the Marine
Corps refused:
“as the Marine Corps disagrees with the conclusions in this report, it will not release a copy of it to any
outside agency.”165
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VOC contamination in well HP-651 and Tarawa Terrace

By then end of January 1985 it appeared that LantDiv and base officials had a handle on the VOC
contamination found at Hadnot Point. They had closed 10 supply wells for the system and the water
treatment plant appeared to be free of benzene and TCE. Two phone calls from residents in Paradise
and Berkley manner set off a series of events which ultimately changed the course of the contamination
story. The calls were concerning a gasoline smell in the drinking water provided by the Holcomb
Boulevard WTP. The calls resulted in the discovery of a leaking generator fuel line at the treatment plant
allowing gasoline to collect in the plant’s reservoir. The plant was shut down and two connecting
transfer valves were opened allowing Hadnot Point to supply water to the service area served by
Holcomb Boulevard.166 Prior to 1972, the Holcomb Blvd area was serviced by the Hadnot Point WTP and
the intra-connection was preserved when the new plant began production. From January 27th through
February 4th, Hadnot Point supplied all the treated water for Hadnot Point and the Holcomb Blvd
systems. During this time, the Holcomb Blvd system was repeatedly flushed and cleaned. The state was
brought in and split water samples were taken after the plant was cleaned.167 However, unbeknownst to
Navy and Marine Corps officials, one contaminated well had been missed in earlier testing for VOCs.
Well HP-651 was located along Piney Green Road and immediately adjacent to Lots 201 and
203, the base junkyard. Lots 201 and 203 was one of the 22 sites targeted for additional study but for
some reason, well HP-651 was not selected to be sampled in July 1984.168 The well site selected in 1971
by LantDiv engineers and installed in 1972. It is not known whether the engineers involved in selecting
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the site for well HP-651were knew of BUMED 6240.3c and the preventive measures built into the Navy’s
potable water regulations. It was their job to know and comply with these regulations. How could they
possibly begin to justify the selection of a potable water supply well site less than 300 feet from the base
junk yard and the base VOC disposal area (site 82).169 This one well was the sole source for the horrific
VOC readings found in the January 1985 samples taken from the Holcomb and Hadnot Point WTP service
areas received in February of 1985.170
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Well 651 was sampled and closed on 4 February 1985. The tests were completed on 8 February 1985.
Both the January and February samples taken from well HP-651 were contaminated with extreme
amounts of organic solvents.

Samples for Well 651
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In their apparent attempt to demonstrate to the State of North Carolina their good stewardship of the
environment, the Navy and Marine Corps inadvertently and independently documented the worst VOC
contaminated supply well on the base and its corresponding affect on the finished water supplied to the
residents of Camp Lejeune.
The Tarawa Terrace (TT) water distribution system test results for VOCs were received on the
heels of the confirmation of contamination in well HP-651. Just as Mike Hargett and Bruce Babson had
warned the base in 1982, The Tarawa Terrace well field was highly contaminated with VOCs, Specifically
wells TT-26 and TT-23.173
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Samples taken
1/25/85

PCE

TCE

DCE

Vinyl Chloride

TT-26

1580 ppb

57 ppb

92 ppb

27 ppb

TT-23

132 ppb

5.8 ppb

11 ppb

0 ppb

A subsequent test found the finished water provided to the families at Tarawa Terrace contained 215
ppb of PCE.174 The contaminated wells were then immediately closed, almost three years after the initial
warning from Mike Hargett and Grainger Laboratory.
The water supply problems at Tarawa Terrace presented the Navy and Marine Corps a different
and more complex problem than with the Hadnot Point and Holcomb Blvd WTPs. Like the other
treatment plants, the TT system served a large residential population with treated water. Unlike the
other two systems on main-side, there was not intra-connection in the advent of an emergency. To
further complicate the issue, the availability of raw water for the TT well fields was limited. Even before
the closure of wells TT-26 and 23, TT was experiencing trouble with the availability of raw water for the
treatment plant. A memo from W. R. Price, the Utility System Operator General Foreman, warned that
the existing well field was unable to keep with the demands placed on the TT system and that continued
over use of the wells in the system without periodic rest could lead to well failures.175 With the closure
of wells TT-26 and TT-23, Tarawa Terrace was expected to experience a 300,000 gallon per day shortfall
of water for the residents of TT.
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On 1 March 1985, a staff meeting for the Assistant Chief of Staff , Facilities was held on the base.
The purpose of the meeting was to discuss water alternatives for Tarawa Terrace. A list of seven
alternatives was developed by Colonel Lilley, Assistant Chief of Staff, Facilities.

8.
9.
10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

Install a new well at Tarawa Terrace. The problem with a newer well was that water, in significant
quantities was difficult to locate at Tarawa Terrace. Estimate cost: $80,000.
Transport water via tanker trucks from other water plants. However, the logistic of hauling 300,000
gallons per day was questionable. Estimated cost: $2,000 per day.
Tap into existing City of Jacksonville water line under Lejeune Blvd. There was a concern that the city
may not be able to provide the water and there was a fear that the city would request reciprocating
favors to the Marine Corps. Estimated cost: Unknown.
Change the existing contract for Holcomb Blvd to construct a water line to Tarawa Terrace immediately.
The contractor was thought to be unable to perform this option in the time frame required. Estimate cost:
Unknown.
Construction of a 8inch raw water line from Brewster Blvd to Tarawa Terrace across the railroad trestle
on Northeast Creek. At the time, it was unknown if the state would approve the measure. Estimated Cost:
$75,000.
Modify Tarawa Terrace plant to include aeration or granular activated carbon unit capable of removing
VOCs. The alternative was rejected because of they felt the modifications could not be made in the time
frame required. Estimated Cost: $300,000.
Re-activate and use contaminated well(s) that have been closed if required to maintain adequate
water levels and pressure. Lack of Federal MCLs for VOCs or restrictions for using VOC contaminated
water is used to justify this measure. However, the brief also reads “the potential health hazards must be
weighed against the need and cost of providing water from other sources.” (Please see entry for BUMED
6240.3B and 6240.3C and note the language concerning chemicals in the water: “substances which may
have a deleterious (harmful) physiological effect or for which the physiological effects are not known,
shall not be introduced into the water system in a manner which would permit them to reach the
consumer.” Estimated Cost: zero.

Alternative 5 was selected for implementation but the estimated completion date was 5 June 1985 and
state approval for the project was needed. There was no discussion concerning how to provide for the
impending water shortage during while the auxiliary line was under construction.176 Two days prior to
the meeting, a letter from the Calgon Activated Carbon Division in response to a LantDiv inquiry about
emergency potable water treatment systems for VOCs arrived at LantDiv. Calgon advised LantDiv that
based on the organic solvent and its corresponding concentration supplied by LantDiv, they could

176

CLW 1129, March 1985.

192

deliver as system capable of treating the potable water within 24-48 hours.177 The Calgon system was
never ordered According to Marine Corps documents, VOC contaminated well TT-23 was operated and
supplied water to the residents of Tarawa Terrace on at least three different occasions until the
temporary water line was completed in June of 1985.178 The Tarawa Terrace WTP was finally closed on 1
March 1987. According to the water model completed by ATSDR in 2007, Tarawa Terrace remained
contaminated with VOCs throughout this time period.
The USMC’s Camp Lejeune contaminated drinking water media and public relations campaign.
At no point between the first warning of a problem with the base water supply discovered in
October 1980 and the appearance of the first announcement informing the residents of the base that
their drinking water was contaminated in December 1984, were any of the residents and the State of
North Carolina informed about the contaminants found in the Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace
drinking water systems. The first indication of a problem from the Marine Corps was an article
announcing the commencement of the Confirmation Study. The article appeared in the base newspaper
and was titled “Environmental Study kicks-off.” Col. Lilley advised the residents of the base that”
“while contractors will routinely wear personal protective equipment such as chemical resistant
overalls, we do not expect to expose anyone to any contaminants. The results of the survey are due in
August 1984. If any contaminants are discovered, a review of alternatives will determine action
necessary to meet health and environmental standards.” 179

What the Colonel failed to inform the residents was that they were already being exposed. The survey
referenced in the article was the Confirmation Study. The first announcement of drinking water
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contamination occurred in December 1984 when the base newspaper informed the residents of Camp
Lejeune that:
“Environmental officials here are taking precautionary measures to ensure drinking water is free from
possible contamination.”

“As a result of water sampling taken on 3 December, four wells in the Hadnot Point industrial area were
found to contain some traces of organic contamination.”

“none of the compounds noted in the test samples are listed in the regulations under the Safe Drinking
Water Act.”

“Testing is being conducted as part of a basewide confirmation study which is currently underway to
verify whether any groundwater contamination exists.”

“Daily water samples are being taken from the water treatment plant to ensure drinking water remains
within prescribed federal and state guidelines established by the Safe Drinking Water Act.”

“Every effort will be made to maintain the excellent quality water supply traditionally provided to the
residents of Camp Lejeune.”180

On 30 April 1985, the Commanding General of Camp Lejeune issued a Notice to Residents of Tarawa
Terrace informing them that two supply wells for TT were taken off line because “minute (trace)
amounts of several organic chemicals have been detected in the water.” The general then stated there
were no definitive State of Federal regulations for the “compounds” and that as a “precaution” he
ordered them closed. The remainder of the memo discussed the impending water shortages expected at
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Tarawa Terrace. At no point were the residents informed that well TT-23 had been used to supply water
to them after its closure.181 The next series of newspaper articles appeared in May 1985. The
Jacksonville Daily News titled their article “Chemical discovered in Lejeune water wells.” The article
informed the reader that:
“Substances found in the wells were described today as volatile organic chemical by Gunnery Sgt John
Simmons of Lejeune’s Joint Public Affairs Office. He said he had no information on whether the well
water was dangerous to humans.”182

The Wilmington Morning Star’s article was contained more details and false assurances than the Daily
News. The State head of the Water Supply Branch which regulates drinking water in North Carolina was
quoted as stating”
“he did not think Camp Lejeune residents need to worry about getting bad drinking water. I think we
kind of caught it right at the beginning.”

Another paper expanded this quote to include “It’s not something that has been running for two or
three years.”183

Base Spokesman Gunnery Sergeant John Simmons ended the article with what has become a standard
Marine Corps anthem regarding the Camp Lejeune drinking water contamination and then wrapped it in
a total fabrication.
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“Simmons stated that while there were no state or federal regulations that mandate an unacceptable
level of such contaminants in drinking water, “we ordered the closure of all wells that showed even a
trace amount.”184

These three articles and the general’s notice to Tarawa Terrace constituted the first notifications that
personnel and their families aboard Camp Lejeune received for an exposure that they could not touch,
taste, see nor hear. They were relying on the Marine Corps to protect them and their families and for
their trust they received and continue to receive betrayal.
As time passed between the discovery of the drinking water contamination and the news
reports the Marine Corps’ story began to change. An important point to remember is that Camp
Lejeune, like many military bases, has a large mobile population. Some families spent years at the base
while others rotated out over a period from months to years. By September of 1985, the Marine Corps’
story became more direct as evidenced by a quote from the base Environmental Engineer, Robert
Alexander, the same person who received Betz’s memo in January 1983 concerning Grainger’s tests
performed on the Hadnot Point and Tarawa Terrace WTPs and the water provided to the system’s
consumers:
“Alexander said the 22 sites are not considered dangerous because only trace amounts of
contamination have been found to have escaped from the dumps. He said that people had not been
directly exposed to the pollutants.”

“the last thing we want to find is that there is a large piece of Camp Lejeune that can’t be used because
of toxic waste disposal.”
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“Alexander said there is no clear relationship between the closing of the wells and any specific waste
site.”

“The way we got onto the well problem was in sampling near one of our fuel farms, or fuel storage
facilities. We sampled nearby wells. In one near the fuel farm, we didn’t detect fuel but did detect
organic solvents.” 185

The same article also informed the reader that:
“Eight (wells) had been tainted by small amounts of fuel and solvents used to clean weapons and
vehicles. Solvents found in two of the wells, in a residential neighborhood at the northern edge of the
base, have been tentatively linked to civilian dry-cleaning firms in nearby Jacksonville.”

“No one has been harmed by the wastes.”

“Linton (EPA) said the most serious problem at Camp Lejeune was contamination of the groundwater
with solvents that are suspected of causing cancer.”

“Col. Tiebout, Camp Lejeune’s assistant chief of staff for facilities characterized all of the actions so farclosing wells, relocating the day care center, and extensive testing-as precautionary measures.”186

In the public arena, fact was becoming fiction and the Marine Corps’ spin on what transpired at the base
between 1980 and 1984 was rapidly solidifying into reality. Behind the scenes, the EPA moved to force
Camp Lejeune onto the National Priority List (NPL) also known as the Superfund list. In a meeting which
took place at the base in November of 1985, Robert Alexander told the EPA that their contractor’s
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report was in error and resisted the idea of placing the base on the NPL.187 Somehow or another, the
EPA walked away with the idea that no contamination was detected in treated potable water at the
Hadnot Point WTP.188 Two weeks after this meeting, the treated water at the Hadnot Point WTP was
sampled and found to contain benzene in the extreme amount of 2,500 ppb.189 The analytical data
sheets for this test and a subsequent benzene finding several weeks later are both missing. There are no
known notifications of this finding to the residents at Camp Lejeune and the words “Not Representative”
were handwritten over the 14 November 1985 test results for the Hadnot Point WTP. The false
contention that people were not directly exposed to the pollutants appeared again in a media story
detailing the contamination written in January 1986.190
On Christmas Eve 1987, the Jacksonville Daily News again repeated Robert Alexander’s
September 1985 assertion that people had not been directly exposed to the pollutants. The paper also
informed the public that the EPA was considering Camp Lejeune for the NPL. The contamination steadily
devolved into “traces of TCE, DCE and PCE.” The fuel found at Hadnot Point had entirely disappeared in
the media. 191
Colonel Thomas Dalzell, Assistant Chief of Staff, Facilities was designated as the overall
coordinator for Camp Lejeune’s incorporation onto the National Priorities List. In February 1988, he was
featured in a question and answer press release which became the basis for several media news stories
on the drinking water contamination aboard the base.
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“Q. Is my health or the health of my family in any danger?

A. No it’s not. All the wells which we get our raw water out of are continually tested and the wells that
were identified as being contaminated have been closed off.”

“Q. What about prior to 1983?

A. At that time we were not aware of any of these particular compounds that might have been in the
ground water and we have no information that anyone’s health was in any danger at that time.”

“Q. What are the long term effects of exposure to these contaminants?
A. Heavy long term exposure to these chemicals could cause some health hazards, depending on the
amount of chemical ingested.”

Q. What was the source of the contamination?

A. Most of the sources of contamination were the motor pools that existed down in the Hadnot Point
area. At
that time oil, greases, solvents, gasoline and cleaning fluids and other types of
chemicals were just being dumped in the ground or dumped in sewers or things like that; and we
were really not aware back in the 60’s and 70’s of the effects on groundwater contamination. Now
we are more aware of these things and have taken appropriate precautions to ensure the ground
water contamination is not progressing any further.”192

How could the man placed in charge of coordinating the placement of Camp Lejeune on the NPL be
ignorant of the fact that warnings about the contamination began in October of 1980? Was his claim
that there was no knowledge of the drinking water contamination prior to 1983? Was this
misrepresentation fabricated by design or ignorance?
The massive Hadnot Point Fuel Farm fuel spill surfaced again in late 1988. The attention was
more than likely due to the impending release of O’Brien and Gere’s Final Report for the Contaminated
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Ground Water Study at Hadnot Point.193 The engineer’s report detailed large losses of fuel from the
HPFF and a fuel plume 15ft thick was identified floating in the semi confined aquifer at Hadnot Point.
Once again, Marine Corps statements in the media did not match up what was actually known at the
time. A Jacksonville Daily News article titled “Base officials study cleanup of fuel leaks” appeared in print
in October.
“leaks from an underground tank system were confined to an are two square blocks around the fuel
farm.”

“The spill is contained by the section’s natural flat terrain and water table conditions.”

“the number of gallons leaked is unknown.”

“Cleanup is expected to start after final design of a fuel recovery system. Recovered gasoline products
are expected to be recycled for use on the base.”194

By the following year, the base was ready for listing on the NPL and the old pattern of “no single source
had been found for the chemicals (solvents) along with the 1983 IAS conclusion that none of the 22 sites
selected for further investigation posed an immediate threat to human health were rehashed in the
media.195 Of the 22 sites, the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm was designated as the first site to be cleaned up
once Lejeune was placed on the Superfund list.196 Camp Lejeune was officially added to the NPL in
October 1989. Shortly before the base was listed on the NPL an article appeared in the base newspaper
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featuring Base Supervisory Chemist, Elizabeth Betz who had laboriously documented the early stages of
the contamination from May 1982 through January 1983.
“You’d have to look at each VOC individually, but many of them are carcinogens. That’s the main reason
we immediately shut the wells down, although the levels we found in the tests were not near the EPA
limit.”

“We were puzzled when the chemicals showed up. At first, we couldn’t figure out how it had gotten into
the Tarawa Terrace system. Then we looked across Highway 24. There were dry-cleaning businesses
right across the road from the housing area.”

“Once you have identified where the potential for a threat is, you start taking action to correct it. You
can not leave a contaminant in the groundwater.” 197

The Marine Corps controlled the message and information surrounding the details of the
drinking water contamination at Camp Lejeune. With the addition of Camp Lejeune onto the NPL, the
Marine Corps was required to establish and administrative record for public use. This repository is
located in the Onslow County Public Library. The problem is that a large number of personnel and
families exposed at Camp Lejeune no longer live near the base to have access and view the CERCLA
library. Beginning in the mid to late 2000’s, the Marine Corps placed portions of the administrative
record on the internet. The online library is known as the “Baker website.” This website is cumbersome
and largely unusable. A brief document library appeared on the USMC’s website but was removed after
the Congressional hearing in 2007. Without access to original sources of information, the affected
community is left to the mercy and whim of the Marine Corps. A breakthrough in gathering information
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occurred in 2007 with the release of ATSDR’s water model for Tarawa Terrace. The corresponding discs
contained electronic files of the Marine Corps’ Camp Lejeune Water document library and the Cercla
administrative record. Through these discs the affected community has had the opportunity to educate
ourselves and revisit the Marine Corps’ version of what happened at Camp Lejeune.
Our advantage is the Corps told their lies up front. The truth is in their documents and they do
tell a far different story than what the Marine Corps has asserted to the media and Congress. What is
now needed is for an authoritative body such as Congress to work objectively with the Marine Corps and
the affected community to ascertain what really happened at Camp Lejeune and what chemicals we
were exposed to in our drinking water aboard the base. The stumbling block is that our government is
the source and remedy for this issue and there is an inherent conflict of interest in securing the full and
objective co-operation of the various agencies capable of providing the answer and ultimate relief from
our exposures.
The recent Marine Corps informational brochure proudly boasts that the USMC has investigated
three separate times and found to be exonerated of blame in the contamination.198 Each of these prior
investigations occurred before the release of the initial electronic document library to the public and our
subsequent enlightenment of what transpired at Camp Lejeune during the contamination period. Both
the Commandant’s 2004 Blue Ribbon panel and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 2007
Report on Camp Lejeune share a common fatal flaw. Each report failed to identify the true extent of the
fuel problem at Hadnot Point, the Navy and Marine Corps’ own internal directives and standards for
potable water systems aboard Naval vessels and facilities, including Camp Lejeune and the Marine
Corps’s 1974 Base Order identifying Organic Solvents as hazardous materials. Each report failed to
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locate and interview the owner and lead chemist from Grainger Laboratory concerning the events in
1982. Instead, the reports relied on LantDiv and base employees who, to one degree or another,
seemed to suffer a collective form of selective memory. In fact, during the 2007 Congressional
“Poisoned Patriot’s” hearing, Chairman Bart Stupak asked the EPA’s Special Agent, Tyler Amon if he had
personally recommended that obstruction of justice charges be brought up against the former LantDiv
and base personnel who appeared to have been coached and were uncooperative with his investigation.
Agent Amon confirmed that he had identified areas of concern for obstruction of justice charges but
these recommendations were overruled by the Department of Justice.199This same department is
currently tasked with representing the government (the Navy and USMC) for any and all Federal Tort
claims filed because of the Camp Lejeune drinking water contamination. This blatant lack of objectivity
by the Department of the Navy continues to this day. Early this summer, the Secretary of the Navy
established a Camp Lejeune Assistance Team (CLAT) in response to the pressure placed upon the Navy
by Congress, the media and the affected community over the recent discoveries pertaining to the
Hadnot Point Fuel Farm and the electronic portal. The CLAT is tasked to provide a report to Secretary
Mabus. There is no input whatsoever from the affected community nor is there any shred of
independent oversight or objectivity. Members of the CLAT are required not to do anything which may
compromise the Navy;s legal defense against the families. All in all, the CLAT, as with the prior
government investigations into Camp Lejeune’s contaminated drinking water, sounds like a classic case
of the “Emperor’s New Clothes”
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Perhaps one the most important single recent event in the Camp Lejeune contaminated drinking
water story occurred last April when the ATSDR withdrew their flawed public health assessment (PHA)
for Camp Lejeune. The assessment was fraught with errors including but not limited to, improper usage
of exposure duration and dosage models used to characterize our risks for adverse health outcomes, the
disappearance of the assessments supporting references and interviews, and the omission of benzene
from the 1997 Camp Lejeune Public Health Assessment.200 The Camp Lejeune PHA failed to recognize
that our exposures on the base surpassed mere occupational settings. The models used to evaluate our
exposures failed to account for the fact that the resident population on the base was exposed 24 hours
a day and 7 days a week throughout the year. The PHA also underestimated the amount of
contaminated water consumed by the personnel exposed on the base. To add insult to injury, the
supporting interviews and documentation for the agency’s work on the assessment were allegedly
“accidently destroyed” by a contractor after the assessment was published. What this meant, was that
there was no way for other scientists or the affected community to fact check ATSDR’s work. The
breaking point for ATSDR came when members of the Community Assistance Panel (CAP) for Camp
Lejeune correctly identified that well HP-602 was discovered contaminated with fuel products while the
well was actively pumping water for the Hadnot Point Water Treatment Plant. ATSDR’s leadership found
their prior position that no direct proof existed that benzene was in our water, suddenly untenable. On
28 April 2009, the ATSDR withdrew their Camp Lejeune PHA at our CAP meeting held in Atlanta. This
event was the first time a PHA was withdrawn in the agencies history.
The ATSDR PHA for Camp Lejeune was not the only report which failed to address the benzene
exposure at Camp Lejeune. In June of last year, the National Research Council (NRC) released their
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controversial report on Camp Lejeune.201 This report was the result of well intended, but poorly
overseen legislation, in which the Department of the Navy was allowed to write the charge, or directions
to the scientist on how to conduct their review of scientific literature concerning the chemicals we were
exposed to at Camp Lejeune. The committee focused their efforts on PCE and TCE and omitted benzene
in their evaluations and assessments. I am not a scientist and thus not qualified to comment on the
specifics of why the report is flawed. This area has been openly addressed by other scientists including
one who participated in a peer review of the NRC report and who is present today as a witness before
the committee. I will defer discussion of the scientific issues about the validity of the NRC to Dr. Richard
Clapp of Boston University. However, there are some non scientific issues that have come to light
concerning the report. First and foremost, shortly after the report was released to the public, we
discovered that the National Academy of Science entered into a $600,000 contract with the Department
of Defense to effectively serve as the DOD’s hired gun and consultant for work at Camp Lejeune. What
was more disturbing was that the contract was negotiated and signed while the NRC committee was
engaged in their work on the Camp Lejeune NRC report.202 Earlier this year, we learned that the National
Academies quietly dissolved the contract with the DOD.
Shortly after the NRC report was released, the Marine Corps mailed a letter signed by Major
General Payne to every registrant with the Marine Corps for Camp Lejeune. The letter notified the
registrants that ATSDR withdrew their PHA for Camp Lejeune because of the omission of benzene
contamination but was written in such a way as to infer the NRC committee did review and assess the
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benzene exposures at Camp Lejeune.203 What is puzzling is that much of what we now know about the
benzene contamination was not provided to the NRC reviewers. Like ATSDR, there are no supporting
documents indicating that the NRC Committee members knew of the existence of up to 1.1 million
gallons of fuel lost into the groundwater at Camp Lejeune.204 It is a mystery how the Marine Corps and
Major General Payne are able to conclude that the NRC did indeed evaluate and assess our benzene
exposures in the drinking water at Camp Lejeune.
Just how did the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm’s massive fuel loss escape the attention of ATSDR in
their 1997 PHA? We may never know the complete answer to that question but what the historical
documents make clear is that ATSDR should have known about our benzene exposures, investigated
them and assessed the risk of those exposures. The Navy and Marine Corps were also complicit in
casting a shroud over the fuel losses at the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm. It was their base, their facility where
the contamination occurred, their documents detailed the extent of the contamination and their people
were the ones exposed. The Navy and Marine Corps had a moral obligation to ensure the State and
Federal regulatory agencies, especially the ATSDR knew we were exposed to benzene. If the
subcontractor for the ATSDR had not found the UST portal in 2009, just when did the Navy and Marine
Corps plan to disclose the fuel losses at Hadnot Point? Was this a game of catch me if you can?
The defunct ATSDR PHA did contain a reference to a Marine Corps sponsored report on the
Hadnot Point Industrial Area issued in May of 1988. Contained on page 18 of 373 is a statement by the
contractor in which benzene was described as a contaminant in well 602. The lost fuel was also found in
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the deep aquifer at Hadnot Point.205 There was no excuse for the personnel working for ATSDR at that
time to have missed this vital fact which confirmed benzene was a major contaminant at Camp Lejeune.
However, with this being said, once it was established that the ATSDR was in error, the 1997 PHA for
Camp Lejeune was rescinded. The same was not true for the polluter. Instead of acknowledging their
role in the omission of benzene in the PHA by ATSDR, the Navy and Marine Corps leveled sole blame at
the ATSDR:
“If benzene was not fully addressed in the PHA, it was not for lack of data.” 206

According to Col Tokarz’s March 1988 letter concerning the Hadnot Point Fuel farm, the
upcoming Technical Review Committee (TRC) was slated to discuss the details about the HPFF and fully
explain the situation to the members of the committee which included the community and
representatives of the EPA. 207 Four months later, the first TRC meeting took place aboard Camp
Lejeune. The TRC was a requirement of CERCLA and served to bring the affected community, DOD and
EPA together to discuss developments for cleaning up the base. When the time came to discuss the
Hadnot Point Fuel Farm, as promised in Tokarz’s letter, something entirely different happened:
Cheryl Barnett, LantDiv: “Well, they’re part of the other 22 sites that we said we are looking at, we just
don’t have any data to present to you today.”208
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Earlier in the meeting, the base environmental engineer was asked what kind of readings were found in
the water samples from the 1980’s. Mr. Alexander who was present during that time period and fulfilled
the role of base environmental engineer stated:
“We had very little, if any data, before we realized our groundwater was contaminated.”209

Why the deception? In December 1988, the O’Brien and Gere Contaminated Ground Water Study for
Camp Lejeune was released. The report identified two pools of free floating gasoline in the groundwater
at Hadnot Point. The engineers were unable to clearly define the exact boundaries and extent of the
plumes. Clearly, the fuel contamination was much worse than the 23,150 to 33,150 gallons cited in base
inventory records.210
Sometime between 1985 and 1990, the Navy moved handling of the HPFF fuel loss problem to
LantDiv’s Underground Storage Tank Program. We have been unable to ascertain the exact date and
how this was accomplished. The Navy stated in their 2009 written responses to Senator Burr and Hagan
that:
“After 1986, the sites were evaluated to determine whether they were under the CERCLA, in which the
EPA or RCRA, in which the state has primacy. In 1988 it was determined that corrective action at the
HPFF fell under RCRA and therefore the State of North Carolina had primacy.” 211

Apparently, the Navy and Marine Corps forgot to inform the EPA of their evaluation. There was another
problem with their arbitrary determination. The CERCLA vs. RCRA delineations did not apply if mixed
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contaminants were present. If mixed contaminants were present at a Superfund site, CERCLA is primary.
The issue came to a head at a TRC meeting in July of 1990. During the meeting, Camp Lejeune officials
informed the EPA representative that HPFF was not part of the Federal Facilities Agreement and thus
out of the purview of the EPA. Base officials advised the EPA that a fuel recovery system for the HPFF
was finalized and ready for bidding. Once bidding was completed, the Navy and Marine Corps were
ready to begin remediation of the shallow aquifer around the HPFF. The EPA representative, Victor
Weeks, disagreed and advised the attendees of the meeting there was a mixing of solvent plumes and
fuel plumes and as such, the groundwater cleanup in the HPIA is all interconnected.
“Just because it’s an underground storage tank at this point doesn’t matter to us because we have a combined
plume.” Mr. Weeks went on to conclude: “If this was an isolated area separated from Hadnot Point, we could
agree with that (Handling under the state’s UST program) we feel like it’s part of the CERCLA program as well”.

He also warned that the Navy was doing work at their own risk.212
By April of 1992, Mr. Weeks was no longer the EPA representative working on Camp Lejeune.
The EPA replacement received a letter from Paul Rakowski at LantDiv requesting that the HPFF be
exempt from CERCLA under the petroleum exclusion because Jet Fuel was the only source of
contamination at the HPFF.213 Shortly afterwards the HPFF was officially moved to the RCRA program
and under the purview of the State of North Carolina. The result of this move was the HPFF was dropped
from CERCLA and corresponding reports pertaining to CERCLA sites on the base. For example, the 1994
Final Remedial Investigation Report for Operable Unit 1 (Sites 21, 24 and 78 in the Hadnot Point
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Industrial Area) mentions the existence of the HPFF within the Operable Unit, but then the report added
that:
“Since the fuel farm area is a UST problem, it is not included as part of the CERCLA RI/FS process, but is
being handled as a separate study under the UST Program.”214

Another result of the move from RCRA to CERCLA was that documents pertaining to the UST Program
were not required to be filed for public view in the CERCLA Administrative Record. This is evident when
one compares the CERCLA administrative records file to what was filed with the State of North Carolina.
The end result was that control of information concerning the Hadnot Point Fuel Farm lay at the
discretion of the Navy and what reports they chose to submit to the State of North Carolina. The EPA
was effectively out of the HPFF picture.
A July 1994 court recorded public hearing was held at Camp Lejeune concerning the proposed
clean up for the Hadnot Point Industrial area, except the HPFF. A base representative was asked why
there was no public hearing for the HPFF. Neal Paul, The base Installation Restoration Program Manager
for Camp Lejeune responded:
“There are some public relations requirements and this predates me.”

Mr. Paul failed to answer the question and advised the attendees of the meeting:
“to date there’s like 25,000 gallons of gasoline from the inventory records that were shown to be missing. And to
date we have recovered about 20,000 gallons of gasoline.”
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“but the plume treatment is pretty close to being remediated.”

“If you get 75% of the free product that you think you spilled into the groundwater, then you’re doing a great
job, and 20 out of 25 is almost 80 percent. So, we done probably as good as we can do.”

“And that is really one of our big success stories.”

“From the people I’ve talk to in the state agree it is a success.” 215

Two years later a partnering meeting hosted by Mr. Paul was held at Camp Lejeune. The attendees
included base officials, the Navy’s contractor for the remediation work on the base, representatives
from the State of North Carolina, EPA and personnel from LantDiv. The meeting was not open to the
public. A contractor for the Navy advised the attendees that based on data from an engineering
contractor working on the HPFF, an estimated 800,000 gallons of fuel had been lost at the HPFF and
benzene was appearing in the deep aquifer.216 Notably absent from the meeting were representatives
from the ATSDR. The ATSDR 1997 PHA for Camp Lejeune was still in draft form at the time of the
meeting. The brief reference to the 800,000 gallon fuel loss was the only place we have found in the
entire CERCLA library which quantified the size and scope of the fuel plumes at Hadnot Point and is
more than the disclosed 23,150 to 33,150 gallons lost in Marine Corps inventory records.
The former base Fleet Service and Refueling area was located within 300 feet and up-gradient
from well HP-602. Buildings 1100, 1111, 1115 and seven underground storage tanks comprised the
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facility. The USTs were intra-connected to the fuel farm by underground piping.217 The facility served as
a service station from 1957-1965, and administrative office from 1965-1972, a data processing center
1972-1976 and a printing plant from 1976-1986.218The tanks were removed from the ground in 1993
and the contents of the tanks were described as diesel fuel and gasoline.219Building 1115 turned out to
be a separate and distinct source of fuel loss at the Hadnot Point Industrial Area. Last week the Navy
released many of the documents on the web portal discovered by ATSDR last year to the public. We are
currently reviewing this previously undisclosed document library and we are finding indications organic
solvents were mixed in the fuel plume at this site. As far as we know, no specific risk assessment or
remedial investigation was ever performed for building 1115. Instead, the Navy sent a letter to the State
of North Carolina advising the State that building 1115 was being incorporated into the Hadnot Point
Fuel Farm and the two were handled as one site.220 Who gave the Navy the authority to make this
decision and why was it not challenged by the EPA? Building 1115 was only mentioned in the CLW and
CERLCA libraries. The extent of the contamination found in the groundwater underneath the former
Fleet Service and Refueling Area was not previously disclosed to ATSDR. Details of the contaminants
found at building 1115 are currently surfacing as we review the documents. The concealment of
building 1115 did not stop with ATSDR. In 1991 the EPA queried the Navy whether USTs existed at
building 1100/1115.221 Paul Rakoswki from LantDiv responded that a leaking 55 gallon drum of PCE was
found at the site but failed to answer the EPA’s question on the USTs.222 If one agency of our
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government chooses to misrepresent and conceal material facts to Federal regulators in another agency
and nothing happens when the truth is revealed, where is the accountability?
It is now thirteen years since the release of the 1997 Public Health Assessment for Camp
Lejeune and the community still has no clear answer to what happened to us while we or our loved ones
served our country. Our country has seen a renewed appreciation for our volunteer military and the
sacrifices made by our fighting men, women and their families. It is hard to drive down the road without
seeing a “support the troops” ribbon on someone’s car. How can we profess respect for our military
personnel and families when in their time of need, this country not only abandoned them but
abandoned their families as well. We trusted the Marine Corps would do the right thing for their
Marines and their families. We trusted that the EPA and the State of North Carolina would ensure the
Marine Corps fully disclosed the extent of the contamination at Camp Lejeune. The subtitle of this
hearing is “Looking back, Moving Froward.” We looked back and found the Marine Corps’ statements do
not match the historical documents. We cannot move forward with understanding the Camp Lejeune
drinking water contamination unless there is a full disclosure from the Navy and Marine Corps. We can
not rely on the agencies of the Executive branch to provide our answers. The Department of Defense
was the polluter. The Department of Justice (DoJ) represents the government for all claims brought
against the Navy and Marine Corps and overruled the EPA special agent investigating government wrong
doing at Camp Lejeune. Congress is where this issue must be resolved. What other measures has the DoJ
taken to bolster their defense for the government? Our exposures are known and well documented. The
negligence of the Marine Corps is clear. There are thousands of Marines, Sailors, their family members
and base employees who were sickened by he fouled water at Camp Lejeune. When will this country
fulfill our commitment to support the troops?
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APPENDIX F: CAMP LEJEUNE DIGITAL COMMUNITY ARCHIVE
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Screen Shot of TimelineJS Digital Timeline: Camp Lejeune, A Toxic Legacy 1953-1987,
WWW.TFTPTF.COM.
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Screen shot of Camp Lejeune Community Digital Database of records.
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Screenshot of Camp Lejeune Community Historical Timeline of events.
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